Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943
## CONTENTS

### Polish - Soviet Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanatory Note</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Moscow, August 29—1918.</td>
<td>Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Moscow, January 28—1920.</td>
<td>Declaration of the Council of People’s Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. to the Polish Government and the Polish Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Riga, March 18—1921.</td>
<td>Treaty of Peace between Poland, Russia and the Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Paris, March 15—1923.</td>
<td>Decision of Conference of Ambassadors on Frontiers of Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Moscow, July 25—1932.</td>
<td>Pact of Non-Aggression between Poland and U.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>London, July 3—1933.</td>
<td>Convention for Definition of Aggression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Moscow, September 10—1938.</td>
<td>Exchange of Notes between Polish and Soviet Government on the U.S.S.R.’s entry into the League of Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Warsaw - Moscow, November 26—1939.</td>
<td>Joint Communiqué issued by Polish and Soviet Governments on Polish-Soviet Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Warsaw, November 26—1939.</td>
<td>Polish Telegraphic Agency’s Official Commentary in the Polish-Soviet Joint Communiqué</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Warsaw, February 19—1939.</td>
<td>Polish Telegraphic Agency’s Communiqué on signature of Polish-Soviet Commercial Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Moscow, May 31—1939.</td>
<td>Excerpts from M. Molotov’s Speech to Supreme Council of U.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Warsaw, June 2—1939.</td>
<td>M. Szaronov’s Speech on Presenting his Credentials to the President of Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Moscow, August 23—1939.</td>
<td>German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXPLANATORY NOTE

These documents concern the relations of the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the quarter century from 1918 to 1943. All these texts have already been published either by the Government of the Republic of Poland or by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The purpose of this publication, comprising only the most important diplomatic documents, international agreements, Government reports, and excerpts from official speeches, is to provide, in easily accessible form, reference material for those interested in the problems of Eastern Europe and particularly in Polish-Russian relations.

NEW YORK, April 10, 1943

POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS

No. 1

Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars No. 698—abrogating the agreements of the Government of the former Russian Empire with the Governments of the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, the Kingdoms of Prussia and Bavaria, the Duchies of Hesse, Oldenburg, Sachsen-Meiningen, and the City of Lubeck.

Moscow, August 29, 1918.

Art. 1. .................................................................
Art. 2. .................................................................
Art. 3. All agreements and acts concluded by the Government of the former Russian Empire with the Governments of the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in connection with the partitions of Poland, are annulled for ever by the present Resolution, in view of the fact that they are contrary to the principle of the self-determination of peoples and to the revolutionary, legal conception
of the Russian nation, which recognizes the inalienable right of the Polish nation to decide its own fate and to become united.

Art. 4. ..................................................................................................................................................
Art. 5. ..................................................................................................................................................

Signed: Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars:
W. ULJANOW (LENIN).
Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs:
L. KARACHAN.
Executive Secretary of the Council of People’s Commissars:
WLOD. BONCZ-BRUJEWICZ.

No. 2

DECLARATION of the Council of People’s Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. to the Polish Government and the Polish Nation

Moscow, January 28, 1920.

Poland is now confronted with a decision that for many years to come may have grave repercussions on the lives of both nations. Everything shows that the extreme imperialists of the Entente, the supporters and agents of Churchill and Clemenceau are directing at present all their efforts to draw Poland into a futile, ill-considered and criminal war with Soviet-Russia.

Conscious of its responsibility for the fate of the Russian working masses and wishing to prevent new and innumerable disasters, sacrifices and devastation threatening the two nations:—

1. The Council of People’s Commissars declares that the policy of the U.S.S.R. towards Poland is based not on any occasional, transient considerations of war or diplomacy but on the inviolable principle of self-determination of nations and it has recognized and recognizes unreservedly the independence and sovereignty of the Polish Republic and declares this recognition to be the basis of all its relations with Poland from the moment of the formation of an independent Polish State.

2. While regarding the last peace proposal of December 22nd put forward by the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs as still fully valid, the Council of People’s Commissars, which has no aggressive intentions whatever, declares that the Red Army will not cross the present line of the White-Ruthenian front that passes near the following points: Dryssa, Dzisna, Polock, Borysow, Parycz, Rail-
road Stations Pycz and Bialokozowice. As regards the Ukrainian front, the Council of People’s Commissars declares in its own name and in the name of the provisional Ukrainian Government that the army of the Federated Soviet Republic will not engage in military operations to the West of the present line, running near the localities of Budouwa, Pilawy, Dereznia and Bar.

3. The Council of the People’s Commissars declares that the Soviet Government has not entered into any agreements or pacts, with Germany or any other country, aimed directly or indirectly against Poland, and that the character and spirit of international policy of the Soviet authorities excludes the very possibility of similar agreements, as well as attempts to exploit eventual conflict between Poland and Germany or Poland and other countries in order to violate Poland’s independence and her territorial integrity.

4. The Council of People’s Commissars declares that so far as the essential interests of Poland and Russia are concerned there is not a single question, territorial, economic or other, that could not be solved in a peaceful way, through negotiation, mutual compromise or agreement, as is now the case in the negotiations with Estonia.

While recommending to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that it obtain at the next session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in February, a confirmation by the Supreme Body of the Republic of the above stated basis of Soviet policy towards Poland, the Council of People’s Commissars considers on its part that by this categorical declaration it is fulfilling its duty towards the peace interests of the Russian and Polish nations and hopes that all controversial matters will be settled by friendly negotiations between Russia and Poland.

Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars:
W. ULJANOW-LENIN.
People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs:
CZICZERIN.
People’s Commissar for Army and Navy:
TROCKI.

No. 3

TREATY of Peace between Poland, Russia and the Ukraine, signed at Riga, March 18th, 1921.

PREAMBLE

Poland—of the one hand—and Russia and the Ukraine—of the other—being desirous of putting an end to the war and of concluding
a final, lasting and honourable peace based on a mutual understanding and in accordance with the peace preliminaries signed at Riga on October 12, 1920, have decided to enter into negotiations and have appointed for this purpose as plenipotentiaries:

The Government of the Polish Republic:

MM. Jean Dabski,
Stanislas Kauzik,
Edouard Lechowicz,
Henri Strasburger and
Léon Wasilewski.


MM. Adolphe Ioffé
Jacob Ganetski
Emmanuel Kviring
Leonide Obolenski and
Georges Koutshoubinski.

The above-mentioned plenipotentiaries met at Riga, and having exchanged their full powers which were recognised as sufficient and found to be in good and due form, agreed to the following provisions:

*Riga, March 18, 1921.*

**ARTICLE 1**

The two Contracting Parties declare that a state of war has ceased to exist between them.

**ARTICLE 2**

The two Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of national self-determination, recognize the independence of the Ukraine and White Ruthenia, and agree and decide that the eastern frontier of Poland, that is to say, the frontier between Poland on the one hand, and Russia, White Ruthenia and the Ukraine on the other, shall be as follows:

The frontier shall follow the course of the western Dzwinia from the frontier between Russia and Latvia. . . . It shall then cross the railway line near the town of Orzechowo. . . . leaving the station of Zachacie to Poland. . . .

Thence the line shall follow the river Wilia to the south of the town of Dolhinowo; . . .

Thence it shall run to the town of Radoszkowicze; . . . leaving . . .

to Poland the town of Radoszkowicze; . . . and leaving the station of Radoszkowicze to White Ruthenia; . . .

Thence it shall continue as far as the Warsaw-Moscow road, crossing it to the west of the village of West Filipowicz; . . .

Thence it shall run south as far as the Morocz river, near Choropol; . . .

Thence it shall follow the Morocz river as far as its confluence with the river Slucz of Minsk;

Thence it shall follow the river Slucz as far as its confluence with the river Prypec; . . .

Thence it shall continue as far as the Sarny-Olewska railway, which it shall cross between the stations of Ostki and Snowidowicz, . . .

Thence it shall run up the river Korczyk, leaving the town of Korze to Poland; . . .

Thence it shall continue as far as the town of Bielowzokia, leaving to the Ukraine . . . the town of Jampol, . . .

Thence it shall continue as far as the river Zbrucz, leaving the road and the village of Szcesnowka to Poland;

Thence it shall follow the river Zbrucz as far as its confluence with the river Dniester.

**ARTICLE 3**

Russia and the Ukraine abandon all rights and claims to the territories situated to the west of the frontier laid down by Article 2 of the present Treaty. Poland, on the other hand, abandons in favour of the Ukraine and of White Ruthenia all rights and claims to the territory situated to the east of this frontier. The two Contracting Parties agree that, in so far as the territory situated to the west of the Frontier fixed in Article 2 of the present Treaty includes districts which form the subject of a dispute between Poland and Lithuania, the question of the attribution of these districts to one of those two States is a matter which exclusively concerns Poland and Lithuania.

---

**No. 4**

**DECISION of the Conference of Ambassadors, March 15, 1923, on the subject of the frontiers of Poland**

The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, signatories with the United States of America, as the principal Allied and associated Powers, of the Versailles Treaty of Peace:

Considering that by the terms of Article 87, paragraph 3, of the
Governments concerned. who will States and on their responsibility related November 28, 1922.

100,000):

of Nations on February 3, 1923; concerning, there is cause to take into account the actual situation resulting, notably, from the Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations on February 3, 1923;

Considering that by the terms of Article 91 of the Treaty of Peace of Saint Germain-en-Laye, Austria has renounced in favour of the principal allied and associated Powers all its rights and titles to the territories which previously belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and which, situated outside the new frontiers of Austria, as they are described in Article 27 of the said Treaty, are not actually the subject of any attribution;

Considering that it is recognized by Poland that in so far as the eastern part of Galicia is concerned, the ethnographical conditions necessitate an autonomous regime;

Considering that the Treaty concluded between the principal allied and associated Powers and Poland on June 28, 1919, has provided for special guarantees in favour of racial, language and religious minorities in all the territories placed under Polish sovereignty;

Considering that so far as its frontier with Russia is concerned, Poland has entered into direct relations with that State with a view to determining the line;

That in so far as the frontier between Poland and Lithuania is concerned, there is cause to take into account the actual situation resulting, notably, from the Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations on February 3, 1923;

Have charged the Conference of Ambassadors with the regulation of this question.

In consequence, the Conference of Ambassadors:

1. Decides to recognize as the frontiers of Poland:

   (1) With Russia:
   The line drawn and delimited by the agreement between the two States and on their responsibility dated November 28, 1922.

   (2) With Lithuania:
   The line below described (according to the German map, scale 1: 100,000):

   ..............................................................

   ... The tracing of this line on the spot is left to the care of the two Governments concerned, who will have every latitude to proceed, by mutual agreement, to rectifications of detail which they may recognize on the spot as indispensable.

2. Decides to recognize to Poland, which accepts all rights of sovereignty over the territories comprised between the frontiers above defined and the other frontiers of the Polish territory, with reserve to the dispositions of the Treaty of Peace concluded at Saint Germain-en-Laye concerning the charges and obligations incumbent upon the States to which any territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is transferred.

Done at Paris, March 15, 1923.

ERIC Phipps.

ROMANO AREZZANA.

The undersigned, duly authorized, declares, in the name of the Polish Government, his acceptance of the foregoing dispositions.

