Lines of Action in Economic Reconstruction

Follow this and additional works at: http://utdr.utoledo.edu/ur-87-68
LINES OF ACTION IN ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

By MORDECAI EZEKIEL

BACK TO NORMALCY" will not be adequate for a postwar economic program. It is generally recognized both here and in other countries that this is an age of rapid change in economic institutions. We refuse to accept the totalitarian thesis that economic progress can come only through revolution. But we do recognize the great unsolved economic problems of the prewar world. The democratic process of step-by-step evolutionary change may have to be speeded up greatly if it is to deal effectively with these unsolved problems once the war is over.

Modern technology has created a high and rapidly rising level of individual productive power. No country, totalitarian or democratic, has yet solved the modern problem of how to keep its people fully employed at these high levels of productivity merely in turning out the things they as consumers need. The temporary full employment achieved by Germany and Italy in recent years was made possible by unlimited military expenditures. We are now seeing how rapidly our own economy can be galvanized into action by unlimited defense expenditures. The economic problem during war time is simplified, for the appetite of Mars is insatiable. The only present problem is to produce all we can as fast as we can. The economic problem of peace is far more difficult. It involves not only high-level production but high-level consumption. Full solution of the peacetime problem embraces three things:

1. Keeping all those who wish to work employed at useful occupations.
2. Turning out various goods and services of the amounts and kinds that the market—mainly the workmen and their families—stand ready to buy.
3. Providing the consumers—largely the workmen and their families—with a flow of buying power large enough and steady enough to maintain adequate markets for all that is produced.

Of these three problems only the first exists in war time. The other two come to the front only in peace time. Failure to solve those two ade-
ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

quately was what kept one-quarter of our city workers chronically un-
employed during the past decade. Methods of solving them after defense
is over is the basic issue before students of economics today.

When one discusses how to deal with the peace-time problems of full
production there is constant danger of being misinterpreted as attacking
the traditional virtues of thrift, individual initiative, industry. To prevent
such misunderstanding let us see what are the elements of economic policy
on which all can agree, and then see if the proposed programs conform
to those basic principles. Regardless of the form of economic organization,
the following principles will, I believe, hold true:

(1) The objective of production is consumption. Men do not work merely for
the fun of keeping busy but primarily to make the things they and their families
need.

(2) A nation can consume only what it produces. . . . Every adult has an obli-
gation to work and to produce as a prerequisite to sharing what is produced.
"In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread" still holds true today.

(3) Labor or materials must not be wasted. Each business must operate efficiently,
to produce the most it can with the resources it employs.

(4) Nations can increase their own standard of living when they exchange
things that are cheap for them to make for imported products that would be
more costly for them to make. A large volume of international trade lets each
country or region specialize in making the things it is best fitted to produce.

(5) It takes real capital—plant, machinery, and tools—to make things, as well
as labor. If we are to keep raising our living standards we will have to keep
replacing the machinery and tools we have now, and making more of them.
The real use of plans and tools, though, is to turn out things that people need—
just providing machinery and plant is not an end in itself.

(6) Men's welfare depends not only on how much they earn but also on how
they spend what they have. Many families are malnourished even though they
spend enough on food to buy a proper diet. Wise use of the funds available is
essential to a good standard of living.

(7) The state, as the collective agent of the people, is under similar obligation to
make wise use of the resources it commands. It must make its expenditures in
such a way as to get the most out of them for the general welfare of all. Public
agencies however, must also take into account the effect of their expenditures
upon the welfare of society as a whole, whereas the individual cannot be expected
to look beyond his own needs and resources in making his own expenditures.

These seven principles may be briefly summarized:

(1) Consumption is the objective of the economic system.

THE ANTIOCH REVIEW

(2) Consumption cannot exceed production.
(3) Each productive unit must be efficient.
(4) International cooperation raises efficiency.
(5) Capital is essential to production, in the proper proportion.
(6) Each individual must be prudent in his use of resources.
(7) The nation must be prudent in its use of resources and watchful of the
effect of its actions on the general welfare.

Holding to these basic principles, what are the problems of domestic
economic reconstruction?

Defense production is expanding our employment and production to
peak levels. By the time Hitler is defeated we will have no idle men and
no idle plants. Somewhere between a quarter and a half of our total na-
tional output will then be directed into defense needs. When those needs
cease, we will have to find other outlets for our goods, other markets for
our products.

