Preventing violent unrest: student protest at the University of Toledo, 1965-1972

Matthew J. Deters

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Preventing Violent Unrest: Student Protest at the University of Toledo, 1965-1972

by

Matthew J. Deters

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Master of Education Degree in Higher Education

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May 2010
An Abstract of
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The student protests of the late 1960s and early 1970s were the most widespread in American history. Students around the country organized themselves in response to political, social and cultural developments. War in Vietnam, the hippie movement, generational conflict, Communism, the Civil Rights Movement, and rapid growth and bureaucratization of American higher education, all had an influence on the generation of young people entering college. Towards the end of the 1960s, student protest tactics shifted from relatively peaceful rallies and sit-ins to more radical tactics, often involving disruption, property destruction, and violence. Higher education institutions across the nation, especially in Ohio, were affected by student protest and in some cases suffered significant property damage and violence. Similar to many other campuses across the country, and across Ohio, the University of Toledo (UT) also experienced incidents of student protest in the late 1960s and early 1970s. UT had radical political groups such as the Students for a Democratic Society. There were massive rallies protesting the ROTC on campus and the Vietnam War. There were protests that took action against what the protestors viewed as the administration’s repressive practices and policies. There were controversies surrounding student rights,
representation, and code of conduct, as well as rallies for free speech. The University of Toledo students went through the same cultural, political, and generational changes that caused rallies and protests on other campuses around the country. However, the University of Toledo did not face the shutdowns, injuries, deaths, or property damage that other campuses, including a few in Ohio, did. Sound administrative leadership, recognition of student rights and representation, proper law enforcement, and effective communication, all contributed to the prevention of violent unrest on the UT campus during a tumultuous period of American and Ohio history.

The present study is a historical analysis of campus unrest at the University of Toledo between 1965 and 1972. This historical analysis examines the incidences of student protest at UT and the institutional role in responding to student unrest. The study is based on primary documents from local newspapers, correspondence, speeches, memoranda, and other materials collected in the UT library archives. A brief review of the history of American student activism places the case of the University of Toledo into the larger national context of student protest in the United States during the 60s era.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Student protest in the United States has been a recurring theme throughout the history of American higher education since the early eighteenth century (Astin, Astin, Bayer & Bisconti, 1975; Johnston, 1998; Altbach & Peterson, 1971). Most early protest dealt with the role of the administration in student life and the extent of In loco parentis (Magolda & Magolda, 1988). These protests were generally issue specific and unrelated to the larger political climate outside the university (Johnston, 1998). After WWI however, student groups became more politicized, a trend that continued through the Great Depression, only to diminish again during WWII (Johnston, 1998; Altbach & Peterson, 1971). However, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, several cultural, political, and demographic forces shaped the emergence of a new kind of college student. War in Vietnam, the hippie movement, generational conflict, Communism, the Civil Rights Movement, and rapid growth and bureaucratization of American higher education, all had an influence on the generation of young people entering college (Altbach & Peterson, 1971; “President’s Commission,” 1970). Coming from a very different childhood than their parents, these students had new ideas on individual rights and the structure of
society (Astin et al., 1975). These factors came to a head at the University of California at Berkeley in 1964.

The events at the University of California at Berkeley began a nationwide phenomenon of renewed student protest. After Berkeley, student protest tactics shifted from relatively peaceful rallies and sit-ins to more radical tactics, often involving disruption, property destruction, and violence ("President’s Commission," 1970). Violence on the part of student protestors and law enforcement officials became a national crisis, a problem that interfered with the mission of higher education ("President’s Commission," 1970; “American Association Report,” 1970). Higher education institutions across the nation, especially in Ohio, were affected by student protest and in some cases significant property damage and violence ("President’s Commission," 1970).

