

U.S.-Foreign relations - Spanish American

# DEFENSE OF THE AMERICAS

by

LIVINGSTON HARTLEY



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"OUR MAGINOT LINE"

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
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# DEFENSE OF THE AMERICAS

LIVINGSTON HARTLEY

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"OUR MAGINOT LINE"  
in the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies

## FOREWORD

This is a crucial hour for America. Confronting a European cataclysm which may destroy the past foundations of our Atlantic security and appropriating over three billions for defense, we have no more vital problem today than that of safeguarding our American heritage. Every internal issue is overshadowed by the question of what is the safest and surest road to that goal.

This question, so acute today, was foreseen and examined in concrete terms last year in "Our Maginot Line," the greater part of which has been substantiated by subsequent events.

This pamphlet, reprinting some of the most pertinent parts of "Our Maginot Line" and indicating as it does the problems which America must face should the Allies lose in the present European war, makes an important contribution to the problems involved in America's security. The Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies is therefore glad to aid in the distribution of the pamphlet. Opinions expressed are of course those of the author.

CLARK M. EICHELBERGER

*New York*

*June, 1940*



## OUR HISTORIC SECURITY

OUR AMERICAN heritage has been built upon bountiful gifts from geography and history, upon unsurpassed concentrations of mineral and agricultural wealth, abundant harbors, navigable rivers, a healthy climate, an energetic, progressive people, and a virgin continent upon which to write a new and better chapter of the human story. But this chapter could not have been written in so free and flowing a hand if our people had been menaced, harassed or thwarted by interference or invasion from abroad. We could not have created our Twentieth Century America without national security, and we cannot, without national security, preserve what we have created through the coming years.

This safety of our nation and our hemisphere has to some extent been assured by our naval and military defenses. But, unless we cling still to the happy theory that one American can always lick a dozen foreigners, we have to admit that during most of our history our armed forces have been entirely inadequate to cope with those of the swaggering empires of Europe. So we must look deeper, into strategic and political realities, for the underlying causes of our historic inviolability, and here we find three great pillars on which it has rested for more than a century and on which it still rests today.

### DISTANCE

The first and most obvious of these is the distance that separates us from both Europe and Asia. The width of the Atlantic has always prevented any European nation from exerting more than a fraction of its power in our hemisphere, and, as sail has given way to steam and made navies dependent on fuel supplies, the value of the Atlantic as a barrier against Europe has increased.

Today many battleships and cruisers possess a range of action sufficient for trans-Atlantic operations, but no fleet can put to sea in war without a protecting screen of destroyers whose



average radius without refueling is little more than 2,000 miles. So, despite all the progress that has been made in naval construction, our thousands of leagues of ocean still contribute mightily to our security

Even if our Battlefleet were confined to the Pacific by a sudden and successful blow against the Panama Canal, no European Power would dare attempt either an invasion of the United States or a close blockade of our Atlantic ports unless it had first established a naval base in our hemisphere. Burdened by a train of colliers, tankers and supply ships, no fleet would be safe near our Coast in the face of attacks by our submarines, destroyers and shore-based bombers, if this burden were multiplied by a vulnerable convoy of a hundred or more transports, the would-be invader would risk almost certain disaster.

Distance can thus preserve us now from serious danger at home, but it cannot preclude all damage. A strong hostile navy could always attempt "hit and run" raids against some of the more exposed ports on our long coastline. And while enemy bombers could not yet attack New York from Europe, a few planes from a carrier, or even from a cruiser or converted merchant vessel, might succeed in dropping a limited number of bombs on our Eastern cities. But danger from the air, like danger from the sea, could only become really serious if the distance obstacle were eliminated by establishment of bases in our hemisphere.

Our Atlantic barrier narrows in two places to less than 1,800 miles, in the north between Ireland and Newfoundland, and in the south between Africa and Brazil. The first of these "narrows" does not affect our hemisphere security due to our unique relationship with Canada, but the second would reduce it drastically and face us with some crucial defensive problems if Germany won in Europe and inherited the West African Coast.

Since the Pacific is so much wider than the Atlantic, its protective value is considerably greater. Our West Coast, shielded by the strong and strategically situated Hawaiian base, is entirely out of danger from anything more serious than

minor raids. And unless the Japanese push their outposts into our half of the Pacific, the vast extent of this ocean will continue to form a valuable bulwark of South America against Asiatic attack. For Chile and Peru do not face any "narrows" opposite a potentially dangerous bulge of the Eastern Hemisphere, but look out instead upon thousands of leagues of rolling waters.

Only Alaska is within easy range of Asia, and a defensive problem could only develop there if the bleak wastes on the Siberian side of Bering Strait were built up into a power base by a nation liable to clash with us in the Pacific. There appears little prospect of trouble here unless Japan should first expel Russia from the entire Siberian Coast, and then carry out a colossal program of northeasterly development.

#### OVERSEAS BALANCES OF POWER

The second pillar of our historic security, carrying even more weight than the first, has been the balance of power on the far sides of our two oceans.

How the rivalries of Europe have contributed to the safety, welfare and peaceful growth of the United States is stressed again and again by Professor Bemis in his recent survey of our diplomatic history.<sup>1</sup> These rivalries first brought us French aid and thus final success in our struggle for independence. They subsequently induced Napoleon to sell us Louisiana, made the Monroe Doctrine tenable, permitted us to progress our Republican way in a world of kings and emperors, and prevented foreign intervention in our Civil War and foreign assistance to Spain in 1898. For over a century no European Power, facing potential enemies of comparable strength in its own backyard, has been in a position to contemplate an attack upon the United States.

Today, when we have grown to a stature greater than that of those Powers who once loomed so big across the ocean, a continuance of these rivalries would seem almost adequate to

1. Bemis, Professor Samuel Flagg, "A Diplomatic History of the United States," New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1936.



keep our Atlantic defense an academic issue. But if they are terminated by a German victory which makes Europe a bloc of nations subservient to Berlin instead of a Continent divided against itself, this pillar of our historic security will be split in half. The immense power of Europe will then be liberated to operate freely in the Atlantic.

A similar balance between Russia and Japan has developed in Asia during the last forty years. Swaying since 1931 with ever more violent oscillations, it has impelled Japan to direct her energies towards the Asiatic Continent instead of towards the Pacific.

Yet we are witnessing even now what may be the prelude to the destruction of this balance, for if Japan can hold and partially consolidate the grip her militarists have already fastened on China, her prospects of success in her aim to drive Russia out of Eastern Siberia will be more auspicious than ever before.

If this happens, we shall confront across the Pacific a Japanese Empire controlling virtually the entire coast of Eastern Asia, strengthened by new economic resources which will eliminate much of her present dependence on the West for essential raw materials, and free her to direct her expansive momentum in our direction.

To appreciate properly how these European and Asiatic balances serve America, it is necessary to bear in mind certain fundamental characteristics of our world position.<sup>2</sup> For though we divide the world in maps and in thought equally into two hemispheres, our Western is but a fraction of the Eastern in size and resources, and contains only one seventh as many people.

The power of the Eastern Hemisphere is not concentrated in its central plateaus, but in its two extremities which face the Americas. Each one of these forms a power bloc comprising over half a billion people, whereas our entire hemi-

2. For a more extended treatment of our long-term relationship with the European and Far Eastern power blocs, see "Is America Afraid?", by the author, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1937

sphere, lying between the two, contains no more than 230,000,000. Of the two, Eastern Asia is far the weaker, since its total industrial capacity is greatly inferior to that of the United States, and must require long decades of development before it can reach our level. Europe, on the other hand, despite the fact that its industrial output has been restricted by internal political divisions and economic barriers, produces even now more than fifty per cent more steel, coal and electricity than our entire hemisphere.

So the European bloc alone could cast ominous shadows over the Americas if its superior human and material resources, now dispersed among conflicting nations, were brought under centralized control. And the Far Eastern bloc, under the same circumstances, could cast comparable if lesser shadows tomorrow if not today. Should the future bring such unification of resources in both these blocs simultaneously, our two flanks would be menaced by overwhelming forces which together might bring our centuries of progress to a tragic conclusion.

These two potent extremities of Eurasia need have little basic conflict of interest, since their spheres of influence would meet in the arid, lightly peopled expanses of Central Asia. But they would each have fundamental causes of conflict with us, as long as our restrictive tariff and immigration policies and our Monroe Doctrine blocked their full enjoyment of the vast mineral and agricultural resources of our sparsely populated hemisphere. It would be again the old story of the "haves" and the "have nots," this time on an inter-continental scale, since the two Americas form the outstanding "have" region of the globe, with many times more natural wealth per capita than either congested Europe or teeming Eastern Asia.