Done at Paris, March 15, 1923.

MAURICE ZAMOYSKI

No. 5

Protocol, signed at Moscow, February 9, 1929, between Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Rumania, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for the immediate entry into force of the Treaty of Paris of August 27, 1928, regarding renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy

The Government of the Estonian Republic, the President of the Latvian Republic, the President of the Polish Republic, His Majesty the King of Rumania, and the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, being desirous of promoting the maintenance of peace between their respective countries and for this purpose of putting into force without delay, between the peoples of those countries, the Treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, signed at Paris on August 27, 1928, have decided to achieve this purpose by means of the present Protocol and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries . . .

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, signed at Paris on August 27, 1928, a copy of which is attached to the present Protocol as an integral part of that instru-
ment, shall come into force between the Contracting Parties after the ratification of the said Treaty of Paris of 1928 by the competent legislative bodies of the respective Contracting Parties.

**Article 2**

The entry into force in virtue of the present Protocol, of the Treaty of Paris of 1928 in reciprocal relations between the Parties to the present Protocol shall be valid independently of the entry into force of the Treaty of Paris of 1928 as provided in Article 3 of the last-named Treaty.

**Article 3**

1. The present Protocol shall be ratified by the competent legislative bodies of the Contracting Parties, in conformity with the requirements of their respective constitutions.

2. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited by each of the Contracting Parties with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics within one week of the ratification of the present Protocol by the respective Parties.

3. As from the date of the deposit of the instruments of ratification by two of the Contracting Parties, the present Protocol shall come into force between those two Parties. In reciprocal relations between the other Contracting Parties and the States for which it has already come into force, the Protocol shall come into force as and when their instruments of ratification are deposited.

4. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall immediately notify the deposit of the several ratifications to all the signatories to the present Protocol.

**Article 4**

In order to give effect to Article 1 of the present Protocol, each of the High Contracting Parties, after ratification by its legislative bodies of the Treaty of Paris of 1928, shall immediately notify the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all the other Parties to the present Protocol, through the diplomatic channel.

**Article 5**

The present Protocol shall be open for the accession of the Governments of all countries. Notification of final accession shall be made to the address of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall duly notify all the other Parties to the present Protocol. Immediately on receipt of such notification of accession, the present Protocol shall be put into force in reciprocal relations between the acceding State and all the other Parties to the present Protocol.

**Article 6**

The entry into force, in virtue of the present Protocol, of the Treaty of Paris of 1928, in reciprocal relations between the acceding State and all the other Parties to the said Protocol, shall be effected in the way laid down in Article 4 of the Protocol.

**Article 7**

The present Protocol has been drawn up in a single copy, an authentic copy of which shall be communicated by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to each of the signatory or acceding States.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and have affixed their seals thereto.

---

**No. 6**

**Pact of Non-Aggression between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Signed at Moscow, July 25, 1932**

The President of the Polish Republic, of the one part, and the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of the other part,

Desirous of maintaining the present state of peace between their countries, and convinced that the maintenance of peace between them constitutes an important factor in the work of preserving universal peace;

Considering that the Treaty of Peace of March 18, 1921, constitutes, now as in the past, the basis of their reciprocal relations and undertakings;

Convinced that the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the exclusion of all that might be contrary to the normal condition of relations between States are the surest means of arriving at the goal desired;

Declaring that none of the obligations hitherto assumed by either of the Parties stands in the way of the peaceful development of their mutual relations or is incompatible with the present Pact;

Have decided to conclude the present Pact with the object of amplifying and completing the Pact for the renunciation of war signed at Paris on August 27, 1928, and put into force by the Protocol.
signed at Moscow on February 9, 1929, and for that purpose have designated as their Plenipotentiaries . . .

Who, after exchanging their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

**Article 1**

The two Contracting Parties, recording the fact that they have renounced war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations, reciprocally undertake to refrain from taking any aggressive action against or invading the territory of the other Party, either alone or in conjunction with other Powers.

Any act of violence attacking the integrity and inviolability of the territory or the political independence of the other Contracting Party shall be regarded as contrary to the undertakings contained in the present Article, even if such acts are committed without declaration of war and avoid all possible warlike manifestations.

**Article 2**

Should one of the Contracting Parties be attacked by a third State or by a group of other States, the other Contracting Party undertakes not to give aid or assistance, either directly or indirectly, to the aggressor State during the whole period of the conflict.

If one of the Contracting Parties commits an act of aggression against a third State the Other Contracting Party shall have the right to be released from the present Treaty without previous denunciation.

**Article 3**

Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to be a party to any agreement openly hostile to the other Party from the point of view of aggression.

**Article 4**

The undertakings provided for in Articles 1 and 2 of the present Pact shall in no case limit or modify the international rights and obligations of each Contracting Party under agreements concluded by it before the coming into force of the present Pact, so far as the said agreements contain no aggressive elements.

**Article 5**

The two Contracting Parties, desirous of settling and solving, exclusively by peaceful means, any disputes and differences, of whatever nature or origin, which may arise between them, undertake to submit questions at issue, which it has not been possible to settle within a reasonable period by diplomatic channels, to a procedure of conciliation, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention for the application of the procedure of conciliation, which constitutes an integral part of the present Pact and shall be signed separately and ratified as soon as possible simultaneously with the Pact of Non-Aggression.1

**Article 6**

The present Pact shall be ratified as soon as possible, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Warsaw within thirty days following the ratification by Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, after which the Pact shall come into force immediately.

**Article 7**

The Pact is concluded for three years. If it is not denounced by one of the Contracting Parties, after previous notice of not less than six months before the expiry of that period, it shall be automatically renewed for a further period of two years.

**Article 8**

The present Pact is drawn up in Polish and Russian, both texts being authentic.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Pact and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Moscow, in two copies, July 25, 1932.

**Protocol of Signature No. 1**

The Contracting Parties declare that Article 7 of the Pact of July 25, 1932, cannot be interpreted as meaning that the expiry of the time-limit or denunciation before the expiry of the time-period under Article 7 could have as a result the limitation or cancellation of the obligations arising out of the Pact of Paris of 1928.

Done at Moscow, in two copies, July 25, 1932.

**Protocol of Signature No. 2**

On signing the Pact of Non-Aggression this day, the two Parties, having exchanged their views on the draft Conciliation Convention

---

1 The Convention for Conciliation between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was signed at Moscow, November 23, 1932.
submitted by the Soviet Party, declare that they are convinced that there is no essential difference of opinion between them.

Done at Moscow, in two copies, July 25, 1932.

No. 7

Convention for the Definition of Aggression, Signed at London, July 3, 1933

His Majesty the King of Rumania, the President of the Estonian Republic, the President of the Latvian Republic, the President of the Polish Republic, the President of the Turkish Republic, the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia, and His Majesty the King of Afghanistan;

Being desirous of consolidating the peaceful relations existing between their countries;

Mindful of the fact that the Briand-Kellogg Pact, of which they are signatories, prohibits all aggression;

Deeming it necessary, in the interests of the general security, to define aggression as specifically as possible, in order to obviate any pretext whereby it might be justified;

And noting that all States have an equal right to independence, security, the defence of their territories, and the free development of their institutions;

And desirous, in the interest of the general peace, to ensure to all peoples the inviolability of the territory of their countries;

And judging it expedient, in the interest of the general peace, to bring into force, as between their countries, precise rules defining aggression, until such times as those rules shall become universal;

Have decided, with the aforesaid objects, to conclude the present Convention, and have duly authorized for this purpose ... Who have agreed on the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to accept in its relations with each of the other Parties, from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention, the definition of aggression as explained in the report dated May 24, 1933, of the Committee on Security Questions (Politis Report) to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, which report was made in consequence of the proposal of the Soviet delegation.

ARTICLE 2

Accordingly, the aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be considered to be that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions:
1. Declaration of war upon another State;
2. Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State;
3. Attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State;
4. Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;
5. Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.

ARTICLE 3

No political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred to in Article 2 (for examples see Annex).

ARTICLE 4

The present Convention shall be ratified by each of the High Contracting Parties in accordance with its laws.

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited by each of the High Contracting Parties with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

As soon as the instruments of ratification have been deposited by two of the High Contracting Parties, the present Convention shall come into force as between those two Parties. The Convention shall come into force as regards each of the other High Contracting Parties when it deposits its instruments of ratification.

Each deposit of instruments of ratification shall immediately be notified by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to all the signatories of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 5

The present Convention has been signed in eight copies, of which each of the High Contracting Parties has received one.
In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and have thereto affixed seals.

Done in London, July 3, 1933.

ANNEX

To Article 3 of the Convention Relating to the Definition of Aggression.

The High Contracting Parties, signatories of the Convention relating to the definition of aggression,

Desiring, subject to the express reservation that the absolute validity of the rule laid down in Article 3 of that Convention shall in no way be restricted, to furnish certain indications for determining the aggressor,

Declare that no act of aggression within the meaning of Article 2 of that Convention can be justified on either of the following grounds, among others:

(a) The internal condition of a State:

E.g., its political, economic, or social structure; alleged defects in its administration; disturbances due to strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions, or civil war.

(b) The international conduct of a State:

E.g., the violation or threatened violation of the material or moral rights or interests of a foreign State or its nationals; the rupture of diplomatic or economic relations; economic or financial boycotts; disputes relating to economic, financial, or other obligations towards foreign States; frontier incidents not forming any of the cases of aggression specified in Article 2.

The High Contracting Parties further agree to recognize that the present Convention can never legitimate any violations of international law that may be implied in the circumstances comprised in the above list.

Protocol of Signature.

It is hereby agreed between the High Contracting States that should one or more of the other States immediately adjacent to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accede in the future to the present Convention, the said accession shall confer on the State or States in question the same rights and shall impose on them the same obligations as those conferred and imposed on the ordinary signatories.1

Done at London, on July 3, 1933.

1 On July 22, 1933, the Republic of Finland adhered to this Convention.

No. 8

Protocol renewing until December 31, 1945, the Pact of Non-Aggression of July 25, 1932, between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Moscow, May 5, 1934.

The President of the Republic of Poland, and The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Being desirous of providing as firm a basis as possible for the development of the relations between their countries;

Being desirous of giving each other fresh proof of the unchangeable character and solidity of the pacific and friendly relations happily established between them;

Moved by the desire to collaborate in the consolidation of world peace and also for the stability and peaceful development of international relations in Eastern Europe;

Noting that the conclusion on July 5, 1932, at Moscow, of the Treaty between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has had a beneficial influence on the development of their relations and on the solution of the above-mentioned problems;

Have decided to sign the present Protocol, and have for this purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries . . .

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and true form, have agreed on the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

In modification of the provisions of Article 7 of the Treaty of Non-Aggression concluded at Moscow on July 25, 1932, between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the date and manner in which that Treaty shall cease to have effect, the two Contracting Parties decide that it shall remain in force until December 31, 1945.

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall be entitled to denounce the Treaty by giving notice to that effect six months before the expiry of the above-mentioned period. If the Treaty is not denounced by either of the Contracting Parties, its period of validity shall be automatically prolonged for two years; similarly, the Treaty shall be regarded as prolonged on each occasion for a further period of two years, if it is not denounced by either of the Contracting Parties in the manner provided for in the present Article.
ARTICLE 2

The present Protocol is drawn up in duplicate, each copy being in the Polish and Russian languages and both texts being equally authentic.