The problem we will face will be a double one. First, there will be the
physical or structural problem of changing over from defense produc-
tion to peace-time production, of shifting men and plants from shipbuilding
to house building, from machine guns to fishing tackle, from bombers to
private planes, from heavy machine products to light consumers' goods.

Second, there will be the fiscal or financial problem of expanding the
size of the market, so that peace-time outlets for goods increase as rapidly
as defense expenditures contract. Unless we can maintain the markets
for continued full production we cannot go on producing as much as we
did during war time, and defense expansion will be followed by the disas-
trous postwar contraction which many groups today regard as inevitable.
If we are to prevent the catastrophe we must prepare to move swiftly and
positively when the time comes.

There are two lines of action to maintain full production, external
methods and internal methods. External and internal are used here from
the way they affect individual business concerns. External controls oper-
ate through fiscal and financial steps which affect buying power directly.
With their aid business would keep producing because it would find mar-
kets for all it could produce. Internal programs work through the price,
wage, and production policies of individual business concerns themselves.
They would establish a situation where business can keep producing be-
cause it makes markets for all it can produce. Both external and internal
programs involve economic planning. Both require foresight and judgment in their use. External programs, however, require this planning only in terms of fiscal or financial operations in the large, while internal programs require industrial planning which goes on into consideration and action on many matters of business operations, industry by industry or commodity by commodity. It is this detailed internal planning of industrial operation and policy which is sometimes thought of when the term "economic planning" is applied.

External methods of stimulating demand are favored by those who agree with the basic ideas of the eminent English economist, John Maynard Keynes. These include Alvin Hansen, Marriner S. Eccles, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Lauchlin Currie, and many others. Briefly, these ideas center in the point that the profitable use of private funds for new investment is limited, and that in the past as national income has risen to high levels the amount of money which income-receivers set aside as new savings has tended to exceed the amount of money which could usefully be employed in new investment. In consequence of this fact whenever national income has risen near to the point of full employment (in times of peace) a portion of the total buying power has accumulated unspent in hoarded savings; the markets for the product have been inadequate to absorb the current production; and a depression has followed which reduced both production and employment. This phenomenon has been heightened by certain short-time movements of business inventories and of consumers' credits which have intensified the savings both up and down. These theories relating to income and investment explain why it is possible for savings and private investment to attain a stable equilibrium at a level which corresponds to a national income far below full employment or full production. Chronic heavy unemployment can thus be a normal situation.

We can put these theories into more realistic shape by applying them to the probable situation at the end of the war. At that time we will have all employable people at work. We will be producing far more than we have ever produced—somewhere between 100 and 110 billions of goods and services a year, valued at present prices. At least 20 to 30 billions of those goods will be articles of defense—bombers and tanks, guns and shells, uniforms and ships. Not over 80 to 90 billions of what we produce will be going into normal civilian uses. When we stop spending for defense, what will happen?

Let us suppose we could divert our defense factories from war goods to those of peace. They could change from uniforms to work clothes, from military knapsacks and mess kits to hikers' gear, from giant bombers to transport planes and private aircraft, from munitions to fertilizers and plastics, from building barracks and military camps to building recreational facilities, from medical, hospital, and nursing care for soldiers to the same care for civilians, even from steel ships to steel buildings. Suppose we did solve all the technical and engineering problems of changing over from a 30-billion output of defense goods to a 30-billion output of goods for normal peace-time use. We would then be producing 110 billions' worth for peace instead of 80 billions' for consumers and 30 billions' for defense. What would happen then?

According to these theories we would be quite able to produce 110 billions of peace-time goods, but we would not be able to market them—if private industry followed the same price, wage, and profit practices it has followed heretofore in times of peace, if consumers used their incomes the same way they have heretofore, and if government followed the tax and expenditure policies either of the '20's or of the '30's. Perhaps by a temporary government subsidy we could get industry to operate on a 110-billion dollar level for a year. Businessmen would then have 110 billions from the sale of their products and would pay this out as wages, salaries, and dividends, or hold it as additions to corporate surplus. But part of the business savings and of the private savings would be hoarded, for at 110 billion dollars of national income savings would expand to much more than could profitably be invested. In the next year, if the government...
ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

subsidy were withdrawn, there would be market demand for a good deal less than $10 billion dollars of goods, and depression and unemployment would follow.