These considerations are, of course, long-range rather than immediate, but they show in large perspective how the maintenance of some sort of balance of power in Europe and the Far East safeguards the two Americas. They also cast revealing light upon our dubious wisdom in failing to employ our present world primacy to block German and Japanese drives designed to destroy these balances, by intruding upon us a very unpleasant thought: that our final destiny as a nation



is likely to be determined not by what we do in our own hemisphere, but by the political development of the billion people who inhabit the two extremities of Eurasia.

Which of these balances is the more essential to our safety is a pertinent question here, since surface appearances point one way and the instinct of our people the other. It is evident that the Far Eastern balance is now being attacked with the greater violence. It is also evident that our Pacific position is more "front line" than our Atlantic, since only our own Navy lies between the Asiatic Weltmacht-seeker and our Coast, and that we have found it wise for some years to support this position by keeping our Battlefleet at Californian bases. Finally, we have in the dangerously exposed Philippines a territorial "involvement" in Asia that we do not have in Europe. Yet, despite all these facts, our people are far more absorbed in the European struggle, and show a greater anxiety as to how the outcome in Europe may affect our country

There are four reasons to believe that our people are right in judging our menace from Europe as the more serious and the more crucial of the two.

1. Even if the fulfillment of Japan's "divine mission" proceeds with the speed and precision of her military advance in China, it will take her many years to make most of China another functioning "Manchoukuo" and drive Russia out of the Maritime Provinces. It will then take her many more years to develop the resources of these areas sufficiently to enable her to face the United States on equal terms. So her way to a bid for Pacific supremacy must be long as well as steep, blocked by a succession of obstacles which many observers believe beyond her capacity to surmount.

Germany, on the other hand, might succeed in consolidating her Munich gains and reducing the British barrier to Weltmacht at a much more imminent date. In this event, she would possess already a power position comparable with that of the United States, and so be able to initiate at once the first stages of a drive on South America.

2. German military prowess and "war potential" are greatly

superior to Japanese. Here Germany showed her capacity, when she withstood for over four years a coalition which finally included most of the world, whereas Japan has yet to show her ability to match the West on the battlefield. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 was hardly a case in point.

3. The Atlantic is much narrower than the Pacific, and the East Coast of South America faces a potential strategic menace in Africa while the West Coast looks out upon the broadest stretch of water on the globe. The British and French islands subject to "inheritance" by a victorious Germany, moreover, are much nearer to our Coast and the Panama Canal than any of their South Sea holdings liable to be seized during war by Japan.

4. Due to the traditional intimacy between Latin America and Europe and greater similarities of races and culture, a German economic and ideological drive south of our borders is much more to be feared than corresponding efforts by the Japanese.

When these four considerations are weighed, it seems clear that the immediate problem of preserving our hemisphere security is more closely concerned with the issue in Europe, and, further, that, however our danger from Asia may grow in later decades, it can only become acute now if Japan aligns herself with Germany during war in Western Europe and gains thereby new island bases in our half of the Pacific.

#### BRITISH SEAPOWERS

The third pillar of our historic security buttresses the second on its Atlantic side, guaranteeing that the second shall not fall even if its foundations are temporarily shaken by changes of balance in Continental Europe. Despite the fact that it is set in the sea, it has proved to be both solid and strong during the lives of four generations. This pillar is the protection afforded to the two Americas by the British Navy ever since the Monroe Doctrine first took its place among the most portentous pronouncements of history

Though the Doctrine sprang from the initiative of the British



Foreign Secretary, Canning, who suggested three months prior to its enunciation that the United States and Great Britain should issue a joint declaration of opposition to "projects" of any of the European Powers "which looks to a forcible enterprise for reducing the colonies to subjugation, on the behalf or in the name of Spain, or which meditates the acquisition of any part of them to itself, by cession or by conquest,"<sup>3</sup> our Government preferred to state its position on this question unilaterally. Yet our power was then entirely inadequate to have prevented intervention in Latin America by the Holy Alliance or France, so the fact that the Doctrine remained unchallenged must be attributed primarily to the opposition towards such intervention shown by the unquestioned masters of the European and Atlantic waves.

This British support of the Monroe Doctrine was not based upon altruistic motives, but upon two vital British interests, trade and the security of the Cape route to India. The first of these would have been seriously impaired, and an expected opportunity for investment curtailed as well, if the Powers of Europe had carved South America into colonies and spheres of influence. And the second would have been undermined if rival Great Powers had established naval bases on the eastern shores of the South Atlantic.

From the day of President Monroe until almost the eve of our War with Spain, excepting only the decade of the sixties when our sea armaments temporarily reached formidable proportions, our Navy was puny in comparison with the armadas of Europe. Yet during this long period, the Monroe Doctrine achieved its purpose, not because it was a successful bluff, but because behind it loomed the potential threat of British seapower. An analogous situation persisted even into the early years of this century, when the Kaiser, with all his ambition and yearning for "a place in the sun," and with a navy which could have defied our own in the South Atlantic, never dared try to reach firmly for any of the many sunlit lands of South America. Not even a Tirpitz would have tempted fate by

3. Clark, J. Reuben, Under-Secretary of State, "Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine," Washington, Department of State, December 17, 1928, p. 94.

sailing into the Atlantic while the superior British Fleet remained in the North Sea athwart his communications.

Our homeland also has benefited so directly from this Atlantic "pax Britannica" that we were able to contemplate serenely the ambitious kings of Europe for decades at a time without effective naval protection of our own. For no European Power or combination of Powers could afford to undertake an offensive against our shores without first securing an iron-bound guarantee of non-intervention from London, and no British Government would have been so foolish as to lend such negative assistance to her European rivals at the obvious expense of its own Atlantic position, its Canadian Dominion and its larger world interests.

Even now, when we are prepared and able to guard our own shores and hemisphere with our own ships, we still derive vast advantages from Britain's seapower. These are shown in the striking paradox that, despite universal rearmament, the waxing of the Fascist International, and the progressive deterioration of the European outlook, we have been able to concentrate our Battlefleet in the Pacific some 4,900 miles from New York. Today, as in the last century, the aggressive Powers of Europe cannot push their designs on South America beyond propaganda and economic offensives while the Royal Navy controls their egress to the Atlantic in the North Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar.

The value to us of this British capacity to protect our hemisphere from Europe with such ease depends largely upon the nature of Anglo-American relations. Were these strained to the breaking point, the Royal Navy might conceivably lead Europe against us in a titanic Atlantic struggle. Fortunately, as the whole world now knows, our harmonious relationship with the British Empire is unparalleled by any precedent of history in the size, number and importance of its interwoven strands.

There is no need here to portray yet again the many bonds and interests<sup>4</sup> making up this relationship, which far outweigh

4. For these see "Is America Afraid?", op. cit., pp. 234-254 and 113-123.



our rivalry in export markets, and which, as democracy and decency are extinguished elsewhere, develop rather than diminish the community of attitude of the English-speaking peoples. It is sufficient to list only the more salient, such as trade amounting to over one-third of our total foreign commerce, mutual investments measured in billions, intangible but highly important ties of common origin, language and institutions, parallel interests in South America and the Far East, and a similar desire for peace with the rest of the world. All these ties, moreover, are now knit closer every year by the growing influence of Canada and the other Dominions in the British Commonwealth which, because their views are so akin to our own, draws London ever nearer to Washington.

How these bonds and interests, in their sum total, have bulwarked our world position has been shown in the last decade. They have ruled out war between the United States and the British Empire, both because it is actually "unthinkable" to their peoples, and because, owing to the position of Canada, such a war would lead to the destruction of the British Commonwealth of Nations. They have also created a common conviction in these dangerous days that every time either Britain or the United States adds a battleship or cruiser to its Fleet, the world interests of both are directly benefited.

When we view the modern German Question in the light of this relationship, the history of a hundred years, and the ABC's of naval strategy, we can only draw one conclusion, namely, that the Weltmacht drive cannot extend across the Atlantic as long as the Royal Navy rules its eastern waves. No matter how mighty the Reich may grow in Europe, she cannot strike at South America while British seapower is maintained, for even if the threat of Goering's bombers could cow London into allowing the German Fleet a westward passage, the mere possibility that British intervention might subsequently materialize would preclude Atlantic adventure by Germany's Admirals. Only by first reducing the barrier of the British Navy could she hope to lay her hands upon the weaker Republics of our American Hemisphere.

We have, consequently, a vital national interest in the preser-

vation of Britain's power on the Atlantic. It is not the maintenance of her great Empire, of her wealth or of her internal welfare and prosperity that is essential for America, it is the assurance that her seapower shall continue to act as a buffer between Europe and us. For this buffer contributes to our safety as directly as French power contributes to the safety of England. It is only a less indispensable protection because we have greater capacity to face the consequences if it is destroyed.