The present Protocol shall be ratified as soon as possible, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged between the Contracting Parties at Warsaw.

The present Protocol shall come into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Moscow in duplicate, in the Polish and Russian languages, the 5th day of May, 1934.

FINAL PROTOCOL

In connection with the signature on this date of the Protocol prolonging the Treaty of Non-Aggression between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of July 25, 1932, each of the High Contracting Parties, having again examined all the provisions of the Peace Treaty concluded at Riga on March 18, 1921, which constitutes the basis of their mutual relations, declares that it has no obligations and is not bound by any declarations inconsistent with the provisions of the said Peace Treaty and in particular of Article 3 thereof.

Consequently, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics confirms that the note from the People's Commissar, G. V. Chicherin, of September 28, 1926, to the Lithuanian Government cannot be interpreted to mean that the note implied any intention on the part of the Soviet Government to interfere in the settlement of the territorial questions mentioned therein.

Done at Moscow in duplicate, in the Polish and Russian languages, the 5th day of May, 1934.

No. 9

EXCHANGE OF NOTES between the Polish Government and the Soviet Government in connection with the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League of Nations

Moscow, September 10, 1934.

Monsieur le Commissaire du Peuple,

In connection with the eventuality of the entry of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into the League of Nations, the Government of the Republic of Poland proposes to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a reciprocal recognition that after the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has entered the League of Nations the relations between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will in all their extent continue on the basis of all existing agreements between them, including the Pact of Non-Aggression and the Convention for the Definition of Aggression.

I have, etc.,

HENRYK SOKOLNICKI.

To M. Mikolaj Krestinski,

Director of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow.

Moscow, September 10, 1934.

Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires,

In reply to your note of to-day's date, I have the honour to communicate to you in the name of my Government that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics completely agrees with the Polish Government on the question that, after the eventual invitation to and entry of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into the League of Nations the relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Poland will remain on the basis of the treaties existing between them, all of which, including the Pact of Non-Aggression and the Convention for the Definition of Aggression, will continue to preserve all their force.

I have, etc.,

M. KRESTINSKI.

M. Sokolniki,

Chargé d'Affaires of the Republic of Poland in Moscow.

No. 10

JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ issued by the Polish and Soviet Governments on the subject of Polish-Soviet relations

November 26, 1938.

A series of conversations recently held between the U.S.S.R. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. Litvinov, and the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, M. Grzybowski, has led to the following statement:

1. Relations between the Polish Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are and will continue to be based to the fullest extent on all the existing Agreements, including the Polish-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression dated July 25, 1932. This Pact, con-
cluded for five years and extended on May 5, 1934, for a further period ending December 31, 1945, has a basis wide enough to guarantee the inviolability of peaceful relations between the two States.

2. Both Governments are favourable to the extension of their commercial relations.

3. Both Governments agree that it is necessary to settle a number of current and longstanding matters which have arisen in connection with the various agreements in force, and, in particular, to dispose of the various frontier incidents which have lately been occurring.

No. 11

Official Commentary issued by the Polish Telegraph Agency on the Joint Polish-Soviet Communiqué regarding Polish-Soviet relations

November 26, 1938.

Conversations recently held between M. Litvinov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and M. Grzybowski, the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, and the Communiqué recently issued as their result, are the expression of the enduring and unalterable will of both Governments to regulate their mutual relations in accordance with the existing bilateral Agreements, and loyally to observe them. This mutual tendency appears to provide a sufficient guarantee for the stabilization of conditions on the Polish-Soviet frontier.

1 No. 10.

No. 12

Communiqué issued by the Polish Telegraph Agency on the signing of the Polish-Soviet Commercial Agreement

February 19, 1939.

Negotiations which have been taking place for some time past between Poland and the U.S.S.R., have led to the signing of the following Agreements embodying economic relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R.: a Commercial Agreement, an Understanding with regard to trade, and an Understanding with regard to clearing operations.

The Agreements were signed on behalf of Poland by M. Grzybowski, Polish Ambassador in Moscow, and M. Lychowski, the head of the Trade Delegation, and on behalf of the Soviets by M. A. J. Mikoyan, the U.S.S.R. People's Commissar for Foreign Trade. This Agreement is the first general Polish-Soviet Commercial Agreement to be based on the most favoured nation principle. It includes a number of points of principle concerning trade turnover and also maritime transport.

The Agreement with regard to trade provides for a considerable extension of trading operations between the two countries. The main articles of Polish imports from the U.S.S.R. will be cotton and cotton by-products, furs, apatites, tobacco, manganese ore, asbestos, graphite, etc. Poland, for her part, will supply the Soviet Union with coal iron manufactures, zinc and sheet zinc, textiles, textile machinery, tanned leather and viscose.

The clearing Agreement stipulates that financial payments will be effected through a Polish Clearing Institution.

No. 13

Excerpts from a speech by M. Molotov, to the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. on May 31, 1939

"... We stand for the cause of peace, and for an end being put to the development of aggression, ...

"... As is known, a special communique was published in February last confirming the development of good neighbourly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. A certain general improvement is now noticeable in our relations with Poland. Furthermore, the Trade Agreement concluded in March with Poland may considerably increase the trade turnover between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. . . .

"The foreign policy of the Soviet Union must reflect the changes which have occurred in the international situation, and the role falling to the U.S.S.R. as a powerful factor for peace.

"There is no need to demonstrate that the U.S.S.R.'s foreign policy is thoroughly pacific and is directed against the aggressor.

"... In a united front of the peaceful Powers which effectively opposes aggression, the U.S.S.R. could occupy only a foremost place."

1 The dates given by M. Molotov are inexact. The communiqué in question was published not in February 1939 but on November 26, 1938 (No. 10 supra), and the Commercial Agreement was concluded on February 19, 1939, and not in March (No. 12 supra).
No. 14

Speech made by M. Szaronov on presenting his Credentials to the President of the Polish Republic

Warsaw, June 2, 1939.

Monsieur le President,

I have the honour to present my Credentials, in which the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. accredits me to the Polish Republic as Ambassador Extraordinary and Envoy Plenipotentiary of the U.S.S.R.

The high mission entrusted to me by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. lays on me the duty to support and develop those friendly, neighbourly relations which have been strengthened by a series of political and economic Agreements concluded between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Polish Republic.

The close and fruitful co-operation of our two countries is an important factor in the consolidation of universal peace, and is in harmony with the aims of the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R., which endeavours to have peaceful friendly relations with all countries, and in the first instance with its neighbours.

Permit me to express my conviction that the Government of the Polish Republic is also imbued with the determination to foster and consolidate the relations already existing between our two countries.

It is with a feeling of profound satisfaction that I undertake the responsible mission entrusted to me by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and I express the hope that in the fulfillment of my office I shall meet with complete understanding, support and co-operation both from you, Monsieur le President, and also from the Polish Government.

No. 15

Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, guided by the desire to strengthen the cause of peace between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and taking as a basis the fundamental regulations of the Neutrality Agreement concluded in April 1926 between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have reached the following agreement:

ARTICLE 1

The two Contracting Parties bind themselves to refrain from any act of force, any aggressive action and any attack on each other, both singly and also jointly with other Powers.

ARTICLE 2

In the event of one of the Contracting Parties becoming the object of warlike action on the part of a third Power, the other Contracting Party shall in no manner support this third Power.

ARTICLE 3

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties shall in future remain continuously in touch with each other, by way of consultation, in order to inform each other on questions touching their joint interests.

ARTICLE 4

Neither of the two Contracting Parties shall participate in any grouping of Powers which is directed directly or indirectly against the other Party.

ARTICLE 5

In the event of disputes or disagreements, whatever their nature or origin, arising between the Contracting Parties, both Parties would clarify these disputes or disagreements exclusively by means of friendly exchange of opinion or, if necessary, by arbitration committees.

ARTICLE 6

The present Agreement shall be concluded for a period of ten years on the understanding that, in so far as one of the Contracting Parties does not give notice of termination one year before the end of this period, the period of validity of this Agreement shall automatically be regarded as prolonged for a further period of five years.

ARTICLE 7

The present Agreement shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Berlin. The Agreement takes effect immediately after it has been signed.

For the German Reich Government: RIBBENTROP.

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: MOLOTOV.
No. 16

EXCERPTS from interview with Marshall Voroshilov, reported in “Izvestia”

August 27, 1939.

“HELP in the form of raw materials and war materials is a commercial question, and no Pact of Mutual Assistance whatever, far less a Military Convention, is needed in order to supply Poland with these materials.

“The United States of America and several other States have neither a Pact of Mutual Assistance nor a Military Convention with Japan, yet for the past two years they have been selling raw materials and war materials to the Japanese, irrespective of the fact that Japan is in a state of war with China.”

No. 17

M. GRZYBOWSKI, Polish Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., to the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Moscow, September 17, 1939.

M. POTEMKIN sent for me to-day, September 17, at 3 a.m., and read me a note from his Government, signed by Premier Molotov. The note communicates that the Soviet Government has ordered its troops to cross the Polish frontier. The motives given in the note were of such a nature that I refused to take it into cognizance and categorically protested against its contents. In view of the absence of Soviet diplomatic representatives from Poland I agreed only to transmit the above information. I await instructions.

No. 18

TEXT of the Russian note communicated by M. Potemkin, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs to M. Grzybowski

September 17, 1939. 3 a.m.

The Polish-German war has revealed the internal bankruptcy of the Polish State. During the course of ten days’ hostilities Poland has lost all her industrial areas and cultural centres. Warsaw no longer exists as the capital of Poland. The Polish Government has disintegrated, and no longer shows any sign of life. This means that the Polish State and its Government have, in fact, ceased to exist. Therefore the Agreements concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Poland have ceased to operate. Left to her own devices and bereft of leadership, Poland has become a suitable field for all manner of hazards and surprises, which may constitute a threat to the U.S.S.R. For these reasons the Soviet Government, which hitherto has preserved neutrality, cannot any longer observe a neutral attitude towards these facts.

The Soviet Government further cannot view with indifference the fact that the kindred Ukrainian and White Russian people, who live on Polish territory and who are at the mercy of fate, are left defenceless.

In these circumstances, the Soviet Government has directed the High Command of the Red Army to order the troops to cross the frontier and to take under their protection the life and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western White Russia.

At the same time the Soviet Government proposes to take all measures to extricate the Polish people from the unfortunate war into which they were dragged by their unwise leaders, and to enable them to live a peaceful life.

No. 19

NOTE presented by the Polish Ambassador in Paris to the French Foreign Office

September 18, 1939. 10.30 p.m.

On instructions of his Government the Polish Ambassador has the honour to communicate the following to the Government of the Republic of France:

To-day, September 17, 1939, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics committed an aggression against Poland. At dawn large Soviet forces crossed the Polish frontier at several points. The Polish troops resisted. In view of the superiority of the Soviet forces, the Polish troops withdrew, fighting.