The problem of keeping up full production on a peace-time basis thus resolves itself into the problem of maintaining markets in peace time. It is technically possible to use all our productive powers making the things we need for ourselves (or which we need to send to other countries in exchange for things such as coffee, cocoa, and silk, which they will send back). Our consumptive needs are so great that we could easily consume all that we could produce. But we have not as yet devised a mechanism for making the markets for goods and services keep pace with their production—except temporarily in time of defense or war.

The external methods mentioned before offer a number of devices for modifying the situation so that buying power can be sufficient to purchase all the goods produced at full employment, so that $100 billion dollars' worth of goods and services would be sold as well as produced. These measures may be employed singly or in combination. They include:

1. Modification of taxation policy so as to increase the funds available to consumers for expenditure. For example, removal of sales taxes, cigarette and liquor taxes, or of gasoline taxes would reduce prices to consumers and leave them more to spend on increased purchases of these or other goods. Removal of extraordinary defense taxes falling on consumers would also increase their buying power for consumption.

2. Modification of taxation policy so as to encourage or stimulate investment. Many proposals are included here, including some to encourage risk-taking by raising the taxes on income from risk-free investment, and lowering taxes on income from risky investment. Other proposals aim at forcing savings into expenditures or investment, through various forms of taxation on inactive balances or other idle funds, or other types of incentive taxation. It is not yet clear whether the holder of funds who will not be led to invest could be made to invest any more than the proverbial horse "led to water."

3. Modification of the laws and customs controlling the investment policies of savings banks, insurance companies, and other institutional holders of funds to widen the fields where they can invest their funds and to permit purchase of equities as well as of bonds. It is agreed that such steps would increase the willingness of these institutions to place their funds in new undertakings, even of a risky nature, and so would increase the volume of new investment.

4. Modifications of social security and other public insurance programs so as to increase the funds available to low-income consumers for their consumptive expenditures. Both old-age and unemployment insurance today take in, in taxes, hundreds of millions of dollars more than they pay out as benefits. Modifications of these programs to place them on a pay-as-you-go basis, by enlarging benefits, reducing waiting periods, or reducing contributory taxes, would directly increase consumer buying power and expenditures.

5. Reorganization of local, state, and federal taxation structures so as to reduce the tax burden on low-income groups and increase the taxes on high-income groups would shift taxation from those who have to take it out of consumption expenditures to those who could pay increased taxes largely out of savings which tend to go into hoarded funds. Before the current war period, three-quarters of all tax revenues came from commodity, excise, and real property taxes, and only one-quarter from corporate taxes, individual income taxes, and estate taxes. As a consequence, taxes, direct and indirect, fell even more heavily on persons with very low incomes than on those with intermediate incomes. Twenty per cent of the income of a $500-income family went into taxes, but only 15 per cent of the income of a $500,000-income family. Shifting much more of the tax burden from poor to well-to-do would greatly increase the consuming power of the community.

6. If measures of these types are not sufficient to close the gap between goods made and goods sold, direct government expenditures can be used to make up the remainder of the deficit in buying power. Government can spend money in many different ways, with corresponding differences in the value received in return for the funds expended. Government can acquire the funds to be spent in many different ways. Some of these also differ in their effect upon the total economic picture. Before exploring these complications, however, it may be noted here that what is needed is sufficient public expenditure to close completely the gap between production and consumption. Data from previous years indicate that when defense expenditures are withdrawn and the new defense taxes on consumers are removed, private expenditures for consumption and investment are likely to rise to within 10 to 12 billion dollars of the value of the national product. More liberal taxes and social security policies as outlined above...


"Treasury Department, "Federal and Estimated State and Local Expenditures for General Government, Fiscal Year 1938" (Bulletin, August, 1939).

ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION
(points 1 to 4) may close part of this remaining gap. Whatever is left will have to be
closed by government expenditures above the usual level of government
spending in peace time if full production is to be maintained by these indirect
measures alone.