Thus, if Germany wins in Europe, upon us alone will fall the task of preserving the Monroe Doctrine and our Atlantic defense, no light and easy task as will be seen. Her victory would shatter the third pillar of our historic security, and crumble the Atlantic half of the second by destroying that balance on the Continent which has always impeded its westward thrusts. Europe, consolidated in varying degrees beneath Germany's rulers, would be able, for the first time in history, to turn its concentrated power towards the two Americas.

Only our first security pillar of distance would remain standing then as a protection on the Atlantic. And this, tapering dangerously in the "narrows" between Africa and Brazil, would become progressively more shaky as modern implements of war increase their range.



## OUR MAGINOT LINE

EVEN THOSE Americans most suspicious of diplomatic dealings with the outer world realize today that there is a limit to isolation. Few of them would seriously claim that the United States, despite all its great wealth of natural resources, could live and prosper without the raw materials we receive from our neighbors to the south. Few of them would abandon the Monroe Doctrine, restrict our national defense to the protection of our shores and insular possessions, and watch passively from the sidelines while European or Asiatic Powers established "Manchoukuos" in South America.

The spread of war and violence in the Eastern Hemisphere has convinced us as a people of the value and the necessity of our traditional policy towards the Western. Once again, as the unholy alliance of militarism and Fascism appears ready to fill the shoes of the more restrained Holy Alliance of a century ago, we find it essential that overseas autocracies shall not "extend their system" to our side of the world. An issue long dormant has come again to life, and has generated a growing interest in Latin America, its trade and its problems, and a growing preoccupation with the efforts of Germany, Italy and Japan to increase their influence south of our border by subsidized trade offensives and propaganda drives.

The defensive frontier set up in the Monroe Doctrine, and reaffirmed by the President in his widely quoted press conference of November 15, 1938, on "continental defense," we may call our Maginot Line. For it extends over our most vulnerable front, the area where an enemy from overseas is most likely to strike. And as long as it can be held intact, there is little chance that the United States will be endangered. But if it falls one day before direct assault or subversive sapping, permitting a Germanized Europe to establish bases and satellites south of Panama, there are reasons to believe that the days of our free, democratic America will be numbered.

An independent and friendly South America performs two

vital functions for the United States, one economic and the other strategic. It furnishes us with tropical products and essential raw materials we do not possess in adequate quantities at home, and without which our cities, industries and defensive power must rapidly deteriorate. And it provides us with a far-flung protective cover for our Caribbean position and the Panama Canal, a cover which would become a deadly menace in hostile hands.

## ECONOMIC RESERVOIR

The Navy and War Departments list twenty-two strategic raw materials which the United States lacks either partially or wholly, and so must import from abroad. Most of these however, are obtained now, or could be obtained in the future with adequate preparation and development of potential sources, from the two Americas. Thus virtual self-sufficiency, while quite out of the question for the United States, is a practicable goal on a hemisphere scale.<sup>1</sup>

Latin America can furnish us with the wool, leather, cane sugar, coffee and sisal hemp we need, and Canada, under any conditions we need envisage, can continue to supply our nickel. For some products, such as shellac, camphor and many medicinal supplies, we could turn under dire necessity to synthetic substitutes, and others, such as jute, we could replace with more expensive materials. The greater part of our silk needs could be met by rayon, which is now reported to be even suitable for parachute fabrics, and where relatively small amounts of real silk were indispensable, as for ordnance, the industry now existing in California could be expanded.

Coconut shells and Manila hemp now come from across the Pacific, but both of these could be obtained in the quantities we need from our American tropics after two or three years of investment and intensive development. If our tungsten im-

1. The following conclusions concerning essential raw materials are based upon Talbot, Lieutenant Commander Melvin F., U.S.N., "Our Armor of Self-Containment," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October, 1937, checked and modified as a result of personal research among appropriate authorities.



ports from Asia were interrupted, rationing and high-pressure home production could fill our requirements.

The serious weaknesses in our hemisphere self-sufficiency boil down to four: lack of enough rubber, manganese, chromite ore and tin. There appears no imminent integral cure for these weaknesses, although much could be done to relieve them with adequate foresight, energy and expenditure.

While the United States consumes normally nearly half the world's rubber output, only some two per cent is produced in our hemisphere. Because expansion of South American production would necessarily be a lengthy process, no matter on how large a scale it were undertaken, a sudden interruption of our East Indian and Malayan supplies would face us with a serious problem. Stocks on hand, reclamation and drastic economies could tide us over for at least a year, but for any longer period we could only satisfy our needs by following Germany into the laboratory, check-book in hand. Even then our heavy requirements for automobile tires would remain a problem, because the synthetic product has so far proved less satisfactory for this than for other purposes. But our rubber deficiencies, grave though they might be, could not halt the wheels of our industries, they could at the worst only spell hardship and expense for so automobile-minded a people.

Far more crucial a problem is our need for manganese, which is absolutely indispensable to the steel industry, and so to all our industry and our national defense. Almost all our home supplies are of very low grade ore, which has not yet been found suitable in the production of high grade steel, our largest sources of supply Russia and the Gold Coast, are both in the Eastern Hemisphere, and only about one-fifth of our imports normally come from the Western. In view of these facts, there is serious doubt whether maximum expansion of Latin American production and the widest utilization of our home ores could fill our minimum needs either for peace or for war.

Our chromite problem is analogous, since our own supplies are low grade. Latin American output is limited, and we are

thus dependent on trans-oceanic sources. And our tin situation is not as happy as the fame of the Bolivian mines has long made it sound, since these mines are now believed to be failing and only produce about one-third of the amounts we normally import.

The existing deficiency of the two Americas in these three minerals, and particularly in manganese, is thus a flaw in our hemisphere position for defense. Yet today, while there is still time, efforts can be made to decrease our danger from this flaw and to undertake exploration and research which may eliminate it.

Any imminent peril could be precluded by storage of reserve supplies, as provided for in the Thomas Bill, introduced into the Senate on May 12, 1938. It is estimated by the Navy Department that an expenditure of \$100,000,000, spread, if desirable, over a number of years, would provide supplies not only of these minerals, but of all essential minerals necessary for our industries for a two-year period. Such provision is a wise defensive measure, which would add economy to safety during war by preventing prices of these minerals, and hence prices of all metal manufactures, from skyrocketing to stratospheric heights. Our legislators were finally convinced, after two decades of effort, that our Fleet, to be efficient, must have cruisers and auxiliaries, and they now appear to be becoming convinced that the Fleet loses much of its defensive value without adequate bases. Let us hope that they will next realize the importance of mineral storage to our security and that, this time, the process of realization will not take so long.

Such foresight would tide us over temporarily, whatever happened overseas, and provide us with a margin of safety during which a more fundamental solution of this problem could be sought. Two approaches toward this would be endowment of exhaustive searches for new mineral sources in the Andes and Brazil, with subsidized development of such sources if found, and a national effort to promote new processes for utilizing our own low grade ores.

Despite these present deficiencies, however, it is within our



capacity to ensure our existence behind our Maginot Line in the event that military autocracies should deny us access to the Eastern Hemisphere. And this could only happen during a war in which hostile European and Asiatic Powers possessed effective control of the other sides of our two oceans, a situation which could only be brought about by the prior destruction of British seapower.

Should such cataclysmic events overseas shut us within our hemisphere, we would undoubtedly suffer exceedingly through the loss of over two-thirds of our foreign markets, the consequent paralysis of our foreign trade and all its inevitable repercussions on our domestic prosperity. But, as far as raw materials are concerned, we could feel confident that our resourcefulness would ensure our survival. That would only become doubtful with the fall of our Maginot Line, which would expose us at once to a twofold peril: the stoppage of our essential supplies of South American raw materials, and direct attack upon our vital defensive areas.

It is not difficult to see how a mightier Germany, armed for Weltmacht by the destruction of the British barrier to the Atlantic, by inheritance of Neptune's trident in European seas, and by possession of West Africa, could raise this double threat to the United States if she could gain a power base in Brazil. She would then have the means to block our trade in that region and in waters further south, closing our access to most of Brazil, to Uruguay and to Argentina. The wool and leather of the Pampas and the manganese, coffee and other essential imports we receive from Rio de Janeiro and Santos could then only trickle through to us by uncertain and indirect channels.