As the incidents at Berkeley and at other institutions attest, administrative policies and decisions regarding the role of students play a large role in determining the outcome of student protest (Heirich, 1968). Administrative actions can quickly diffuse a protest or greatly exacerbate it (Astin et al., 1975, p. 86; Levin & Spiegel, 1977, p. 39; Light, 1977; Spiegel, 1977, p. 140; Lammers, 1977; Brown, Miser, & Emmanuel, 1988; “President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 45; Neff, 1968; Gusfield, 1971). Understanding the proper actions to utilize in the prevention and diffusion of student protest are essential in maintaining the mission and the integrity of a higher education institution. Recognizing student representation in university governance, maintaining effective communication between the administration and students, wisely utilizing law enforcement, and exercising sound administrative leadership, all are actions that can prevent the incidence and support

The University of Toledo, a mid-sized metropolitan university in Toledo Ohio, also experienced incidents of student protest during this time period. UT had radical political groups such as the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and massive rallies protested the ROTC on campus and the Vietnam War. Students took action against university policies and what they viewed as the administration’s repressive practices and policies. There were controversies surrounding student rights, representation, and code of conduct, as well as rallies for free speech. The University of Toledo students experienced the same cultural, political, and generational changes that caused rallies and protests on other campuses around the country. However, the University of Toledo avoided shutdowns, injuries, deaths, or property damage that other campuses, including a few in Ohio, experienced (“Dr. William Carlson discusses,” 1970, August 7).

This study maintains that sound administrative leadership, a recognition of student rights and representation, proper law enforcement, and effective communication afforded the University of Toledo a crucial measure of stability during a tumultuous period of American and Ohio history. The purpose of this study is to analyze the incidents and responses to student protest at the University of Toledo during the protest period of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Most studies focusing on student activism and protest analyze the most well-known participants and the most massive and violent events (Kenniston & Lerner, 1971; “President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 28). In addition, entire
studies have been dedicated to understanding student characteristics in this period at prestigious schools such as Columbia, Harvard, and Berkeley (Heirich, 1971; Lusky & Lusky, 1969; Westby & Braungart, 1966; Watts & Whittaker, 1966). Few studies have looked at a regional institution that experienced non-violent student protest during this time period; even fewer have considered the institutional role in responding to student unrest. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature.

This study is an historical analysis that utilizes archival materials, relying on primary documents from local newspapers such as *The Toledo Times* and *The Toledo Blade*, as well as archival editions of the student newspaper at the University of Toledo, *The Collegian*. Other primary documents, such as correspondence, speeches, memoranda, Student Body Government resolutions, Faculty Senate resolutions, SDS newsletters, and other archival documents are utilized to show the evolution of student protest at the University of Toledo and the actions taken by the administration to solve the problems associated with these protests. The University of Toledo serves as a prime example of how certain governance structures and administrative action can aid in the prevention and diffusion of student protest. A history of student protest in America, using secondary literature, is given in Chapter 2 to place the incidents at the University of Toledo into context, followed by the history of student protest at the University of Toledo in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 is an analysis of student representation, effective communication channels, the role of law enforcement, and administrative actions taken by University of Toledo officials during the time period, followed by the conclusion in Chapter 5.
Chapter 2

Student Activism and Protest in the United States

Student protests were not a new phenomenon in the 1960s. Most of the early protests were minor and focused on narrow, university specific issues (Altbach & Peterson, 1971). However, there were several periods when students protested larger societal issues. These periods of mass student organization and protests were followed by relatively calm periods when students did not organize or protest (Johnston, 1998). By the 1950s, several factors, including changing youth attitudes, the Vietnam War, the Civil Rights Movement, civil liberties, nuclear weapons, Communism, and the changing role of higher education in America, led to a resurgence in student activism and protests, beginning with the iconic Free Speech Movement (FSM) in 1964 at the University of California at Berkeley (“President’s Commission,” 1970).

The incidents at Berkeley in the spring of 1964 led the way for protests at other schools. Societal factors such as the escalating Vietnam War, police brutality, lack of perceived “change” in the “system,” university reaction to protest, and changes in the Civil Rights Movement, all had an influence on the tactics used by student protestors
(“President’s Commission,” 1970). These protests became more common and as time went on, the use of violence by protestors escalated. Counter reactions to these protests by university and civil authorities became more violent as well, often igniting even more protest against the authorities. Media portrayal of student protestors led to public backlash and new laws aimed at punitively curbing disruptive protests (“President’s Commission,” 1970). As the Civil Rights Movement shifted from peaceful tactics to Black Power and more violent methods, Blacks on college campuses organized to demand more rights (Astin et al., 1975; “President’s Commission,” 1970). These factors, combined with the announcement that America had been bombing Cambodia in late April 1970, was the turning point that led to the incidents at Kent State and Jackson State College in May 1970. These incidents significantly affected campuses across the country, including the University of Toledo.