Ways in which public funds can be spent are almost unlimited. In
line with the basic principles set forth at the beginning, especially points
1, 3, and 7, these expenditures should be so selected as (a) to emphasize
self-reliant work rather than relief grants; (b) to encourage expansion in
the goods and services which are most useful socially; and (c) to serve
where possible to expand the future productive power of the country.
With some overlapping some of the possible public expenditures may be
classified as follows:

I. Expenditures creating work and increasing present or future social pro-
ductivity:
  Public works (including PWA, USHA, REA, and some types of
  WPA projects, for example).
  Expanded social services, either under direct Federal operation or by
  grants-in-aid to states, for education, health, child care, and
  nutrition.
  Expansion of useful public services—police, fire, research, and infor-
  mation agencies.
  Production or subsidization of cultural or recreational projects, not
  otherwise feasible—theaters and operas, recreational facilities.

II. Expenditures encouraging or assisting private investment:
  Assistance or insurance in real estate or housing, financing at lowered
  rates (including FHA and FCA, for example).
  Payments to farmers to encourage soil conservation practices or opera-
  tions (AAA).
  Loans to farmers to increase their working capital and put families on
  a self-sustaining basis (Farm Security operations).
  Loans to private industry, here or in foreign countries, to expand opera-
  tions or develop new undertakings (RFC and Export-Import Bank).

III. Expenditures providing funds directly to needy citizens for their own
  consumptive expenditure:
  Direct relief grants (such as the old FERA).
  Old-age pensions (without contributions) and aid to the blind, lame,
  and other physically handicapped persons.
  Subsidies to farmers through crop loans or parity payments (though
  these have other economic adjustments tied up with them).

IV. Subsidies to increase the buying power of low-income families for partic-
  ular products where surpluses are available (the food and cotton stamp plans
  of the Surplus Marketing Administration).

V. Direct government purchase of commodities and distribution to those in
  need:
  School lunches.
  Cotton mattress program.
  Relief in kind, etc.

Without exhausting the list of possible lines of expenditures, there are
apparently almost unlimited avenues for the expenditure of public funds.
The way the public funds are raised has no necessary connection with
the way they are to be expended. Possible methods are as follows:

I. Within the usual pattern of public finance of the past:
  (a) Increased taxation, preferably falling on upper-income groups, for
      the reasons already given.
  (b) Borrowing on short-term notes or on bonds, as part of the public debt.
  (c) Borrowing outside the budget through special publicly owned agencies,
      where the new liabilities are backed in whole or in part by correspond-
      ing assets in the usual manner of private business. The RFC and the
      FCA land banks are examples of such special means of financing for
      self-liquidating projects. The way the public funds are raised will
      have some effect on the ability of public expenditures to maintain
      production under one particular set of circumstances. If the supply
      of loanable funds is so short that taxing or borrowing by the govern-
      ment uses up funds that otherwise would be invested in private offer-
      ings, there is a possibility that the increase in public expenditure may
      cause a corresponding decrease in private expenditure, with no net
      gain. Such a situation would exist, however, only when the opportuni-
      ties for investment were as large as the savings available for investment.

II. Beyond previous usual methods of raising funds:
  (a) Direct issue of government obligations without interest.
  (b) Direct issue of credit by the government, by some method of trans-
      ferring the credit issuance power from private banks to the govern-
      ment (possibly through some such method as that proposed by Profes-
      sor Irving Fisher of Yale University*).
  (c) Direct issue of fiat money, such as "greenbacks" or other paper money.

Those who propose that the government raise the necessary funds in
one of these latter ways recognize that unlimited issuance of fiat money

ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

has frequently produced inflation in the past. They therefore recommend that the power of the government to create additional purchasing power in this way be strictly limited with reference to existing economic conditions, as judged by indexes of production, employment, price level, etc. The objective would be to create just enough additional money in each period to keep workers substantially fully employed and to keep national production and income running at high levels, without adding so much buying power as to cause inflation in the general level of prices. If prices started moving up generally, the levels of expenditure would be reduced until price stability was restored.

The problem of maintaining price stability under peace-time conditions should not be as difficult as it is today. Under defense we are spending almost unlimited funds for every means of defense. This involves very drastic redirection of our whole economy, with great expansions in many industries and resulting curtailments elsewhere. Production and speed are the great objectives, and cost is secondary. Many bottlenecks exist, and more are being created as expansion in one sector reveals unbalanced limitations elsewhere. The problem of preventing price inflation in the midst of this hectic drive for production is far more difficult than it would be under peace-time conditions, when speed would not be so imperative and production would be running in more familiar channels.