Such a Brazilian base, moreover, would furnish an excellent foundation for military, political and ideological extension of German control both south and north. The situation of the two River Plata Republics would be particularly precarious, since the long arm of American seapower could not reach out to protect their coasts and harbors while a German Fleet looked out upon the South Atlantic from a well-defended stronghold in Brazil. Any American efforts to aid them against

the German Colossus would then be limited to such military and aerial support as we could furnish them via the Pacific Coast of South America.

It would be unrealistic, moreover, to consider the strategic value of South America, either as a protection or a menace, without looking towards the Pacific as well as the Atlantic, since it is far from likely that Japan would keep her eyes fixed on Asia while Germany penetrated our Maginot Line. We have seen how Europe and Eastern Asia have far more reason for mutual assistance against the Americas than for conflict with each other, and how Germany and Japan have fallen into a natural alignment against all the "have" Powers that lie between them. Evidence of how this partnership works can be found in the "Anti-Comintern" Pact, successive diplomatic "putsches" against the British Empire and France, and mutual support in propaganda drive on Latin America. Warning of how it would work against us is furnished by our fundamental opposition to German policy in Europe and Japanese policy in Asia, and our efforts to prevent extension of the influence of both over the Republics of our hemisphere.

So if Germany secured a Brazilian base in the east, we must count it as probable that Japan would heed the call of opportunity and seek a foothold in Peru or Ecuador on the west. This would mean for us a desperate struggle on both our oceans simultaneously, against great odds in manpower and military resources. Unless we could maintain permanently a Navy able to cope with combined fleets of these two Powers and all their satellites, we could have little hope then of keeping Japan out of our hemisphere.

Whether it is easier and more practicable to hold this Line by attempting to assure it against attack, as we might do by endeavoring to influence the fate of Europe, or whether by sitting tight and defending it only when it is attacked, will be considered below. The essential thing here is that we Americans, whether isolationists, "internationalists," pacifists, or partisans of any other "ism," should unite in realizing that it must be held.



## VULNERABILITY

The task will be far from easy if the trans-Atlantic pillars of our security fall, because most of South America is a liability, not an asset, in our strategic position. While its wealth in mineral and agricultural resources and its vast tracts of fertile but sparsely settled land must always exert a strong magnetic attraction on Europe and Asia, its own defensive capacity is exceedingly weak. In this whole great continent, stretching over 4,500 miles from the Caribbean to Cape Horn, there are but 89,000,000 people, and only about one-third of these can be counted as able to meet Europeans on anything like equal terms. The rest, owing either to a high percentage of mixed blood or to the debilitating effects of climate, could not be expected to pull the weight of their numbers in an inter-continental clash. And all the nations of South America lack the industrial development and the political, economic and social maturity which give the Powers of Europe such capacity for war.

This means that the real burden of defending South America must fall upon us, with only limited assistance from our sister Republics beyond Panama. And we shall have to make this defense effective many thousands of miles from either our home ports or our Caribbean bases. If the overseas vultures commence to circle around this very fat turkey, the eagle must fly far to his protection.

The United States would be far better situated to face storms from across our oceans if this southern continent stopped abruptly at the Amazon, concentrating north of this line the raw material resources we draw upon now. Then it would be within easier range of our naval power, further from Africa, and so further from Europe. As it is, we must take geography as we find it, and realize that, if Germany wins in Europe, the defense of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and the rich Argentine Pampas will fall squarely upon the American Navy.

We must recognize, moreover, that South America's weakness is not solely military. Our southern neighbors are also peculiarly susceptible to another form of aggression, which might, as it has already done in Austria and Czechoslovakia

and appears to be doing in the Balkans, open the way to foreign domination and control. That is the ideological offensive, fostered by trade and promoted by alien minority groups and local Nazi or Fascist movements.

The countries of Latin America have long known the dictator, the coup d'état, the political revolution and the election by bullets instead of ballots. While in some, such as Argentina and Colombia, democratic institutions have deep roots, in most of them democracy only flowers intermittently between long periods of dictatorships. None of these as yet has been of the Nazi type; their power has rested instead upon the support of the military forces and influential economic interests. But South American soil is for many reasons suited to the growth of the totalitarian state.

Political parties there, for example, are usually "personalista" in their character, supporting some individual leader rather than a fundamental program. And university students play a prominent and sometimes decisive role in the national arena, often initiating the riots and disorders which precede a forceful change of regime. Together these conditions furnish three basic components of the totalitarian state, the leadership principle, the disproportionate role of organized youth, and the habit of government by violence.

Next there is the fact that socially and culturally the peoples of South America have far greater affinity with Europe than with the United States. Today this affinity serves the Fascist International on only a limited scale, because British and French influence south of Panama has long had deeper roots and wider branches than German and Italian. Tomorrow the influence of the Fascist Powers may be greatly augmented by a Franco victory in Spain, the Motherland to which every Latin American nation except Brazil is closely tied by history, language and the family connections of the ruling classes. This would be bad enough, but the outlook will be infinitely worse if Germany marches to hegemony across the Atlantic. For the Reich then would possess unparalleled prestige, would inherit a great part of the sum total influence of Europe in South America, and so would multiply exceedingly her capacity there for ideological penetration.



Finally there is trade, which, in South America as in the Balkans, can become a potent instrument of the ideological and national policy of a totalitarian Power. For in Argentina or Brazil, as in Hungary or Rumania, it can extend German influence, enhance the local voice of German minorities and pro-German economic interests, and contribute directly to the promotion of local Nazi movements.

The following table, compiled from the International Trade Statistics of the League of Nations for 1934 and 1936, shows the place occupied in these two years by the United States, by Germany and by Europe<sup>2</sup> in the trade of the four East Coast Republics. From it can be seen the rapid increase of German exports even prior to her territorial expansion of 1938, and the tremendous lead which Europe, despite a declining tendency, holds over the United States. This last relationship is pertinent, because it suggests that a Germanized Europe would wield an economic influence in these Republics far greater than our own.

<i>Percentage of imports of</i>	<i>From the United States</i>		<i>From Germany</i>		<i>From Europe</i>	
	1934	1936	1934	1936	1934	1936
Argentina .....	13.1	14.6	8.8	9.2	60.9	54.3
Brazil .....	23.7	22.1	14.0	23.5	52.4	48.1
Uruguay .....	14.9	14.9	8.6	9.4	48.6	43.1
Venezuela .....	45.1	47.4	7.1	15.0	50.7	45.5
<i>Percentage of exports from</i>	<i>To the United States</i>		<i>To Germany</i>		<i>To Europe</i>	
	1934	1936	1934	1936	1934	1936
Argentina .....	5.5	12.1	8.3	5.8	83.0	69.3
Brazil .....	39.5	38.5	13.2	13.2	47.3	45.6
Uruguay .....	10.4	15.5	16.3	11.2	68.7	65.7
Venezuela .....	16.0	17.5	1.3	2.0	80.6	79.2

When all these factors are taken into account, there can be little doubt that a conclusive German victory in Europe would open the way to an ideological offensive against South America which would dwarf in scale and drive the comparatively minor advances already attempted. We should have to expect to see repeated first what is already happening in

2. Including Great Britain and all European percentages important enough to be listed. The total figures for Europe would be a little larger.

the Balkans. Later, when the Reich reached striking distance from the West African Coast, we should be very likely to witness what has happened in Spain. And if this type of "non-intervention" was employed against some "Bolshevik and democratic" government in Buenos Aires, Montevideo or Rio de Janeiro, we could only prevent the creation in our own hemisphere of a German satellite and base for further operations by either going to war, or by intervening as forcefully and effectively ourselves on behalf of the other side. Here is an ugly prospect we must face if Germany gains in Europe the strategic freedom to direct her power and influence across the Atlantic.

Nowhere is this prospect so ugly as in Brazil, once viewed with special attention by the Kaiser's Government, and now bulking large in the eyes of the Hitler Regime as is indicated by its recent trade, propaganda and diplomatic offensive and its attitude towards the Integralista movement. For Brazil, because she juts so far towards the Eastern Hemisphere, is the strategic key to the Atlantic defense of South America. And, at the same time, her huge and partially developed territory is a vital existing and potential source of the essential raw materials the United States requires.

Geography, climate and the racial texture of her people make Brazil a prospective happy hunting ground for the overseas empire builders and their ideological service departments. Owing to internal barriers of mountains and jungle not yet overcome by adequate railroad development, most of her sprawling bulk is divided into loosely connected compartments held together by sea or river communications. She has hence always been a prey to sectionalism, which has frequently burst into inter-state civil war, and which has ominous possibilities today due to the waxing Fascist International and the strong German and Italian influence in her most progressive southern states.