2.1 The Origins of Student Activism

Student protests have been prevalent on university campuses across the country since the early eighteenth century (Astin et al., 1975; Johnston, 1998). A disruption at Harvard in 1766 over serving bad dining hall butter is an example of common early protests (Lucas, 1994, p. 112; Johnston, 1998; Altbach & Peterson, 1971). American higher education at the time was on a much smaller scale compared with today. For example, by 1860, only 1 % of White males attended college (Johnston, 1998). The faculty who administered most of the schools during the early years of American higher education were often charged as being very adversarial and many felt that they adopted a
paternal attitude toward their students through *In loco parentis*. Administration and corporal punishment were rigid and severe (Thelin, 2004, p. 22). The curriculum was based on the traditional liberal arts and students many times felt that it did not provide useful instruction for a career. Students were not satisfied with their education in general (Lucas, 1994, p. 124). In addition to low interest in higher education, religious affiliation of higher education institutions declined as well. As a result of these various factors, student drinking, debauchery, gambling, and violent assault became more common during this period (Lucas, 1994, p. 111). These factors led to unrest in some schools. For instance, in 1807 Princeton had to close due to students vandalizing local property and the subsequent student rebellion after the university suspended the vandalizing students (Johnston, 1998). Much of this unrest was channeled through new student organizations.

The rise of student organizations and fraternities, which were separate from the faculty, increased the cohesiveness of the student body and provided outlets for student energy (Lucas, 1994, p 212). The changing roles of higher education after the Civil War also led to a lessening of student dissent. The new land grant colleges constructed under the 1862 Morrill Act gave new colleges and universities new emphases in practical disciplines which expanded the curriculum and student choice (Lucas, 1994, p 147). A higher number of students attended college and with that came growth in student organizations such as university student governments, sports teams, student newspapers, and fraternities which gave at least some power and a voice to students. With this new representation and the remoteness of the university from political life, students were more likely to work through these new channels. However, with the coming of the 20th century, student groups began to find a new outlet in political action (Johnston, 1998, p. 12, 15).
Student extracurricular activities such as Greek letter societies, social clubs, athletics, and campus newspapers began taking a larger share of students’ time and attention (Lucas, 1994, p. 212; Thelin, 2004, p. 94). These groups slowly went from concern over local issues to broader political issues, as the stirrings of the First World War approached. Early groups such as the Young People’s Socialist League (YPSL) and the Student Christian Volunteer Movement (SCVM) were largely educational but brought political attention as they invited controversial speakers to campus and distributed literature (Astin et al., 1975, p. 18). Groups such as the Intercollegiate Socialist Society had more than fifty college chapters in 1915 (Johnston, 1998, p. 16). The ISS and other student groups took an isolationist stand to America’s involvement in WWI. At the same time, the federal government created the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) which was a program for military training on campus. ROTC was made mandatory at many schools but nearly all students opposed it (Johnston, 1998, p. 17).

By 1918-19, the ISS and other left-wing student political groups were far less outspoken due to the Red Scare and the subsequent Sedition act of 1918 (Altbach & Peterson, 1971, p. 3). It is important to note that these movements were very small by 1960s standards, and were very much connected with outside “adult groups.” They were also largely focused on domestic political issues (Altbach & Peterson, 1971, p. 3). However, student discontent over the bureaucratization of higher education, and the rise of ROTC programs solidified groups such as the National Student Federation of America (NSFA), which was the first large association of student governments that promoted student rights and efficacy of student government (Astin et al., 1975; Johnston, 1998, p.
Some of these new groups took a pacifistic stance as they felt that America entered the First World War for capitalistic reasons.