The goods and services we use at any time are those we produce at that time, just as every one of the airplanes and tanks we are sending over to Europe today are made by our own present generation. Our grandchildren, who so frequently are said to have to pay the cost of the present defense, will not make a single one of the bombs or torpedos exploded today. The physical goods and services made today are what count; our wealth consists in what we as a nation produce and consume. Those who argue for continuous deficit expenditure point out that the records of debt and ownership are after all only marks on pieces of paper; if the methods we have used heretofore in keeping those records do not serve to maintain maximum production of the real things, then we should shift to methods which do.10


THE ANTIΟΧ REVIEW

The external methods of maintaining full production thus embrace two general phases: (1) modification of our taxation policies and investment institutions so as to increase the proportion of current income which will be spent privately either for consumption or investment goods; and (2) closing any remaining gap between the value of goods and services produced and the total of private purchases by public expenditures in excess of public receipts.

If the first set of measures were inadequate, the budget could be balanced, at least over long periods. If measures of the second sort were required permanently, we would operate continuously with an unbalanced budget.

These external methods of dealing with chronic unemployment assume that business will operate after defense in just the same ways that it operated during the '20's and '30's. Some of the business policies which have been important in this respect were as follows:

(1) The force of competition has been restricted in many commodities by the growth of large industrial and corporate units. When a few such units dominate an industry, free and impersonal competition no longer controls prices and production. Instead, the conscious decisions of men, as business executives, take the place of impersonal economic forces in establishing or changing prices, wages, or production.11

(2) Under conditions of modern technology in mass-production industries, labor per unit and other costs of production fall as output rises, so that cost per unit of product is much less when they are operating at full capacity than when they are operating far below capacity.12

(3) Corporations tend to set their prices at such levels that they can “break even” at relatively low levels of output. Then if they are able to sell more and to operate nearer to full capacity, they generally put the reduced costs into higher profits, rather than lowering prices or increasing wages.

(4) Modern technology is constantly increasing the output per man-hour of work, on farms as well as in factories and in transportation.13 Under effective con-

petition these falling costs would be reflected in falling prices or higher wages. In industries where competition is restricted, these changes are slowed down, and a considerable portion of the technological gains are diverted to profits and dividends instead.

These various forces combine to create a situation where rises in production and employment increase the income at the upper portions of the income scale much more rapidly than they increase the income of lower-income groups. Since these upper-income groups save proportionately more than lower-income groups, the tendency of savings to outrun investment opportunities becomes even greater as national income rises. Thus the data of the National Resources Planning Board show that individual savings are practically twice as great at eighty billion national income as at sixty, yet presumably it would take only one-third more investment to sustain this one-third higher level of national income.

The external measures outlined before provide various lines of public action to offset the hoarding of savings which results from the way private business operates. If business would modify its policies in such ways as itself to disburse its income less unequally, there would be less need for public action. The broader the distribution of income by business to consumers who will spend all they receive, the less need there will be for the redistribution or creation of income by public action.

Certain types of public and private legislative action have already tried to modify business policies in these directions. Private institutions have studied business policies and have urged low-price or high-wage policies. Antitrust and Federal Trade Commission actions have sought to eliminate or reduce monopoly controls. The Wage-Hour Act has put a floor under certain wages. The National Labor Relations Act has encouraged collective bargaining, with its pressures toward higher wage rates, and toward enabling labor to share in increased incomes in periods of rising activity. All of these efforts together, however, have apparently made at best only a moderate change in the distribution of income as paid out by business. The problem of maintaining buying power for full production still remains to be solved by other means.

A further step in the direction of internal changes in industrial policies is possible by the use of economic planning. No matter how good their desires may be, there are now few ways by which big corporations can follow policies of low prices, high wages, and full production. If an individual corporation, or even an individual industry, were to take such action, it could not do so safely unless other major industries were taking corresponding and properly related action. If all major industries should simultaneously operate at low prices, increased wages, and substantially full production, they could both keep all workers fully employed and at the same time pay out and maintain a volume of buying power large enough to make markets for all they could produce. Of course it would be necessary for them to adjust production to what consumers would want to spend their money for, but American business is already highly skilled in doing that, as well as in making consumers want what American business does produce. As matters stand now, though, there is no practical procedure by which our major industries can operate on such a program. Lacking a practical procedure for simultaneous action, any concern or industry which attempted to act by itself would almost certainly suffer losses by doing so.