These conditions suggest how an ideological drive of a greater Reich might succeed in detaching a number of the southern states, such as Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catharina and Paraná which were once shown as German colonies on



maps published during the World War,<sup>3</sup> from the control of the Federal Government and in forming them into an "independent" Nazi satellite. This could become not only a power base in our hemisphere, but also a center from which to infect the important São Paulo industrial region, Uruguay, and perhaps even some of the provinces of Argentina. Though this specter has not yet arisen, because the Reich has first to consolidate her Munich gains and achieve freedom of action on the Atlantic, and though it may be permanently laid if the Vargas Government is a hundred per cent successful in its efforts to overcome Brazilian sectionalism, it appears destined to trouble our hemisphere very soon after a German victory in Europe.

Should the two overseas pillars of our Atlantic security crumble and fall, our Brazilian supply base and defensive bastion will be exposed to direct attack, and with it the whole of South America. Such attack may come in the full panoply of war, or it may seek to gain a foothold inside our naval fortifications by subversive sapping with ideological tools. However it may develop, and whatever its intensity and magnitude, we must drive it back, counter-attacking if need be with every means at our disposal to prevent a permanent breach in our Maginot Line. When the President caused wide comment by saying on October 25, 1938, "And we are determined to use every endeavor in order that the Western Hemisphere may work out its own interrelated salvation in the light of its own interrelated experience," he only voiced once more a traditional national policy which has been and is a basic essential of the continued free survival of the United States.

For if South America falls to the enemy in the time to come, the ultimate fate of our own people will have been decided. Driven back into the keep of our American castle, our defensive moat and our storehouse will be in the enemy's hands and our innermost battlements will be subject to his assaults. All our courage, all our energy and all our skill could not then suffice to hold forever so restricted a final stronghold of liberty and civilization in a constantly shrinking militarized and totalitarian world.

3. New York Times cable despatch from Buenos Aires, October 27, 1938.

## AFRICA AND THE ISLANDS

AFRICA and the European island possessions in the Atlantic and the Caribbean do not trouble the sleep of American statesmen and Admirals today because they are in the hands of the British, the French and lesser peoples with whom we have no fear of conflict. Although the bulge of Africa looks only 1,630 miles at the bulge of Brazil, although Bermuda lies within 700 miles of New York, and although Jamaica and the Lesser Antilles clutter the restricted space of our Caribbean backyard, we have habitually based our Battlefleet in California, confident that the British naval screen between us and Europe will keep our Atlantic front untroubled.

All the West Coast of Africa and every one of these British and French islands could be gained by a victorious Reich, as we have seen, in a "Diktat" forced on her decisively vanquished foes in Paris or London. A few typewritten pages and a number of signatures would do the trick juridically, and the subsequent replacement of British and French officials, garrisons and police would be a congenial and relatively easy task. Should the Reich then desire, for strategic purposes, to control as well any Portuguese or Spanish islands, such as Madeira, the Azores, Canary or Cape Verde groups, there could be little chance of a refusal of her demands.

Two vital defensive problems would then confront America, her historic Atlantic security shattered by the disintegration of two of its three supporting pillars. The first would come upon us gradually but with ever gathering force, like the flood waters of a mighty river. That would be the menace of Africa and its island outposts to our hemisphere in the South Atlantic.

The second would strike us with the sudden violence of a tidal wave, forcing us, perhaps, to choose between American security and American peace. That would be the issue whether Germany should take up her winnings in the Bermudas, the Bahamas and the Caribbean.



## AFRICA

The point at which Africa leans nearest to our hemisphere is also the point best situated for development as a power base for a South Atlantic offensive. Here is the natural harbor of Freetown, endowed with seven square miles of deep water and ample accommodations for the largest fleet, the best harbor on the entire West African Coast. To the north, subsidiary bases are available at Bathurst and Dakar, and communication lines with Europe are flanked by the Cape Verde and Canary Islands and Madeira.

The Cape Verde group would provide not only a flanking stronghold, but an advance base even nearer to Brazil with the excellent deepwater harbor of Porto Grande. Further south in the Atlantic are three islands and one island group now owned by Great Britain, which could be transformed as air-bases and refueling depots into lesser outposts of Germanized Europe. These are:

Ascension Island, formerly utilized as the victualing center of the British African Squadron,

St. Helena of Napoleonic fame, which possesses already an excellent anchorage and some fortifications,

Tristan da Cunha, on the great circle course between Rio de Janeiro and the Cape of Good Hope, once believed of sufficient importance to warrant a British garrison,

The Falkland Islands with their good harbor and coaling station at Port Stanley, situated within 500 miles of the Straits of Magellan and the southernmost ports of Argentina.

With a fleet base at Freetown and fortified naval and aerial outposts at these four Atlantic points, Germanized Europe would loom ominously near the East Coast of South America. How much nearer her bases would be than any belonging to the United States can be seen by the following comparative distances,<sup>1</sup> which cast a revealing spotlight on an unfavorable

1. Distances in nautical miles, obtained from "Table of Distances between Ports," Hydrographic Office, U. S. Navy, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1936. Those marked \* are not listed in this publication, but are estimates based upon others listed.

geographical relationship most Americans have never appreciated.

Distances from Pernambuco, deep water harbor and important city on the eastern point of Brazil, around which all American commerce with Central and Southern Brazil, with Uruguay and with Argentina, must pass, and by which American naval defense of these regions must be projected.

<i>European-owned Bases</i>		<i>American Bases</i>	
Freetown .....	1,632	Norfolk, Va. ....	3,651
Cape Verde Is. ....	1,609	Virgin Is. ....	2,516
Ascension .....	1,226		
St. Helena .....	1,771		

Distances from Bahia, a huge harbor 400 miles further south, which might be developed into a fleet base by either Brazil or an overseas invader:

<i>European-owned Bases</i>		<i>American Bases</i>	
Freetown .....	1,980*	Norfolk, Va. ....	4,042
Cape Verde Is. ....	2,010*	Virgin Is. ....	2,907
Ascension .....	1,350*		
St. Helena .....	1,880*		

Distances from Rio de Janeiro, capital of Brazil and one of the foremost natural harbors of the world.

<i>European-owned Bases</i>		<i>American Bases</i>	
Freetown .....	2,600*	Norfolk, Va. ....	4,723
Cape Verde Is. ....	2,700*	Virgin Is. ....	3,588
Ascension .....	1,900		
St. Helena .....	2,161		

Distances from Buenos Aires, capital and chief port of Argentina and heart of the whole La Plata area.

<i>European-owned Bases</i>		<i>American Bases</i>	
Freetown .....	3,690*	Norfolk, Va. ....	5,824
Cape Verde Is. ....	3,786	Virgin Is. ....	4,689
Ascension .....	2,940*		
St. Helena .....	3,050*		
Tristan da Cunha .....	2,300*		
Falkland Is. ....	1,120*		

The strategic significance of these comparisons is only too clear. Even Pernambuco, which lies nearest to our home ports



and Caribbean outposts, is almost a thousand miles nearer to Africa and within easy range of a fleet operating from Freetown. Since the efficiency of naval operations is affected so decisively by distance from bases, our Fleet would be placed at a great disadvantage in dealing with any comparable German fleet even in this sector of the South Atlantic.

When we go further down the coast, the disparity becomes even greater. At Rio de Janeiro, our bases are 1,500 miles further away than the advanced footholds of Europe, and at Buenos Aires, even if the Falklands are omitted from consideration, our disadvantage must be measured in thousands of miles.

#### SOUTH ATLANTIC IMPLICATIONS

Even while peace still reigned between us, these axes would carry great weight in South America. Power talks in international relations, as we are seeing in the Balkans now that the political counter-weight to the Reich has been overbalanced. It is always well to remember, in weighing the possible consequences in Latin America of a German advance overseas, that dictators are liable to discover interests in common and that the weak are frequently attracted by the strong. To many in Brazil and Argentina, the voice of Berlin would speak from Africa with a decisive volume and emphasis, drowning out the less harsh but more distant voice of Washington, and convincing them that their future could best be served on the German side of the fence. Peaceful penetration by the Reich, commercial, cultural, ideological and political, could be pushed on a scale unimagined now, stimulated perhaps by "good-will" flights of massed bombers from Freetown to Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires.

During war these German bases, unless we countered them by obtaining and developing naval strongholds in Brazil, would create a flank position so strong as to endanger, if not preclude, any American fleet operations south of Pernambuco. Unless the German Navy were far inferior to our strength available for the Atlantic, our Battlefleet could not reach Rio de Janeiro without running the most appalling risks, leaving its supply

lines at the mercy of the enemy and both our own coast and the Caribbean open to hostile attack.