The Polish Government have protested to Moscow, and have instructed their Ambassador to demand his passports. The Polish Government await from the Allied French Government a categorical protest against the aggression committed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

1 A similar note was presented to the British Foreign Office by the Polish Ambassador in London.
The Polish Government reserve the right to call upon their Allies in regard to the obligations devolving upon them by virtue of the treaties in force.

No. 20

COMMUNIQUE issued by the Polish Embassy in London

September 17, 1939.

On September 17, at 4 a.m., Soviet troops crossed the frontier of Poland at many points and were met immediately with strong resistance on the part of the Polish National Army. A sharp encounter in particular is being fought near the frontier in the region of Molodeczno.

The pretext which the Soviet Government advance in order to justify this flagrant act of direct aggression is that the Polish Government has ceased to exist, and that it has abandoned the territory of Poland, thus leaving the Polish population on territories outside the zone of war with Germany without protection. The Polish Government cannot enter into any discussion of the pretext which the Soviet Government has invented in order to justify the violation of the Polish frontier.

The Polish Government, responsible to the President of the Republic and to the duly elected National Parliament, are functioning on Polish territory and are carrying on the war against the German aggressors by all the means in their power.

By the act of direct aggression committed this morning, the Soviet Government have flagrantly violated the Polish-Russian Pact of Non-Aggression concluded in Moscow on July 25, 1932, in which both parties mutually undertook to abstain from all aggressive action or from attack against each other. Moreover, on May 5, 1934, by the Protocol signed in Moscow, the above Pact of Non-Aggression was prolonged until December 31, 1945.

By the Convention concluded in London on July 3, 1933, Soviet Russia and Poland agreed on a definition of aggression, which clearly stamped as an act of aggression any encroachment upon the territory of one Contracting Party by the armed forces of the other and furthermore, that no consideration of a political, military, economic, or any other order could in any circumstances serve as a pretext or excuse for committing an act of aggression.

Therefore, by the act of wanton aggression committed this morning, the Soviet Government stands self-condemned as a violator of its international obligations, thus contradicting all the moral principles upon which Soviet Russia pretended to base her foreign policy since her admittance into the League of Nations.

No. 21

GERMAN-SOVET Agreement

Moscow, September 28, 1939.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government, following the collapse of the former Polish State, consider it as exclusively their own task to restore peace and order in these territories and to assure to the peoples inhabiting it a peaceful existence which will correspond to their national characteristics. With this object in view, they have concluded the following Agreement:

Article 1

The Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government establish, as the frontier between their respective State interests in the territory of the former Polish State, a line which is marked on the attached map and which will be given in more detail in a supplementary Protocol.

Article 2

Both countries recognize as final the frontier between their respective State interests, as set out in Article 1, and will resist any interference with this decision on the part of other Powers.

Article 3

The German Government will carry out the necessary State reconstruction on the territory west of the line indicated in Article 1, and the Soviet Government on the territory east of this line.

Article 4

The Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government regard the above-mentioned reconstruction as a reliable foundation for the future development of friendly relations between their peoples.

Article 5

This agreement is subject to ratification. The exchange of instruments of ratification is to take place as soon as possible in Berlin.

The agreement enters into force from the moment of its signature.
No. 22

THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S PROTEST AGAINST THE GERMAN-SOVET AGREEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1939. PRESENTED BY THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN LONDON TO THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE


In face of the flagrant violation of the sacred rights of the Polish State and the Polish Nation constituted by the Agreement of September 28 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., disposing of territories of the Polish Republic to the benefit of the two aggressor States, in the name of the Polish Government I make the formal and solemn protest against this machination woven between Berlin and Moscow in contempt of all international obligations and all human morality.

Poland will never recognize this act of violence, and, strong in the justice of her cause, she will not cease to struggle for the day when, her territory liberated from the invaders, her legitimate rights will be established in their entirety.

By the heroic resistance of her army, by the patriotic sacrifice of all her population which has been demonstrated in the heroic defence of the capital city of Warsaw, of Lwow, of Wilno, of Gdynia, of Modlin and of so many other towns, the Polish Nation has clearly proved to the world her steadfast will to live in freedom and independence.

Basing herself on the unanimous sympathy of all the countries which respect liberty and good faith in relations between the peoples, and confiding in the steadfast support which is guaranteed her by her treaties of alliance, Poland will continue the struggle by all means in her power, confident in her future and in the ultimate victory.

No. 23

soviet-lithuanian agreement of October 10, 1939


ARTICLE I


No. 24

M. ZALESKI TO ALL POLISH DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ABROAD

Paris, October 18, 1939.

WITH REFERENCE TO THE SOVIET-LITHUANIAN AGREEMENT, PLEASE COMMUNICATE THE FOLLOWING NOTE TO THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED:

No. 25

Polish Government's Note protesting against the holding of Elections in the Soviet Occupied Polish Territories

Paris, October 25, 1939.

On October 25, 1939, during the temporary occupation of Polish territory by the armed forces of the U.S.S.R., the Polish Government addressed a Note to all Governments with which it maintained diplomatic relations, protesting against the elections to the "People's Assemblies" (Local Soviets) then being organized on Polish territory.

The Polish Government declared that the holding of such elections, in areas under military occupation, was contrary to International Law, and warned that it would consider such elections as null and void and would in no case recognize them as having force of law.

No. 26

Report to the Fifth Extraordinary Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. by V. M. Molotov

Moscow, October 31, 1939.

After the Red Army Command of the Western Front had organized elections to the People's Assemblies (Local Soviets) in October 1939, the Fifth Extraordinary Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. was held in Moscow, at which on November 1st and 2nd, that part of Poland occupied by Soviet Forces was illegally "incorporated" in the U.S.S.R.

At the opening session of the Supreme Soviet, on October 31, Mr. V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, made the following statement on the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R.:

Comrade Deputies:

There have been important changes in the international situation during the past two months. This applies above all to Europe, but also to countries far beyond the confines of Europe. In this connection mention must be made of three principal circumstances which are of decisive importance.

First, mention should be made of the changes that have taken place in the relations between the Soviet Union and Germany. Since the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact on August 23, an end has been put to the abnormal relations that have existed between the Soviet Union and Germany for a number of years.

Instead of the enmity that was fostered in every way by certain European powers, we now have a rapprochement and the establishment of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany. Further improvement of these new relations, good relations, found its reflection in the German-Soviet treaty on amity and frontier signed in Moscow September 28.

This radical change in relations between the Soviet Union and Germany, the two biggest States in Europe, was bound to have its effect on the entire international situation. Furthermore, events have entirely confirmed the estimate of the political significance of the Soviet-German rapprochement given at the last session of the Supreme Soviet.

Second, mention must be made of such a fact as the defeat of Poland in war and the collapse of the Polish State. The ruling circles of Poland boasted quite a lot about the "stability" of their State and the "might" of their army. However, one swift blow to Poland, first by the German Army and then by the Red Army, and nothing was left of this ugly offspring of the Versailles treaty which had existed by oppressing non-Polish nationalities.

The "traditional policy" of unprincipled maneuvering between Germany and the U.S.S.R., and the playing of one against the other has proved unsound and has suffered complete bankruptcy.

Third, it must be admitted that the big war that has flared up in Europe has caused radical changes in the entire international situation. It is a war begun as a war between Germany and Poland and turned into a war between Germany on the one hand and Britain and France on the other.

The war between Germany and Poland ended quickly owing to the utter bankruptcy of the Polish leaders. As we know, neither the British nor the French guarantees were of help to Poland. To this day, in fact, nobody knows what these "guarantees" were.

The war between Germany and the Anglo-French bloc is only in its first stage and has not yet been fully developed. It is nevertheless clear that a war like this was bound to cause radical changes in the situation in Europe, and not only in Europe. In connection with these important changes in the international situation, certain old formulas, which we employed but recently and to which many people are so accustomed, are now obviously out of date and inapplicable.

We must be quite clear on this point so as to avoid making gross errors in judging the new political situation that has developed in Europe.

We know, for example, that in the past few months such concepts as "aggression" and "aggressor" have acquired a new concrete connotation, a new meaning. It is not hard to understand that we
can no longer employ these concepts in the sense we did, say, three or four months ago.

Today, as far as the European great powers are concerned, Germany is in the position of a State that is striving for the earliest termination of the war and for peace, while Britain and France, which but yesterday were declaring against aggression, are in favor of continuing the war and are opposed to the conclusion of peace. The roles, as you see, are changing.

Efforts of the British and French Governments to justify their new position on the grounds of their undertakings to Poland are, of course, obviously unsound. Everybody realizes that there can be no question of restoring the old Poland.

It is, therefore, absurd to continue the present war under the flag of the restoration of the former Polish State. Although the governments of Britain and France understand this they do not want the war stopped and peace restored but are seeking new excuses for continuing the war with Germany.

The ruling circles of Britain and France have been lately attempting to depict themselves as champions of the democratic rights of nations against Hitlerism; and the British Government has announced that its aim in the war with Germany is nothing more nor less than “the destruction of Hitlerism.” It amounts to this, that the British, and with them the French supporters of the war, have declared something in the nature of an “ideological” war on Germany, reminiscent of the religious wars of olden times.

In fact, religious wars against heretics and religious dissenters were once the fashion. As we know, they led to direst results for the masses, to economic ruin and the cultural deterioration of nations.

These wars could have no other outcome. But they were wars of the Middle Ages. Is it back to the Middle Ages, to the days of religious wars, superstition and cultural deterioration that the ruling classes of Britain and France want to drag us?

In any case under an “ideological” flag has now been started a war of even greater dimensions and fraught with even greater danger for the peoples of Europe and the whole world. But there is absolutely no justification for a war of this kind. One may accept or reject the ideology of Hitlerism as well as any other ideological system; that is a matter of political views.

But everybody would understand that an ideology cannot be destroyed by force, that it cannot be eliminated by war. It is, therefore, not only senseless but criminal to wage such a war as the war for “the destruction of Hitlerism,” camouflaged as a fight for “democracy.” And, indeed, you cannot give the name of a fight for democracy to such action as the banning of the Communist party in France, arrests of the Communist Deputies in the French Parliament, or the curtailment of political liberties in England or the unremitting national oppression in India, etc.

Is it not clear that the aim of the present war in Europe is not what it is proclaimed to be in the official statements intended for the public in France and England? That is, it is not a fight for democracy, but something else of which these gentlemen do not speak openly.

The real cause of the Anglo-French war with Germany was not that Britain and France had vowed to restore old Poland and not, of course, that they decided to undertake a fight for democracy. The ruling circles of Britain and France have, of course, other and more actual motives for going to war with Germany. These motives do not lie in any ideology but in their profoundly material interests as mighty colonial powers.

Great Britain, with a population of 47,000,000, possesses colonies with a population of 480,000,000. The colonial empire of France, whose population does not exceed 42,000,000, embraces a population of 72,000,000 in the French colonies. The possession of these colonies, which makes possible the exploitation of the hundreds of millions of people, is the foundation of the world supremacy of Great Britain and France. It is the fear of Germany’s claim to these colonial possessions that is at the bottom of the present war of England and France with Germany, who has grown substantially stronger lately as the result of the collapse of the Versailles treaty. It is the fear of losing world supremacy that dictates to the ruling circles of Great Britain and France the policy of fomenting war with Germany…

As I have said, our relations with Germany have radically improved. Here development has proceeded along the line of strengthening our friendly relations, extending our practical cooperation and rendering Germany political support in her efforts for peace.