Our present experience with starting to plan business for defense may acquaint businessmen with the possibilities of joint action on production programs, and make them more willing to use economic planning after defense is over. Obviously what is needed is not a cartelization of industry with a stabilization of production and employment at low levels, as under NRA, but a vigorous planning for full production, full employment, and the levels of prices, wages, and profits which would be consistent with the maintenance of markets for all that was produced.

Without discussing the elements of such economic planning in detail, here are some steps which have been suggested in any such program of planned full production under peacetime conditions:

1. Establishment of a common objective or goal as to the level of employment and national income to be maintained in the next production period.

2. Industry programs for the levels of production and sales to be maintained in that period, in view of the proposed level of national income, for each major...
industry, including level of production, reductions in prices, and adjustments in wages.

(3) Coordination of the program between industries through some inter-industry agency, with readjustments where necessary to secure consistency.

(4) Government underwriting of markets for the programmed production, with provisions for public purchase and temporary storage and sale of any unanticipated surpluses.

(5) Corresponding expansions in production in industries already under public regulation, including agriculture, railroads, and other public utilities.

(6) Successive programs in subsequent years, expanding levels of production as rapidly as employable population and technological efficiency rise.

(7) Formulation of industry programs through democratic procedures, including representation of all interests—business, labor, consumers, and government—on planning and administrative bodies, and democratic participation in formulation of industry and national programs through open hearings and public discussion. Democracy in consumption also to be maintained through freedom of choice by consumers. They would be free to spend their increased incomes as they saw fit; while business would adjust its product to their demands through advance planning, the use of the storage reservoirs to absorb errors or shocks, and the readjustment of programs to operating experience.16

Such planning of industry for peace would be more difficult than for war, for the plans would have to provide for maintaining buying power and forecasting consumer demand as well as for increasing the product. To the extent American business does prove willing to help develop and carry through a program such as this, however, it would avert the need for extensive financial operations on the part of the government as outlined earlier. If, by planning or otherwise, business will distribute income in such a way as to provide the buying power for full production, it will be unnecessary for government to do so. If business proves unable to carry through such internal changes, then the external programs will have to be correspondingly larger.

Regardless of whether internal or external means are used, the object is the same—to maintain the volume of national production and national consumption at the highest possible level, and to use most efficiently our labor power and our technical and raw material resources. That is consistent with the basic principles stated at the beginning. Idle men produce nothing. Idle plant produces nothing. Only by keeping plant and men

---

16For more details of one such program for economic planning, see Mordecai Ezekiel, Jobs for All (New York: Knopf & Co., 1939).
This pamphlet is one of several presenting varying viewpoints on problems of post-war reconstruction, being distributed to encourage widespread discussion of this subject. The titles are:

**THE ATLANTIC CHARTER**—The Eight Point Declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941 with Summary of Recommendations of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 8 West 40th Street, New York, N. Y.

**FOUNDATIONS OF THE PEACE,** by Vice-President Henry A. Wallace (reprinted from the *Atlantic Monthly,* January 1942).

**THE WORLD WE WANT,** by Malcolm W. Davis, Associate Director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (reprinted from Report and Monographs of Commission to Study the Organization of Peace in *International Conciliation* No. 369, April 1941).

**LINES OF ACTION IN ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION,** by Mordecai Ezekiel, Member of Committee on Post-War Planning, United States Department of Agriculture (reprinted from the *Antioch Review,* Fall 1941).

**PLANNING THE WAR FOR PEACE,** by Helen Hill, Executive Director of National Policy Committee, Washington (reprinted from the *Virginia Quarterly Review,* Winter, 1942).

**AN APPRAISAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS,** by Benjamin Gerig, Professor of Government at Haverford College (reprinted from Report and Monographs of Commission to Study the Organization of Peace in *International Conciliation* No. 369, April 1941).

**CAN WE SAVE FREE ENTERPRISE?** Post-War Economic Plans, by Charles E. Wilson, President of General Electric Company (reprinted from the *American Magazine,* November 1941).

*Write for additional copies*

- 10 copies free
- 11-100 copies @ 5c each
- 101-500 copies @ 3c each
- over 500 copies @ 2c each

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
405 West 17th Street, New York, N. Y.

February 1942