The Germans, on the other hand, would have easy access to the South Atlantic from these bases, and with naval strength anything like our own, a fairly effective command of its waters. This would enable them to intercept most of our trade with Brazil and Argentina, and perhaps even to despatch an expeditionary force to Southern Brazil strong enough to convert restive Rio Grande do Sul and its neighboring States into a German satellite.

With an adequate navy operating from Africa and these island bases, the Reich might win the campaign of the South Atlantic. Her control of these waters would mean the interruption of our trade routes and of our vital imports of essential raw materials, which, if Japan were also an enemy, could only be obtained from this hemisphere. And it might permit her, at the same time, to transport armies to South America, not large enough for an attempt at conquest, but adequate, perhaps, to ensure the success of local ideological or separatist movements already instigated by her subversive propaganda.

The best defense is usually attack, but here our capacity would be limited. Overwhelming naval superiority might permit us to seize and occupy Ascension and St. Helena, if our Government were prepared to run the great risks inherent in such distant operations. But an attack on the Cape Verde Islands or the African mainland, where her great military and aerial strength could be brought to bear, would be out of the question without powerful assistance from Europe, which we could not then hope for.

We must not lose sight of the possibility, moreover, that the Reich, with her great military supremacy, might attempt a more "totalitarian" offensive against South America, seeking to destroy our hemisphere position once and for all, instead of merely securing footholds for the subsequent extension of her power and influence. In this case, she could find within easy reach a vulnerable area which, seized and held by her, would pave the way to her widest ambitions south of the Equator



This area comprises the states of Rio Grande do Norte, Parahyba, Pernambuco, and Alagoas, which together form the bulge of Brazil so near to Africa. It is a backward, agricultural region, slightly larger than Italy, with a sparse population of only 6,000,000, almost entirely composed of Negroes and mulattoes. Lacking any rail link with Rio de Janeiro and badly provided with roads, it is only loosely connected with the heart of Brazil by sea and air. It thus forms an exposed salient which, due to an enervating climate and the small number and the character of its inhabitants, has a very limited defensive capacity.

German occupation of this region, especially if the way were prepared by ideological intervention, propaganda and bribery of strategically-placed local officials, might prove to be a practicable operation. Perhaps four divisions of picked German troops would suffice for the task, and these, with large reserves of military supplies, could be transported in half a dozen high-speed liners, capable of making a sudden dash across from Africa in four days. The risk would be great, of course, but the potential losses insignificant compared with the decisive advantages success would bring, and success, when we take into account relative distances from bases and the possible effects of naval diversions elsewhere on the disposition of the American Fleet, cannot be counted as out of the question.

With a firm trans-Atlantic foothold in this region, the German High Command could contemplate happily its future campaign prospects. Pernambuco, a deep water port and the principal city of Northern Brazil, could be given some covering protection against any subsequent American naval offensive by the already fortified island of Fernando Noronha, 125 miles northeast of Cape St. Roque. While the naval facilities of all ports in this region are limited, Bahia, which lies within 250 miles of the border of Alagoas, might be made into a suitable base for a fleet of any size.

If this exposed and vulnerable region fell to the enemy, our hemisphere defenses would be completely, and perhaps irretrievably, shattered. One possible consequence would be the further extension of German power northwest to within easy

bombing range of the Panama Canal and the Caribbean. A certain consequence would be the erection of a hostile fence of seapower across the Atlantic which no American Fleet could safely pass, and which would mark out the whole East Coast beyond it as a German shooting preserve.

No one familiar with the patriotism and strongly nationalistic feelings of the Brazilians and the Argentines would believe them, even then, likely to bow to Germany's will without a struggle. But their territory is vast, their population relatively small, and their war capacity very low by European standards. Their prospects of resisting successfully the economic and political demands of the Reich would, therefore, depend very largely upon how effectively the United States could reinforce their defensive efforts in such distant theaters of war.

Cut off from them by sea at Pernambuco, our only support could then be military, furnished by expeditionary forces which had first to be transported down the West Coast more than 2,000 miles beyond Panama to Iquique, Antofagasta and Valparaiso. From these debarkation points, our assistance would be seriously circumscribed by the very limited capacity of the available trans-Andean railroads. The Germans, on the other hand, with their command of the South Atlantic, their consequent ability to ship troops and munitions directly to the theater of operations, and their far greater military resources, would face infinitely easier problems of transport and supply. We could only expect, accordingly, that they would outnumber us many times over on any Brazilian or Argentine front they chose for a major offensive.

Only in the air could we vie with the enemy on even terms, for here our planes could reach the battle zone as easily as theirs. But aerial supremacy can only make a limited contribution to a military victory, particularly in a campaign fought in sparsely settled, agricultural terrain. Unless the relative importance of the aerial arm is completely revolutionized in the coming years, we could not hope to ensure the defense of Argentina or Southern Brazil by airpower if our naval power were blocked at Pernambuco.

All this is what Africa could mean to our hemisphere as a



southern bastion of Germanized Europe. We could hope that it would not bring upon us such disasters because time would give us an opportunity to prepare our hemisphere defense. But we should have to think fast and work fast, and dedicate all our resources to national defense if we were to keep the two Americas intact.

We might succeed in holding fast, year after year, in the face of increasing pressure, ideological intervention or war, but it would take all our strength, and probably force us, even while peace reigned, into a war economy. Always we would be at a great disadvantage in manpower, industrial capacity and strategical situation, which would tend to grow instead of diminish, and always we would have to maintain as well our defenses on the Pacific. With Germanized Europe controlling West Africa, the Americans would be "on the spot" for as long ahead as we can see. Only one event could relieve the relentless pressure, a crack up of the Nazi Colossus, either through internal strains or in the course of the clash between their world and ours.

## PRECARIOUS PRECAUTIONS—SOUTH

ALTHOUGH PRECAUTIONS in the South Atlantic to meet the strategic problem of Africa are less pressing, they must necessarily be infinitely more vital and far-reaching. For our stake here far overshadows that in the northern islands we have just considered; it is not merely the risk of involvement in a war of limited liability, but the future of our hemisphere and our country. Peace is precious to our people, but security against defeat and disaster is priceless.

There are three fields in which we may today begin to lay the foundations for the South Atlantic safeguards we may need so sorely a few years from now. The first is naval strength, which cannot be multiplied overnight because battleships and cruisers require three or four years to build. Here we must, regardless of the outcome in Europe, embark upon considerable balanced expansion in order to maintain a sufficient margin of superiority over Japan.

But we must not forget that we have two oceans, not one, and that a German triumph abroad will make our Atlantic defense problem the more acute. We can best prepare for this contingency now by establishing an initial lead over the Reich so vast that, despite all the new resources she may gain, she could only hope to catch us in seapower by the most exhausting naval race that history has yet recorded.

With increased activity in our Navy Yards should go a consistent development of our naval and military airpower, creating the basis for expansion of our aerial armaments at forced draft if the outcome in Europe should suddenly put our New World "on the spot." The President's request to Congress for an increase of our strength to 8,200 planes is a wise move in this direction.

A second field where preparations must go on is that of diplomacy. If Freetown flies the Swastika flag, our South Atlantic defenses will have to be diplomatic as well as military,



calling for intimate relationships with Latin American Republics which neither we nor they have yet contemplated. For these the groundwork must be laid by unswerving development of the "Good Neighbor" policy, paving the way for outright political alliances in the event of need.

A third safeguard which we can undertake now, looking west as well as east, is the proposed Nicaragua Canal, estimated to call for an outlay of about \$725,000,000. It is not just to our people, during a time of progressive international anarchy, to expose them to the dire disasters which a successful attack on the locks at Panama could so easily bring. A surer link between our oceans, desirable even now, might become essential to our two flank defense in a very few years, and canals, even more than battleships, require time to build.

If we go ahead successfully in these three fields, the more drastic safeguards of the South Atlantic can perhaps be left until the danger from Europe and Africa becomes acute. But we must seek to lay out now the lines we must then follow, because the probable odds against us in manpower, industrial resources and strategical situation would leave us little margin to dally, extemporize or "muddle through."

German victory in Europe would, as we have seen, completely revolutionize our present Atlantic situation, forcing us at once to step up our armament programs to the limit of national capacity. Budgetary considerations would have to go by the board, taxes multiply, and national wealth be poured out on almost a wartime scale. That would be the first essential for safety.

But we could not expect to protect South America successfully against Germanized Europe and Africa from our present Caribbean bases, as the distance differentials listed previously show only too clearly. We should, accordingly, be confronted with the immediate necessity of extending our Atlantic defensive base line far beyond where it stops today.