The non-aggression pact concluded between the Soviet Union and Germany bound us to maintain neutrality in case of Germany participating in war. We have consistently pursued this course, which was in no wise contradicted by the entry of our troops into territory of former Poland, which began September 17…

Subsequent events fully confirmed that the new Soviet-German relations are based on the firm foundation of mutual interests. After Red Army units entered the territory of the former Polish State the serious questions arose relating to the delimitation of the State interests of the U.S.S.R. and Germany. These questions were promptly settled by mutual agreement.

The German-Soviet treaty on amnesty and the frontier between the
The relations of the Soviet Union with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are based on peace treaties concluded with the respective countries in 1920. By these treaties Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became independent States, and ever since then the Soviet Union has invariably pursued a friendly policy toward these newly created small States.

This was the reflection of a radical difference between the policy of the Soviet Government and the policy of Tsarist Russia, which brutally oppressed the small nations, denied them every opportunity of independent national and political development and left them with the most painful memories of it.

It must be admitted that the experience of the past two decades of the development of Soviet-Estonian, Soviet-Latvian and Soviet-Lithuanian friendly relations created favorable conditions for the further consolidation of political and all other relations between the U.S.S.R. and its Baltic neighbors. This has been revealed, too, in the recent diplomatic negotiations with representatives of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania and in treaties that were signed in Moscow as a result of these negotiations.

As you know, the Soviet Union has concluded pacts of mutual assistance with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that are of major political significance. The principles underlying all these pacts are identical. They are based on mutual assistance between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, on the other, and they include military assistance in case any of these countries are attacked.

... These pacts are based on mutual respect for the political, social and economic structure of the contracting parties, and are designed to strengthen the basis for peaceful, neighborly cooperation between our peoples. We stand for the scrupulous and punctilious observance of pacts on a basis of complete reciprocity, and we declare that all nonsense about sovietizing the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs.

... The principles of Soviet policy toward small countries have been demonstrated with particular force by the treaty providing for the transfer of the city of Vilna and the Vilna region to the Lithuanian Republic. Thereby the Lithuanian State, with its population of 2,500,000, considerably extends its territory, increases its population by 550,000 and receives the city of Vilna, whose population is almost double that of the present Lithuanian capital.

The Soviet Union agreed to transfer the city of Vilna to the Lithuanian Republic not because Vilna has a predominantly Lithuanian population. No, the majority of the inhabitants of Vilna...
non-Lithuanian. But the Soviet Government took into consideration the fact that the city of Vilna, which was forcibly wrested from Lithuania by Poland, ought to belong to Lithuania as a city with which are associated on the one hand the historical past of the Lithuanian State and on the other hand the national aspirations of the Lithuanian people.

It has been pointed out in the foreign press that there has never been a case in world history of a big country’s handing over such a big city to a small State of its own free will. All the more strikingly, therefore, does this act of the Soviet State demonstrate its goodwill...

Our relations with Finland are of a special character...

What has been the basis of the relations between the Soviet Union and Finland during all these years? As you know, the basis of these relations has been the peace treaty of 1920, which was on the pattern of our treaties with our other Baltic neighbors. Of its own free will the Soviet Union insured the separate and independent existence of Finland.

There can be no doubt that only the Soviet Government, which recognizes the principle of the free development of nationalities, could make such a step. It must be said that none but the Soviet Government in Russia could tolerate the existence of an independent Finland at the very gates of Leningrad...

...We are certain that Finnish leading circles will properly understand the importance of consolidating friendly Soviet-Finnish relations and that Finnish public men will not yield to anti-Soviet influence or instigation from any quarter.

I must, however, inform you that even the President of the United States of America considered it proper to intervene in these matters, which one finds it hard to reconcile with the American policy of neutrality. In a message to Comrade Kalinin, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, dated October 12, Mr. Roosevelt expressed the hope that friendly and peaceful relations between the U.S.S.R. and Finland would be preserved and developed.

One might think that matters are in better shape between the United States and, let us say, the Philippines or Cuba, who have long been demanding freedom and independence from the United States and cannot get them, than between the Soviet Union and Finland, who has long ago obtained both freedom and political independence from the Soviet Union.

Now, as regards our relations with Japan. There has recently been certain improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations. The symptoms of this improvement have been observable since the recent conclusion of the Moscow agreement, as the result of which the well-known conflict on the Mongolian-Manchurian border was liquidated...

As you know, the conflict arose owing to Japan’s endeavor to appropriate part of the territory of the Mongolian People’s Republic and thus forcibly change the Mongolian-Manchurian border in her own favor. Such a unilateral method of action has to meet a resolute rebuff and it has once again demonstrated its utter unsoundness when applied to the Soviet Union or its allies.

While the example of luckless Poland has recently demonstrated how little pacts of mutual assistance signed by some of the European great powers are sometimes worth, what happened on the Mongolian-Manchurian border has demonstrated something quite different. It has demonstrated the value of pacts of mutual assistance to which is appended the signature of the Soviet Union.

As for the conflict in question, it was liquidated by the SovietJapanese agreement concluded in Moscow on September 15 and peace has been fully restored on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. Thus the first step was made toward improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations...

In addition, the possibility has been established of starting SovietJapanese trade negotiations. It must be admitted that the development of Soviet-Japanese trade is in the interests of both countries...

Finally, a few words about war contraband and the export of arms from neutral countries to belligerent countries...

In any event our country, as a neutral country that is not interested in the spread of war, will take every measure to render the war less devastating, to weaken it and to hasten its termination in the interests of peace. From this standpoint the decision of the American Government to lift the embargo on the export of arms to belligerent countries raises justified misgivings. It can scarcely be doubted that the effect of this decision will not be to weaken war and hasten its termination, but on the contrary to intensify, aggravate and protract it. Of course, this decision may assure big profits for American war industries. But one asks, can this serve as any justification for lifting the embargo on the export of arms from America? Clearly it cannot...
No. 27

Excerpts from the Final Report, presented by M. Grzybowski, former Polish Ambassador in Moscow, to the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs

Paris, November 6, 1939.

I

I began my mission in Moscow on July 1, 1936. In the absence of M. Litvinov, who was in Geneva, I was received by M. Krestinski. Our talk was brief, but not without import. M. Krestinski informed me in plain terms that my mission had begun at a most unfortunate time.

"The political relations between us could not be worse. We are working," said M. Krestinski, "to increase the prestige of the League of Nations, and for collective security; we are combating all forms of aggression and all forms of fascism. At the present time we are pursuing an anti-German, anti-Italian, and anti-Japanese policy. Poland is pursuing a diametrically contrary policy, tending to weaken the League of Nations, combating attempts to realize collective security, supporting Italy and sympathizing with Japan. Poland is within the orbit of German policy."

I replied that to define our position as being within the German orbit was an erroneous interpretation, unsupported by any facts whatever. I declared that Poland was pursuing a policy based above all on bilateral agreements, and was working first and foremost for correct and good relations with her neighbours. Not all conceptions of international co-operation carried conviction to our minds. I considered that the differences between our views in this regard should not influence the ordering of our neighbouring relations. The tendency which existed on our side towards good relations with the U.S.S.R. was the best proof that our policy was independent of Germany.

It was in this talk with M. Krestinski that I first noted the fact which afterwards I was continually to come up against: irrespective of Polish policy, the Soviets constantly interpreted it so as to contrapose it to their own policy.

II

I presented my credentials to M. Kalinin on July 4, 1936. On this occasion I had a long conversation with him, M. Krestinski taking part.

M. Kalinin's remarks were in no way aggressive. He talked of the important role which Polish engineers had played in Russian industry in responsible positions. He himself had been a foreman in a factory run by Polish specialists, and admitted that on their depart-
"... It is an error to apply the term 'evolution' to the present stage of development of the situation in the Soviets. What is being achieved in the U.S.S.R. to-day is nothing but a revolution from above, and a revolution which is continually advancing. The entire economic and industrial activity of the Soviets is not the result of natural development nor of the needs of the population. It is a realization of doctrinaire plans enforced from above. Soviet industry is wholly directed towards the future war, and is concentrating its efforts on the up-to-date equipment and motorization of the Red Army. The intensive construction of strategic roads is also characteristic. In the direction of the Latvian frontier three parallel roads have been built, of which only one is given over to normal exploitation. In the direction of Poland two motor roads, one from Moscow to Minsk, and a second from Kiev towards Polish Volhynia, are being constructed.

"...Russian imperialism is still laying down a road for itself by means of the 'Emancipation of the proletariat.' The method by which it works towards this end is by supporting all and every conflict in Europe.

"...So far as we are concerned, despite their ostensible desire to establish good neighbourly relations, the Soviets are doing their best to arouse hatred for Poland with the help of propaganda. By its very nature Soviet expansion is directed against us, for we constitute a natural barrier to the realization of their designs."

V

... in its persistent striving for correct neighbourly relations, in its respect for basic agreements and the Riga Peace Treaty which had been concluded, Polish policy remained invariably faithful to three principles:

1. Abstention from any form of intervention in the internal affairs of the U.S.S.R.
2. The persistent attempts to regulate bilateral relations in a spirit of goodwill to the U.S.S.R.
3. Non-participation in any action or in international understandings directed against the U.S.S.R. Most important of all, Poland resolutely rejected numerous German proposals directed against the Soviets.

The course of diplomatic negotiations during the last year of my mission in Moscow was as follows:

(a) A turning point rendering possible greater diplomatic activity in our relations with the Soviets, arrived only with the series of inter-
national agreements concluded at Munich. Without consulting the U.S.S.R. and without her participation, the four Western Powers regulated among themselves the question of the Sudeten Germans and Czechoslovakia.

Poland also took no part in these agreements.

Local Polish-Soviet relations were in a state of some exacerbation. M. Potemkin's declaration on September 23, 1938, to our Chargé d'Affaires, and our Government's sharp reply were accompanied by a certain amount of ill-will and hardly friendly demonstrations on the part of the Soviet Government. When the European and local atmosphere had undergone a certain appeasement, I decided during the first ten days of October that the time had come to take the initiative in lessening the political tension, acting on the outline instructions I possessed. I called on M. Potemkin, and by virtue of the custom established between us of from time to time having talks which were not binding (having the character of a personal exchange of views, 'thinking aloud' as M. Potemkin put it), I had a long conversation with him on the general situation.

I for my part expressed the opinion that, in the European situation now created, in the interests of both parties an improvement in the existing Polish-Soviet relations was desirable.

M. Potemkin did not express any opinion, but told me that he would like to return to this talk.

Some days later M. Litvinov invited me to call on him. He told me that he had before him a note of my talk with M. Potemkin. The conversation had greatly interested him, and he desired to ask me a few questions. Most of all he wished to know whether my initiative was of a personal character, or whether it originated from my Government. I told him: "I think that that depends entirely on your answer. If your answer is positive I have no doubt that the initiative will originate from my Government. But if your answer is negative, then don't you think it would probably be better that we should have to deal with the personal initiative of M. Grzybowsk?" M. Litvinov agreed, and wished to know what was the political premiss on which I based my proposal. I answered that it was a very simple premiss. I thought, namely, that good neighbourly Polish-Soviet relations were an adequate factor to ensure peace in this part of Europe.