This line would be subject to some limitations, since we could not project it safely into the Eastern Hemisphere in order to check the Reich near her own bases. The Cape Verde

Islands, if we could obtain them during the European hostilities, would provide us with a valuable means of countering the menace of Freetown, but we could not hope to hold them indefinitely in the face of the tidal sweep of German power over the adjacent West African Coast. Our people would almost certainly oppose such a potentially dangerous advance into another hemisphere, even if our Admirals should contemplate it seriously while German seapower was yet undeveloped. So our defense must either stand or fall on our own side of the ocean.

Neither would the extension of this line to the Straits of Magellan appear either necessary or practicable. The cornerstone of our South Atlantic defense, as has been shown, is not the Caribbean or the La Plata region but the eastern shoulder of Brazil.

#### BASES IN BRAZIL

Much as we have always abhorred "entangling alliances," we should be forced for self-preservation to enter into a closer political relationship with Brazil than we have ever had with any nation. It would have to be an alliance as "entangling" as any Europe can show, interwoven with intimate military, financial and economic ties which even Europe cannot parallel. For Brazil would need the most extensive American assistance to keep Germany out, and we would need full use of her facilities to be able to protect our hemisphere successfully.

If Germany should extend her Atlantic front to Freetown, we must be able to counter with a base on the bulge of Brazil, unless we are to be outflanked. The strategic significance of the Pernambuco area can be either a liability to us or an asset. With our southern outposts limited to the Caribbean, the eastward projection of this point would permit Freetown to flank American operations beyond it. But a strong American base here would place the boot on the other leg by enabling us to flank any German advance across the South Atlantic.

So a strong American fleet base on this Brazilian shoulder would be indispensable, both to ensure it against possible German attempts at occupation, and to safeguard the La Plata



area as well as Southern Brazil. We should need the agreement and wholehearted cooperation of the Brazilian Government to create such a base and to build, as best we could, a chain of supporting links at points where adequate naval facilities are almost entirely lacking.

The port of Pernambuco has only limited capacity, so that a fleet base would have to be created at some other point. Rio de Janeiro is already suitable for this purpose, but lies too far south, over 1,100 miles beyond the eastern point of Brazil. Perhaps the best for our needs would be the great bay at Bahia, 399 miles south of Pernambuco, but here very expensive and extensive improvement would be required.

A fleet base so distant from the Caribbean, however, would have to be supported by a chain of lesser naval outposts. A rather sparse chain of these, requiring a tremendous amount of development, dredging and fortification, yet over 1,600 miles from Africa, could be furnished us by Brazil. The first link might be fabricated out of the rather shallow harbor of Belem in the mouth of the Amazon, some 1,500 miles from the Virgin Islands and nearly 1,200 from Trinidad. Some 370 miles beyond lies the extensive bay of Maranhão, which energy and money could make of considerable value, and 817 miles further is the very important focal point of Pernambuco, which might be given some cover to the northeast by the island of Fernando Noronha. While this line of bases would leave much to be desired, and would begin only at a long jump from the Caribbean, its links would be fairly closely spaced at the crucial point nearest the enemy

Brazil is hence able to provide us, if she would be willing to go to such lengths in joint defense, with the makings of a strong position in the South Atlantic. Once this position was fully developed, it should be able to guarantee our Maginot Line from an external trans-oceanic breach, unless either the German Fleet were far superior to the strength we could concentrate against it, or some unforeseen disaster befell us.

But if Brazil is to be our close ally, to furnish us with a chain of bases along her coast, and to co-operate with us in

their development and defense, she must be both strong and stable. Today, although she has more people than France, her defensive capacity is exceedingly low by European standards, and is undermined further by the instability resulting from geographical barriers and sectionalism. If we must lean upon each other so heavily in those days, we must see that her eastern shoulder can carry its proper share of the weight.

Her armed forces could be brought to a far higher level of strength and striking power by unstinted provision of technical assistance and advice, by generous donation of matériel, and by extensive financial subsidies. We could multiply the size and the duties of our Naval Mission at Rio de Janeiro, and assign there analogous military and air missions to raise her Army and air forces to a higher standard of efficiency.

But Brazil could not afford to arm herself on the scale that would be desirable, so we should have to help her with more than technical advice. Something could be done by giving her outright the warships, planes and military equipment we no longer need for our first line forces, but this would not appear enough. It would seem advisable also to subsidize construction of new warships for her in our yards, and to provide her with the most modern planes and military armaments at greatly reduced cost. A strong Brazil could only be created if much of the price were charged to American taxpayers.

One very serious flaw in her defensive position would then remain. This is the lack of satisfactory land communications behind the long stretch of coast from Belem 1,400 miles south to Bahia, along which our chain of naval bases would be situated, and from there 477 miles further to Victoria. If nothing were done to eliminate this flaw, this whole region would remain, as now, cut off by land from the heart of Brazil, and hence highly vulnerable to local or ideological separatist drives or revolutions.

A railroad would doubtless be the best answer, but the distance to be covered and the undeveloped condition of this part of the country would make it an uneconomic project of prohibitive cost, requiring many long years for completion.



Perhaps a modern, all-weather road would suffice instead to meet both our needs and Brazil's. But the cost of even this would run into hundreds of millions, most of which would have to be defrayed by the United States.

Even more essential for our defensive line would be the promotion by all available means of Brazil's internal solidarity. For unless her national stability were assured, local revolutions or separatist movements might play into the hands of the enemy and provide them with centers for ideological intervention behind our line of bases, bringing political repercussions which would imperil our Brazilian partnership and spread throughout South America. Improvement of her Federal armed forces and provision of modern communications between her sectional compartments would contribute directly to this end, but more basic contributions might also become necessary. Thus we might have to bolster up her internal prosperity through commercial treaties favoring her interests at the expense of our own, and furnish her with successive governmental loans at purely nominal interest.

#### OBSTACLES AND COSTS

This whole program of creating a strong South Atlantic bastion would run into two major snags. The first would be the diplomatic problem of binding the Brazilian Government to us, year in, year out, as a close and steadfast ally, and keeping the Brazilian people convinced that their interests were intimately aligned with our own. We might succeed in this with sufficient tact, with the highly expensive contributions to her strength and well-being already suggested, with extensive, truthful and unselfish propaganda, and with firm rejection of all tempting opportunities to use her friendship for the purely selfish advantage of American business. Despite our traditional friendship with her, this would be far from an easy task, since the natural affinity between North and South Americans cannot be rated very high. If we failed, the consequences would be a resurgence of old animosities and suspicions south of the Equator, which might develop into

anti-American movements looking towards Germany for support.

The second would be the very great cost to our people. The development of far-flung naval bases and the many-sided contributions to Brazilian strength and stability would run into a great many millions of dollars every year, at a time when our own armament programs would have to be measured in billions. So heavy an additional outlay for Brazil, when we were already carrying such a burden at home, would almost certainly meet loud opposition in Congress as an unnecessary sacrifice for the benefit of an alien people. Powerful sections of public opinion might not see even then, as they do not see now, that the collapse of the trans-Atlantic pillars of our security must necessarily inflict upon us financial burdens which will bow our shoulders and depress our standard of living. Yet any savings we made in refusing to contribute to the strength of our South Atlantic bastion would be at the expense of our security.

No equally intimate and costly relationship with any other South American Republic would be necessary, for which reason it might be wisest and most practicable to make our Brazilian alliance outside the Pan American framework on a strictly bilateral basis. Since Argentina and Uruguay could best be protected against a major German thrust by establishment of a fleet base near the shoulder of Brazil, there would be no strategical requirement to make comparable contributions to their defensive capacity.

But here a political difficulty would arise from the historic jealousy between the two large East Coast Republics. If we did so much to enhance the power of Brazil without promoting by some corresponding measures the national strength of her La Plata rival, the latter might be tempted to seek to preserve the South American balance by turning towards Berlin. The storm raised at Buenos Aires by a proposal made in Washington to lend Brazil six destroyers for training shows how near to the surface this traditional jealousy lies.

This rivalry would create a thorny problem for American



diplomacy: how raise Brazil almost to the status of a Great Power and yet keep Argentina as a friend? It might be solved by making almost equal contributions to the Navy, Army, air force and internal prosperity of the Argentine Republic, an additional burden which would raise still higher the already crushing costs of hemisphere defense. But even then we might meet resistance to our best endeavors, owing to the facts that Argentina's natural market lies in Europe, not here, that she has always felt closer culturally to European capitals than to Washington, and that she has traditionally nourished a deep suspicion of the "Colossus of the North."

Yet we would have to solve this problem somehow to keep our hemisphere inviolable, whatever the cost and whatever the difficulties. A friendly and internally solid Argentina would become particularly essential if Germany were to establish herself by a European "Diktat" in the Falkland Islands. While a German assault on the La Plata Republic might even then best be forestalled from Brazil, ideological intervention in its sparsely peopled southern territories might prove practicable from these islands. This type of aggression could be met with least danger of setting off an inter-continental war if a strong and stable government at Buenos Aires were able to cope with it unaided.

Finally, we must not forget that South America has long been torn by the rivalries between its ten Republics. Despite the Declaration of Lima for solidarity against foreign intervention or activity, there is no certainty that such solidarity would be maintained under the conditions envisaged here. The coalescence of Rio de Janeiro and Washington into a permanent political and military alliance would produce incalculable consequences in the capitals of the other nine nations, attracting some and repelling others. Dominant political groups, driven either by deep-seated national animosities or by their own personal ambitions, would be tempted to seek advantages by cashing in on the proffered ideological, political, economic, and perhaps financial support of the German Titan. There would be an ever present and growing danger that solidarity would be shattered by some South

American Charlie McCarthy of Berlin. To preclude this, it might become necessary to implement our "Good Neighbor" policy by virtual subsidies in military equipment, tariff concessions or loans to every Republic south of Panama.

Yet one more very substantial item must be added to this pyramidal burden of hemisphere defense, the preparation of a second line in case the first should fail. There would always be a chance that our inter-oceanic canal or canals might suddenly be destroyed when most of our Battlefleet was in the Pacific, or that a new and powerful German Fleet, aided by a synchronized threat from Japan, might defeat decisively the battleship divisions we felt able to spare against her in a major naval engagement. Contingencies like this, unlikely as they may appear, have to be provided for by General Boards and General Staffs.

Our Army would have to fill the gap beyond the Equator as best it could if our Navy failed, attempting with the aid of our aerial armadas and available South American forces to check and defeat any overseas invaders. We have seen how difficult a mission this would be from West Coast debarkation points, yet it would then offer our only means of preventing a permanent breach in our Maginot Line. So we could only prepare for all contingencies on the Brazilian or Argentine fronts by expanding our Regular Army considerably beyond its present strength. This, as will be shown later, appears the only potential battlefield abroad to which the despatch of another large A.E.F. could now be both necessary and safe.

Although it should be possible to carry out the military expansion required for this purpose without imposing upon our people the curse of conscription, soldiers cost us so much more than they do other Powers that we would have to expect our successive War Department appropriations to become ever more burdensome. And we must not forget the truth our forefathers so clearly perceived, that a great standing Army is inherently dangerous to democratic government.

This second line of defense, moreover, creates its own vital needs which must be fulfilled. adequate communications be-



tween its points of debarkation and its probable fronts. Since the existing trans-Andean railroad systems are limited in their capacity, it might be essential to supplement them with other means of transport. Such a means is the proposed Pan American Highway, which might be projected through the heart of Brazil. Work is proceeding slowly on some disconnected sections of this now, but its date of completion is most uncertain. Should our hemisphere defense problem become acute, it would be wise to push completion of this project at high pressure, even if we must defray the greater part of the cost ourselves, and perhaps also construct a similar highway connecting Venezuela with the suggested road behind our bases in Brazil.

All this is the cost of effective hemisphere defense if Germany wins in Europe. If we try to think what it would mean in dollars and cents, including our armament programs at home, we can only conclude that the total would be at least several billions every year, perhaps even a sum surpassing a pre-Roosevelt budget. We might prove able to carry this Old Man of the Sea over the rough road that would loom ahead by following Germany's example in gearing our national economy to war. But we could only do so at sacrifices of our present business system and our standard of living which rock the imagination.

And even then, in the long tomorrow that saw Germany consolidating progressively her hold on a power area greatly superior to our own, there would be no assurance that we could hold out indefinitely. For quite apart from the odds in power resources and our simultaneous preoccupation with the problems of our Pacific flank, our success could not be ensured by our own efforts alone. It would depend as well upon the continued wholehearted co-operation of Latin American peoples less stable and steadfast than ours, who might break ranks under stress or cajolment, and bring our whole defense structure crashing to the ground. So, no matter how great our sacrifices and our endeavors, our long range prospects would always remain precarious.

## THE RIGHT ROAD

Can this then be the right road to hemisphere security, this boulder-strewn, steep and arduous path which has several billion dollar toll gates at every mile and leads perilously close to the edge of an abyss? There are convincing reasons to believe that it is not, that it is the worst, the most costly and the most dangerous road we can take to this objective, only to be followed as a last resort if all others are closed to us by circumstances beyond our control.

We know that in war a defensive policy is almost certain to entail eventual defeat, and that the offensive alone can bring military victory. We are not at war now, of course, but we are engaged in a basic diplomatic, ideological and economic struggle with the Reich, which would be aggravated by her victory abroad to a point where we should have to prepare for war on a colossal scale. Does not this same strategic truth apply to such a struggle between mutually antagonistic Great Powers? If so, is it wise to remain entirely on the defensive in our hemisphere policy?

That is exactly what we are doing. If we fail to use our present power supremacy to prevent Germany from gaining in Europe and Africa a base for a frontal attack on our hemisphere, we are remaining on the defensive. If, when she has gained that base, we concentrate our efforts on building up our hemisphere resistance, we will still be on the defensive. Then, if our fundamental opposition develops into open war, we will find ourselves compelled to fight a defensive campaign, directed primarily towards throwing back German assaults upon our position. We will have no opportunity at that time to take the offensive against Germanized Europe unless developments we cannot count upon, such as internal cracks in her vast political and economic dominion, should providentially furnish us with effective overseas allies.

So what we are doing today, and what we will do tomorrow if Western Europe falls, is to follow the campaign policy which leads not to victory, but to defeat. Unless we depart from this policy today while there is yet time, we may find ourselves



committed to it tomorrow. Seen in this light, our present foreign policy gives little assurance that it will in the end keep this hemisphere safe for America. The many historical precedents of kings and captains who have shut themselves up in castles and fortresses offer small encouragement here.

Such are the implications of a continued policy of drifting on such stormy international seas, even though while we drift, we arm. Our offensive drive now extends only to the effort to free international trade, to restricted diplomatic activity and pressure and to an intermittent barrage of moral exhortation. If these measures were believed sufficient to assure our safety, we would not be arming on our present scale.

A more provident security policy would project the great weight of our influence, while we are still the mightiest Power, far beyond our final defensive front in an effort to prevent the enemy from gaining the base position essential for an assault upon us. It would support to the full the two trans-Atlantic pillars of our security while they still stand, using the more pressing need of both the British and the French to make them carry most of the burden of our Atlantic defense. Realizing that this defense can be ensured far more surely and cheaply by aiding other Great Powers to deny the Reich the overseas position she must have to menace the Americas, it would not shrink from one stitch today in order to save nine tomorrow.

Here is a point where it is well to stop and weigh the alternatives, solely from the angle of the future welfare of our hemisphere and our country. We have seen the crushing cost in armaments, development of Brazilian bases and contributions to South American strength which will be called for to face Germanized Europe on the South Atlantic, a stratospheric cost which must bend the backs of our people. And we have seen how our success must depend upon imponderable factors beyond our control, the continued willingness of Latin American peoples to tie themselves to us so closely at a time when the Reich, crowned with victory and multiplying power and influence, must appear a constantly ascending star. And we know that, under these conditions, the

stake at issue will not be merely peace or war, but the survival of America as we have known her.

Whatever we might do now short of war to prevent Germany from gaining the Atlantic could not entail more than a fraction of these costs. And our prospects of success would be less riddled with imponderables, since there is already a balance of power in Western Europe, a balance we now have the power to sway, as the British did for so many centuries, in order to safeguard vital national interests. This favorable situation contrasts strongly with that we have envisaged, where the United States, no longer free to cast its weight where it chose, would be locked in a South Atlantic balance with Germany, perhaps leaving Japan able to decide the issue.

But we must face as well an ugly contingency, which is largely due to our long post-war failure to use our power primacy effectively to safeguard our own interests. It is possible that we cannot keep Germany off the Atlantic now without participating in a European war. Here again, whatever the price of such participation in national effort and danger, it would be but a fraction of that incurred in an inter-continental clash with Germanized Europe. The first would be a war of limited effort and liability, in which even the defeat of our European allies could not bring catastrophe on America. The second would be a life and death duel in which defeat would probably mean the beginning of the end of Free America.

All these considerations point to one conclusion—that the United States cannot afford to allow Germany to win in Europe. If our power is sufficient to do so, we must bar the Reich at any cost from the Atlantic. For whatever may be the cost of doing that, when her might is balanced overseas and her access to our hemisphere blocked by the Royal Navy, it would be as nothing compared to the price we should have to pay to hold her back indefinitely on our South American front.