M. Litvinov's next question was: "What conditions do you regard as most important to achieve this end?" I answered that the reply to this question would probably be better indicated when I knew his Government's attitude.

Two days later M. Litvinov sent for me again, and informed me that his Government willingly took up the initiative of... I said: "The Polish Government." He asked that we should present our views.
I answered that in foreign policy I did not trust to improvisations, and I counted on a permanent lessening of tension and improvement in relations only after the realization of a series of conditions which in my view were fundamental. I regarded the strict observation of existing agreements as a fundamental condition. The Soviet Government had a tendency towards their one-sided modification, as in the case of the cancellation of the train running between the Polish frontier and Kiev, the endless procrastination over our admitted claims to property, and finally the frontier regulations, which were slowly becoming a dead letter, while incidents and violations of the regulations were multiplying endlessly.

The second condition, in my view, was an increase in trade turnover, which had fallen to a few millions, and I proposed as a basis of discussion that it should be raised to the sum of a hundred million zlotys on each side.

M. Litvinov answered with some animation that what I called the foundation was, in his view, the roof. In order to make it possible to realize the desiderata I had postulated, it was necessary, first and foremost, to create a corresponding atmosphere by some political step. He would regard a corresponding joint declaration as the most modest form of such a step.

I told him that I personally did not reject the idea of such a declaration, but I could recommend it to my Government only when I knew the Soviet Government's positive attitude to the conditions I had put forward.

Again after some days (about October 25, 1938) M. Litvinov informed me that his Government did take a positive attitude to the realization of the conditions I had put forward, and handed me a draft declaration he had ready. I read it through, and at once made a certain number of reservations and changes which I regarded as indispensable. But I accepted the matter ad referendum.

In the last days of October occurred the unfortunate incident of the Soviet Government's destruction of the Polish military cemetery in Kiev.

This affair, together with the necessity to agree certain details of our conditions with the departments of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, had a braking effect on the course of negotiations. Only on November 24, 1938, did M. Litvinov finally accept the text of the declaration we had proposed and a memorandum containing the agreed conditions of the understanding. To the list of matters "pending and not settled" was added also the restitution ad integrum of the cemetery at Kiev. We agreed that the declaration was to be published on November 26, 1938.1

This declaration possesses undoubted political significance for, made as the result of Polish initiative, it is a precise summary of our fundamental position in regard to the Soviets. To our eastern neighbour we guaranteed the complete loyalty of our policy, its sincere striving for improvement in neighbourly relations, and the development of economic relations. In return we required respect for existing agreements and that the Soviet authorities should adapt their conduct to these agreements. At the same time we fully realized that our partner's intentions were rather more complex, that his ambitions went considerably further, and that his aim was not only to worsen relations between Poland and Germany, but also to win us over to his own political system. But we had the right to expect that we would be able to protect ourselves against that.

(b) The most important of the agreed practical conditions of the declaration concerned trade turnover.

The peculiar economic system of the Soviets had resulted in our never having a full trade treaty with them. Exchange was effected only on the basis of quotas established from year to year.

Only the introduction of foreign exchange regulations in Poland created an equal opportunity for both partners, giving the governmental factors of both States the same possibility of regulating turnover.

In view of the importance of the question we set to work on its realization as early as the middle of December 1938. On the Soviet side the negotiations were conducted by the Vice-Premier M. Mikoyan, and the pactum de contrahendo signed by him opened hopeful prospects.

Truly, once more it transpired that, as M. Mikoyan put it, "the Soviets have everything to buy, but really nothing to sell"; but simultaneously with the commercial Treaty we were to have a settlement of the, for us, very important transit agreement; exchange was to be based on the clearing system, assuming equilibrium in the goods balances; and the quotas on the Soviet side were to consist of raw materials of value to us and amounting to a sum of not less than sixty million zlotys. The atmosphere in which the negotiations were conducted could not have been more friendly. The Soviets desired to extend them to the sphere of war industry also, which, however, proved to be impracticable, owing to the fact that their requirements in this direction exceeded our export possibilities.

It must also be noted that immediately after the publication of the declaration the Soviet Government dealt with a number of the desiderata I had advanced. Steps were taken to restore the cemetery in Kiev, an express train began to run regularly between the Polish frontier and Kiev, a certain number of frontier incidents were ad-
justed. But all the other minor postulates were in practice subjected to the tactic of endless procrastination.

But the definite improvement in the atmosphere of relations with Poland did not last long on the Soviet side. The traditional New Year reception for the diplomatic corps in Berlin brought an unexpected incident. Chancellor Hitler talked with the Soviet Ambassador longer than with anyone else. In Moscow this fact was given quite considerable publicity. M. Potemkin told me about it in detail and with some delight. He also declared that the conversation touched purely on the Ambassador’s personal and family affairs. On the other hand, M. Litvinov, in our conversation on January 8, advised me to hasten the trade negotiations, in order “to forestall German intrigues.” Soon afterward, information was spread through Moscow of the impending arrival of a German economic delegation with M. Schnurre at its head.

I note as a characteristic fact that this delegation did indeed arrive—at Warsaw about January 25, ostensibly en route to Moscow, but then it chose the road to the west and returned straight to Berlin.

So one must assume that in this period of contacts there was quite a considerable vacillation in Berlin as well as in Moscow.

Our trade negotiations were opened on January 19, 1939. After only a couple of meetings between our delegations it was possible to deduce that since the time of the conclusion of the pactum de contrahendo a change had occurred in the attitude of the Soviet delegation. Not only did they manifest a disposition to chaffer very ardently over the transit question (which the Soviets, like all other minor postulates we were subjected to, naturally, our attitude was compliant. I can state definitely that our economic representatives attached great importance to the achievement of a trade Treaty with the Soviets, and so, naturally, our attitude was compliant. I can state definitely that after a month of tedious negotiations we achieved a trade Treaty primarily owing to the concessions we made to the Soviets as against the pactum de contrahendo. Except for the postponement of the transit question (which the Soviets said was indispensable because of other negotiations on the same issue) these concessions were not considerable, but they expressively emphasized that every signature of the Soviet Government would have only a relative value.

We signed the first Polish-Soviet Trade Treaty on February 19, 1939. So-called branch discussions on the fulfilment of quotas were to begin without delay. In fact they began in March, but they came up against such considerable difficulties on the Soviet side that they were never concluded. In a letter to Count Szembek dated May 23, 1939, I wrote: “At times I have the impression that in our persistent striving for practical things we are overlooking the possibilities of this country. It looks also as if, when making any kind of agreement with this State, we have to consider only the actual fact that it is made, and not the gain which may result from its conclusion.”

(c) At the beginning of May, M. Litvinov himself vanished from the political scene. To-day we realize that the Soviets’ imperialistic plans must have been already sufficiently formulated for them to retain a final and decisive understanding with Chancellor Hitler as a trump card in their policy of instigation of war. It is obvious that such an understanding could not be negotiated by M. Litvinov.

For the time being the Soviets’ external activity seemed to be turned in another direction. In face of England’s and France’s widespread diplomatic activity they regarded it as sound to extend their own activities also. Vice-Commissar Potemkin was delegated to Ankara with the object of assuring that the U.S.S.R. would have the strict solidarity of Turkish policy. On this journey M. Potemkin halted at Bucharest and Sofia. On his return journey he made his way to Warsaw and, after previous agreement with M. Beck, halted there to carry on conversations. Both M. Beck and M. Arciszewski received favourable impressions from these conversations. M. Potemkin seemed to understand the reservations which restrained us from direct participation in the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations. In the name of his Government he assured M. Beck of the Soviet Government’s decision to adopt a benevolent attitude to Poland. Recapitulating these conversations to me in Moscow, he stressed with satisfaction M. Beck’s declaration that in the event of such a conflict we would rely inevitably on the Soviets. In my private letter of May 25 to Count Szembek I stressed that in conversations with the diplomatic corps M. Potemkin laid great emphasis on M. Beck’s words.

M. Molotov took over the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on May 5th. On Sunday, the 7th, he invited me to call on him. He began with warm compliments on M. Beck’s speech of two days previously, and especially emphasized how much he had been impressed by his words on national honour.

He then talked about the conversations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain and France. I answered that I could not precisely state our views on this subject until I had received instructions. But I could already state, I added, that we adopted a pacific and loyal attitude to all our neighbours and that only clearly aggressive acts committed by any one of them could modify this attitude. As to the proposed collaboration between the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers, we regarded it sympathetically. I also observed that we intended to maintain our alliance with Rumania.

Some days later (more or less at the time of M. Potemkin’s stay in Warsaw) I gave M. Molotov a résumé of our attitude.
We could not accept a one-sided Soviet guarantee. Nor could we accept a mutual guarantee, because in the event of a conflict with Germany our forces would be completely engaged, and so we would not be in any position to give help to the Soviets. Also we could not accept collective negotiations, and made our adoption of a definite attitude conditional on the result of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations. We rejected all discussion of matters affecting us other than by the bilateral method. Our alliance with Rumania, being purely defensive, could not in any way be regarded as directed against the U.S.S.R.

In addition I indicated our favourable attitude to the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations, and once more emphasized our entire loyalty in relation to the Soviets. In the event of conflict we by no means rejected specified forms of Soviet aid, but considered it premature to determine them definitely. We considered it premature to open bilateral negotiations with the Soviets before the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations had achieved a result. M. Molotov made no objection whatever.

(d) In June there was a series of offers on the part of the Soviets to supply us with armaments materials. It has to be admitted that they were always accompanied by unacceptable conditions. The Soviet propaganda never ceased to urge us to resist the German demands.

It is true that when we raised the question of accelerating the transit negotiations we met with a refusal, but M. Potemkin assured me that obviously everything would change in the event of a conflict, and that in that case we could count on transit. It has to be borne in mind that so long as the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations lasted it was almost impossible for us to go beyond a waiting attitude. We felt no optimism whatever in regard to the result of those negotiations. It was difficult to expect that the Soviets would do anything in the direction of preventing a conflict or even rendering its outbreak difficult. We observed rather that their tactics aimed at the exact opposite.

The German-Soviet Pact of Non-aggression justly made a deep impression.

The fact that two mutually contradictory sets of negotiations had been carried on simultaneously was a true measure of the cynicism of Soviet policy. The conclusion of the pact was beyond all doubt an encouragement to Germany to make war. The scope of the obligations undertaken, the extent of the understanding between the Soviets and Germany remained vague.

The Soviets endeavoured to give it the appearance of a pact assuring them peace, but not effecting any fundamental change in their policy. In this regard M. Molotov even appealed to Poland's example.

The undefined character of the obligations resulting from the pact was emphasized by M. Voroshilov's interview given a few days later. Evidently influenced by news emanating from Berlin and London of the conversations between the British ambassador and Chancellor Hitler, Marshal Voroshilov gave the Soviet Press an interview, in which he stated that the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations were only suspended, and that their renewal would not be in contradiction with the Soviet-German pact.

Moreover, Marshal Voroshilov simultaneously stated that the supply of raw material and war material to Poland in the event of a conflict was a 'commercial matter,' equally not in contradiction with the pact.

The warning was understood in Berlin.

(e) On Saturday, September 2, I received instructions to give official notification of the German aggression and the ensuing state of war between Poland and Germany. On the 3rd I was received by M. Molotov. He did not question our statement that it was a case of unprovoked aggression committed without previous declaration of war, by a surprise attack during negotiations. He agreed in recognizing Germany as the aggressor. He asked whether we counted on the intervention of Great Britain and France, and whether we expected any time-limit. I told him I had no official information, but I anticipated their declaration of war to follow a day later, on the 4th. M. Molotov smiled sceptically. "Well, we shall see, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur. . . ."

In the meantime the Soviet ambassador in Warsaw had stressed the importance of Marshal Voroshilov's interview, and had inquired at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs whether steps had already been taken in Moscow with the object of utilizing Marshal Voroshilov's promises in regard to us. As the result of these suggestions, on the 6th I received instructions to investigate the practical possibilities in this direction. Simultaneously I received a list of required materials, which I was to put forward in the event of M. Molotov's adopting a favourable attitude. I was not afforded the opportunity to negotiate on this list. M. Molotov was difficult to get hold of, and received me only on the 8th. Referring to previous official statements and Marshal Voroshilov's interview, I put to him the question of buying the additional raw materials we needed and the eventual supply of war material.

M. Molotov answered that Marshal Voroshilov's interview had been made public in totally different circumstances. Marshal Voroshilov did not and could not know that Britain and France's intervention would follow. The situation had now radically changed. "Poland," said M. Molotov, "is now synonymous with England, so far as we are concerned." The Soviet Union was compelled to safeguard first and foremost its own interests, and to remain outside the conflict.
On the practical question of supplies, which I had raised, the Soviet Government maintained the position of a strict observance of the existing agreements. The fulfilment of our trade agreement had not been satisfactory, but for their part the Soviet Government were prepared to do all that was necessary for that agreement to function normally. Nevertheless, M. Molotov did not think that the Soviet Government could go beyond the quotas established for the current year, either in regard to quantities or in regard to the categories of goods. To this I replied that given good will the difficulties were not so great after all, because, in the first place, the clearing quotas could always be complemented by quotas of purchases for cash, while, secondly, we could even establish supplementary clearing quotas, for the fourth quarter or for the following year, and anticipate with their supply.

M. Molotov said again that he did not anticipate that his Government could introduce any changes whatever in the existing agreements.

I then passed to the transit question and, referring to former Soviet declarations, I asked what facilities could be granted us in this sphere. M. Molotov answered that he was afraid the transit of military materials would be in contradiction with the Pact of Non-aggression concluded with Germany.

So there was nothing else to be done than to inform him that I would communicate his attitude to my Government. At the end of the conversation M. Molotov stated that all he had said had been said in present conditions, but that circumstances might change. The phrase “in present conditions” was several times repeated in his answers.

Almost simultaneously (September 11) M. Szaronov took a friendly leave of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, “in view of his departure for a few days to have contact with his Government.” He communicated to Count Szembek that he had just granted visas to our specialists to travel to Moscow to purchase medical supplies, and he did not doubt that the supplies would be swiftly forthcoming.

Next day Pravda published a leading article violently attacking the condition of our minorities in the eastern areas. It stressed that the fate of these minorities could not be a matter of indifference to the Soviet public.

I drew the Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ attention to this article, stating that it might be in preparation for eventual decisions.

September 16 was already ended when the telephone rang. I looked at my watch: it was 2.15 a.m. M. Potemkin’s secretariat notified me that the Commissar wished to inform me of an important statement by his Government, and asked whether I could come to him at three o’clock. I answered that I would. I ordered a car, and warned Councillor Jankowski that I should need him and Colonel Brzeszczynski as well as the cypher officer for four o’clock. As I drove out of the Embassy the militia-man on duty at the gate saluted with obvious surprise and rushed to the wall-telephone. For the first time in all my term as Ambassador I drove through Moscow without a police escort.

As I went I was prepared for bad news. I thought that under one pretext or another the denunciation of our Pact of Non-aggression was about to follow. That which awaited me was far worse.

M. Potemkin slowly read to me the text of a note signed by M. Molotov. When he had finished I told him at once that I refused to take the contents of the note into cognizance, I refused to communicate it to my Government, and expressed the most categorical protest against its content and form.

I protested against the unilateral abrogation of existing and binding agreements. None of the arguments intended to justify the transformation of those agreements into “scraps of paper” would withstand criticism. According to my information the head of the Polish State and the Government were within the territory of the Republic. The functioning of the Government was by the nature of things restricted by the state of war. “You will not demand that at such a time the Minister for Agriculture should carry out agricultural reforms?” For that matter the question of the Government was not so essential at that moment. The sovereignty of the State existed so long as a single regular soldier was still fighting. “You will not maintain that the Polish soldiers are no longer fighting!”

That which the note said about the position of the minorities within our borders was nonsense. All the minorities, including the Jews, had not only given expression to their loyalty, but were actively proving it by their complete solidarity with Poland in her struggle against Germanism. “More than once in our conversations,” I told him, “you have appealed to Slavonic solidarity. At our side at this moment not only Ukrainians and White Russians, but also Czech and Slovak legions are fighting the Germans. Where is your Slavonic solidarity? “So many times has the U.S.S.R. indignantly condemned and stigmatized the Germans’ perfidy. The note which you have read to me would signify that you had taken the same road.

“During the Great War the territories of Serbia and Belgium were occupied, but it entered no one’s head to regard their obligations to these States as non-existent on that account. Napoleon was once in Moscow, but so long as Kutuzov’s army existed it was considered that Russia existed.”

M. Potemkin tried to explain that my historic responsibility would be very great if I refused to accept a document of such importance. Besides, the Soviet Government no longer possessed any representative
in Poland, and were not in a position to communicate their decision to the Polish Government by any other way.

I said: "Monsieur le Commissaire, if I agreed to communicate the contents of the note to my Government it would be not only a proof that I had no respect for my Government, but it would also be a proof that I had lost all respect for the Soviet Government. I understand that I am in duty bound to inform my Government of the aggression probably already committed, but I will do no more than that. But I still hope that your Government will restrain the Red Army from invasion, and will not stab us in the back at the moment of our struggle against the Germans."

M. Potemkin said that evidently I did not take into account the impossibility of our resisting the German onslaught. On the basis of the reports of their military attaché the Soviet Government considered that the German army would inevitably march to the frontiers of the Union.

I told him: "The most pessimistic reports of military attachés have not the power to release from international agreements. The German troops' advance into the heart of Poland may be the source of great difficulties for them. A similar situation occurred in 1812."

M. Potemkin replied that in face of the attitude I had taken up he must discuss the matter with his Government. It was four o'clock. I waited for further developments for half an hour.

Finally, M. Potemkin informed me that he had communicated with the utmost precision all that I had said, but his Government could not alter the decisions taken.

I declared that I also could not change my decision, and would inform my Government only of the fact of the aggression.

I sent my telegram en claire at a few minutes past five. It did not reach the Ministry for Foreign Affairs until 11 a.m. The Soviet troops invaded Poland at 6 a.m.

(f) On September 18 I received approval of the attitude I had adopted and instructions to demand my passports. At my request the Ambassador of one of the Powers had already obtained the agreement of his Government to take over charge of the Embassy building.

On the 19th I called on M. Potemkin and told him that I regarded my mission as ended. I had only to regulate the transference of the charge of the Embassy to a third Power, and to carry out the evacuation of the outlying posts. I asked that it might be made possible for the personnel of the Consulates to arrive at a definite date, and also for the appointment of a special official to carry out the details of the evacuation in agreement with the Embassy. M. Potemkin answered that, as they did not recognize the existence of the Polish State, they would not be able to agree to a third State taking over the protection of our property. He also warned me that they would not be able to recognize the diplomatic privileges of my personnel. The rest he promised to settle without delay.

In fact, after some days the Director of "Biurobin" (Bureau for Relations with Foreigners), M. Nazarov, was appointed "plenipotentiary for evacuation," and he opened negotiations with the railway authorities. (For understandable reasons, railway communications at this period were unusually difficult.)

The question of our safety and departure became a subject of lively interest to the entire diplomatic corps. The situation was complicated a little by the fact that the doyen of the corps was the German Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, while I was the vice-doyen. Owing to events my functions passed to the Italian Ambassador, M. Rosso, and to him, more than anyone else, we owe the handling of our affairs through diplomatic channels. I must stress that although my position prohibited my communicating with the doyen, Count von der Schulenburg effectively intervened on our behalf several times with the Government. In reply to his intervention M. Molotov stated that les usages diplomatiques would be observed at our departure, and he also communicated to him that that departure would not take place so long as the staff of the Soviet Embassy, who had voluntarily remained in Warsaw and who, owing to the bombardment of the building, were spending their time in the cellars, did not return from the besieged city safe and sound. Realizing that I for my part was utterly helpless, Count von der Schulenburg caused communication on the question to be opened between the German Command and the Warsaw Command, and on September 25 the staff of the Soviet Embassy, to the unexpected number of sixty-two persons, arrived in Koenigsberg.

On September 26 the Consulate staff in Minsk were allowed to depart, being deprived of half their cases on the pretext of lack of room in the train. Certain officials arrived in Moscow without anything whatever. Despite our protests we did not recover this baggage.

A more dramatic incident occurred in Kiev. At two in the morning of September 30 the Councillor of the Embassy, and acting consul-general, Matusinski, was summoned to the plenipotentiary of the Soviet Foreign Office, ostensibly to agree the final details of his departure. He went at once, with two chauffeurs and accompanied by two police cars. From that moment Councillor Matusinski, the two chauffeurs and the car vanished without trace.

Ambassador Rosso intervened with M. Potemkin in this affair. M. Potemkin stated that he had no information so far from the local authorities, but he must point out that as M. Matusinski had already lost his diplomatic privileges, he could be called to account by the Soviet authorities if it appeared that he had committed some crime against the Soviet Union.
Ambassador Rosso justly replied that he saw no possibility of that, for down to September 18 M. Matusinski had enjoyed full diplomatic privileges, while from that day he had been in fact interned and could commit no crime whatever.

In view of the above-stated position of the affair I asked Ambassador Rosso to communicate to the Soviet Government that I would not leave Moscow so long as M. Matusinski was not set free, and that I demanded formulation of the charge against him.

The intervention with M. Molotov gave a result completely different. M. Molotov informed the doyen of the corps most categorically that the Soviet authorities had no information whatever as to the place of residence and the fate of M. Matusinski. "I assure you," said M. Molotov, "that he is not in our hands. I am myself personally making investigations in order to clear up this affair. To hold up the Ambassador's departure on this account is pointless, and I cannot agree to it."

In view of the Soviet Government's obvious intention to avoid formulating any charge against M. Matusinski there was really nothing to wait for, since one could no longer expect him to be found.

Thanks to the kindness of the Finnish Legation and authorities, the railway difficulties were overcome and our departure took place on the evening of October 10.

The train placed at our disposal by the Soviet authorities had one special feature. It was a sealed train. No one was allowed to alight from it at the stops. The following evening we crossed the Finnish frontier.

I cannot but note that from the Diplomatic Corps and from very numerous colleagues we received a great amount of sympathy and assistance. The cordiality of the leavetaking at the station went far beyond anything known on normal occasions. In addition to Ambassador Rosso special thanks are due to the Ambassador of Great Britain, Sir William Seeds, and the entire personnel of his Embassy.

In conclusion one remark prompts itself. A diplomat accredited to Moscow, cut off from all contacts and all sources of information, can get an orientation on the course of general processes, but knows only facts which come to the surface. Any estimate of the Soviets' foreign policy relies upon very inadequate sources. But there can be no doubt that, equally with their internal policy, it is subversive. Is it at the same time a bad policy? Life would be simpler if the directors of foreign policy would be divided into two definite categories: those who commit only errors and those who render only services. Certain features of Stalin's policy have been marked by great ability. But it must be stated that his policy of invasion of Poland, his entente with Nazi Germany and his tactic of keeping us deceived until the last moment, will bring effects of the most negative kind to Stalin and the U.S.S.R.

One may repeat with Talleyrand: "C'est pire qu'un crime, c'est une faute."

---

**No. 28**

**Polish Government's Note protesting against the conscription of Polish Citizens into the Red Army**

*Paris, February 21, 1940.*

On February 21, 1940, the Polish Government addressed a Note to all Governments with which it maintained diplomatic relations protesting against military registration with a view to conscription in the Red Army of Polish citizens residing on Polish territory temporarily occupied by the U.S.S.R.

---

**No. 29**

**Polish Government's Note protesting against various violations of International Law by Soviet Authorities**

*London, May 3, 1941.*

On May 3, 1941, the Polish Government addressed a Note to all Governments with which it maintained diplomatic relations protesting against various violations of International Law by the Soviet authorities of occupation on Polish territory temporarily occupied by the U.S.S.R. The protest dealt with such measures as elections, held in this territory, the forcing of Soviet citizenship upon Polish nationals, conscription in the Red Army, executions, arrests, mass-deportation and religious persecution.

---

**No. 30**

**British Foreign Office Communiqué**

*London, July 30, 1941.*

Text of the Foreign Office communiqué:

"One, an agreement between the Republic of Poland and the Soviet Union was signed in the Secretary of State's room at the Foreign Office on July 30th. General Sikorski, Polish Prime Min-
ister, signed for Poland; Mr. Maiski, Soviet Ambassador, signed for the Soviet Union. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden were present.

"Two, the agreement is being published.

"Three, after the signature of the agreement, Mr. Eden handed to General Sikorski an official note in the following terms:

"'On the occasion of the signature of the Polish-Soviet agreement of today, I desire to take this opportunity of informing you that in conformity with the provision of the agreement of mutual assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland of the 25th of August 1939, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have entered into no undertakings towards the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics which affect the relations between that country and Poland. I also desire to assure you that His Majesty's Government do not recognise any territorial changes which have been effected in Poland since August 1939.'

"General Sikorski handed to Mr. Eden the following reply:

"'The Polish Government takes note of your letter dated July 30 and desires to express its sincerest satisfaction at the statement that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom do not recognise any territorial changes which have been effected in Poland since August 1939. This corresponds with the view of the Polish Government which, as it has previously informed His Majesty's Government, has never recognised any territorial changes effected in Poland since the outbreak of the war.'"
organization of international relations on the basis of unification of the democratic countries in a durable alliance. Respect for international law backed by the collective armed force of all the Allied States must form the decisive factor in the creation of such an organization. Only under this condition can a Europe destroyed by the German barbarism be restored and a guarantee be created that the disaster caused by the Hitlerites will never be repeated.

Signed: By authorization of the Government of the Soviet Union,
STALIN.

For the Government of the Polish Republic,
SIKORSKI.

---

No. 33

COMMUNIQUÉ by the Polish Telegraph Agency


The Polish Government, at a meeting presided over by General Sikorski, discussed Polish-Soviet relations and issued the following declaration:

The Polish Government affirms that neither before the outbreak of this war nor during it has the Polish nation ever agreed to any co-operation with the Germans against the Soviet Union. In her relations with the U.S.S.R. Poland has not ceased to be ready to co-operate with the Soviet Union in the prosecution of the war and in maintaining friendly, neighbourly relations after the victory.

The Polish Government repudiates most definitely the malicious propaganda which accuses Poland of indirect or direct inimical tendencies towards Soviet Russia. It is absolutely absurd to suspect Poland of intentions to base the eastern boundaries of the Polish Republic on the Dnieper and the Black Sea, or to impute to Poland any tendencies to move her frontier farther to the east.

The Polish Government, which represents Poland in the boundaries in which Poland, first among the Allied nations, took up the fight imposed on her, has, from the moment of the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Treaty of July 30, 1941, maintained the unchangeable attitude that so far as the question of frontiers between Poland and Soviet Russia is concerned, the status quo previous to September 1, 1939, is in force; and considers the undermining of this attitude, which is in conformity with the Atlantic Charter, as detrimental to the unity of the Allied Nations.

The Polish Government considers the close co-operation and confidence between all the Allies as an indispensable factor for victory and a permanent peace, and condemns all acts and suggestions tending to wreck or weaken the common front of the United Nations.

---

No. 34

COMMUNIQUÉ by the Polish Telegraph Agency

London, February 26, 1943.

The declaration of the Polish Government is fully supported by the following resolution passed unanimously by the Polish National Council:

The National Council, maintaining, in unanimous agreement with the Government, its attitude that the difficulties which exist in creating mutual trust in the collaboration between the United Nations must be removed, declares that the integrity of the territory of the Polish Republic within its frontiers of September 1, 1939, and its sovereignty, are unviolable and indivisible. No unilateral acts or illegal activities, from any quarter whatever, directed against either the territory and sovereignty of the Polish Republic or the rights of its citizens residing in Poland or outside her territorial boundaries, can in any way alter this state of affairs.

---

No. 35

COMMUNIQUÉ by the Soviet News Agency (T.A.S.S.)

Moscow, March 1, 1943.

The Soviet News Agency (T.A.S.S.) issued the following official Russian statement replying to the Polish declaration:

The declaration of the Polish Government in London bears witness to the fact that the Polish Government refuses to recognise the historic rights of the Ukrainians and Bieło-Russian peoples to be united within the National States.

Continuing to regard as legitimate the aggressive policy of imperialist States, which partitioned among themselves the traditional Ukrainian
and Bielorussian lands, and disregarding the universally known fact of the reunion of the Ukrainian and Bielorussian peoples within their national States which has already taken place, the Polish Government thus comes out as an advocate of a partition of the Ukrainian and Bielorussian lands in favour of the policy of plundering the Ukrainian and Bielorussian peoples.

The leading Soviet circles are of the opinion that the denial of the right of the Ukrainian and Bielorussian peoples of reunion with their blood brethren bears witness to an imperialist tendency, whereas the references of the Polish Government to the Atlantic Charter have no foundation whatever. The Atlantic Charter does not entitle anyone to encroach on the national rights of the Ukrainians and Bielorussians, but on the contrary it has its origin in the principle of the recognition of the national rights of peoples, including the Ukrainian and the Bielorussian peoples.

Even the well-known British Minister, Lord Curzon, in spite of his inimical attitude to the U.S.S.R., realized that Poland cannot put forward a claim to the Ukrainian and Bielorussian lands, but the Polish ruling circles still show no understanding in this matter.

The assertion of the Polish ruling circles that Poland until the beginning of this war refused to collaborate in any way with Germany against the Soviet Union does not correspond with reality. The whole world knows of the pro-Fascist policy of rapprochement with Germany of the Polish Government and its Minister Beck, who tried to oppose Poland to the Soviet Union.

If the present war teaches us something it is above all that the Slav peoples must not quarrel among themselves, but must live in friendship in order to rid themselves of the danger of the German yoke. The Polish ruling circles have learned nothing if they put forward claims on the Ukrainian and Bielorussian lands, and thereby cultivate enmity between the Polish people and the peoples of the Ukraine and Bielorus. Such a policy of the Polish leading circles weakens, in the first place, Poland herself and breaks the united front of the Slav peoples in their struggle against German invasion.

The declaration of the Polish Government bears witness to the fact that the present Polish ruling circles do not reflect in this matter the genuine opinion of the Polish people, whose interests in the struggle for the liberation of their country and for the restoration of a strong and united Poland are indissolubly linked with the strengthening to the utmost of mutual confidence and friendship with the brotherly peoples of the Ukraine and Bielorus, as well as with the Russian people and the other peoples of the U.S.S.R.

--- 60 ---

**No. 36**

**Communiqué by the Polish Telegraph Agency**

March 5, 1943.

The Polish Telegraph Agency has been authorized by the Polish Government to issue the following reply to the Russian statement:

Until the conclusion of agreements between the U.S.S.R. and the Third Reich concerning the partition of Polish territories, the Treaty of Riga and its frontier clauses, approved in 1923 by the Conference of Ambassadors and by the United States, were never called in question by Russia. The Russo-German agreements were cancelled by the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30, 1941. The question of any return to the German-Soviet frontier line of that year requires no further comment.

The so-called "Curzon line" was proposed during hostilities in 1919-1920 solely as an armistice line and not as a frontier.

The polling ordered by the Soviet-occupying authorities in Eastern Poland in 1939 is contrary to international law. It constitutes one of those unilateral acts which are not recognised by the Allied nations. Therefore, it cannot form a basis for any legal acts, and cannot, in particular, deprive Polish citizens of their title to Polish citizenship or to relief organised for their benefit by the Polish Government with the aid of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States.

All German proposals previous to 1939, which were aimed at gaining the co-operation of Poland in military actions against Russia, were repeatedly rejected, and this led finally to a German attack on Polish territory in September 1939.

The declaration of the Polish Government of February 25, 1943, backed unanimously by the entire Polish nation, was not intended to produce controversy which would be so harmful at the present moment. It only stated the indisputable Polish rights to these territories, in which the Polish nation will continue to live in harmony with its Ukrainian and White Russian fellow-countrymen in accordance with the principles proclaimed by the Polish Government. The Polish Government, categorically rejecting the absurd insinuations concerning alleged Polish imperialistic claims in the East, has expressed, and continues to express, to the Soviet Government its readiness for an understanding based on friendly mutual relations.
SOURCES

No. 1 Sobranie Zakonov i Rasporashenii Rabotschekrestianskovo
Pravitelstva No. 64.

(Body of Laws and Decrees of the Workers and Peasants
Government No. 64 of September 9, 1918.)

No. 2 Czerwona Księga, Zbiór Dokumentów dyplomatycznych
dotyczących Rosyjsko-Polskich stosunków od 1918 do 1920
rok.

Komisariat Ludowy Spraw Zagranicznych R.S.F.S.R.
Moskwa 1920.

(The Red Book, Compilation of diplomatic documents
concerning Russian-Polish relations from 1918 to 1920.
The Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, R.S.F.S.R.)


Nos. 4 - 24 and 27 Polish White Book, Hutchinson, London, 1940.

No. 26 Soviet Russia Today—November 1939, New York.

Nos. 30 - 34 and 36 Communiqués by the Polish Telegraph Agency.

No. 35 Communiqué by the Soviet News Agency (T.A.S.S.).