The depression severely affected the university. Faculty were fired, fees and tuition were raised, and graduates were not able to find jobs (Johnston, 1998). Many students decided to stay in college as long as they could due to the lack of employment opportunities during the Depression. The government paid over $93 million in emergency financial aid to students (Lucas, 1994, p. 211). With the outside economy and politics now directly affecting them, students found a new sense of political activism (Lucas, 1994, p. 211). In New York City in 1931, the president of City College blocked leftist literature from the campus newspaper that sparked city wide protests (Johnston, 1998, p. 18). The students involved in the protests founded the National Student League (NSL). The platform of the NSL was largely anti-war and anti-discrimination. The Young Communist League (YCL) eventually overtook most of the NSL.

The NSL and YCL, like many people at the time, viewed America’s involvement in WWI as largely a capitalist venture for profits. This idea created many student pacifists who refused to serve in any future war. In 1934, 25,000 students participated in a national student strike against war, an astonishingly large number considering the enrollment numbers at universities at the time (Johnston, 1998, p. 19). The Intercollegiate Socialist Society had renamed itself the League for Industrial Democracy and after the NSL strike, became more politically active and changed its name to the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID). In 1935, SLID joined the NSFA in an anti-war strike involving 175,000 students (Johnston, 1998, p. 19). The 1936 anti-war strike was also a success, with 500,000 students participating (Johnston, 1998, p. 19).
SLID would eventually become the Student for a Democratic Society (SDS), a radical
group notoriously active during the 1960s.

By the late 1930s, the American Student Union began to focus on anti-fascism. However, splits in the group with YCL members and disagreements on world events threw the ASU into disarray. After the fall of the ASU, there were relatively few peace strikes before America’s entry into World War II. After this date, student activism on campus greatly diminished. Many faculty and students went to war, war time rationing and support of the war effort limited political organizing, and support for the War was at an all time high after Pearl Harbor. In addition, a new focus on finding un-American subversives within colleges began to take hold (Lucas, 1994, p. 243). Enrollment dwindled at many colleges and universities during the War. However, this would certainly change after the War was over.

After WWII, university enrollment nearly doubled as returning veterans supported by the GI Bill enrolled at America’s campuses (Thelin, 2000, p. 263). These veteran students were older, more likely to have families, and more likely to focus solely on getting their education (Lucas, 1994, p. 276). Some of these students did become involved in student groups, especially groups such as the International Union of Students, founded in Prague in 1946 (Johnston, 1998, p. 22). In Prague, more than 350 U.S. colleges and universities participated in the founding of the United States National Student Association (NSA) (Johnston, 1998, p. 22). This new group was focused on having various student governments as members and promoting a unified student front for student civil liberties (Altbach & Peterson, 1971, p. 10). Facing financial problems,
the NSA began to accept funding from the CIA, which caused widespread criticism when this fact was finally revealed in 1967 (Johnston, 1998, p. 23).

In the late 1950s, the United States began to heavily invest in science, giving large amounts of research funds to America’s universities in order to advance science, engineering, and weapons research (Lucas, 1994, p. 252). This promoted a new era of support for and focus on higher education. By the time the baby boomer generation entered colleges in the 1960s, the college student population in the United States would nearly triple (Johnston, 1998, p. 24). The death of the “old left” socialists and Communists during the 1950s paved the way for the “new left” of the sixties who sought ways to improve American society in a fundamentally moral way (Laufer & Light, 1977, p. 8). The 1960s would see the rapid rise of several new and very outspoken student groups who would protest and garner political support in a way never before witnessed in American higher education.

Several societal factors affected students during the 1960s, thus contributing to an era of widespread student protest. New political developments regarding civil rights, nuclear weapons, the environment, the Cold War, and political freedom attracted the attention of students at the time and were responsible for shaping the activism at Berkeley and elsewhere (Altbach & Peterson, 1971). At the same time, the structure and roles of the university were changing, leading to student outrage over institutional policies that they deemed morally wrong. The President’s Commission on Campus Unrest (1970) cites six main societal developments that may help explain university protest:

- The pressing problems of American society, particularly the war in Southeast Asia [later sixties] and the conditions of minority groups;
- The changing status and attitudes of youth in America (i.e. hippie movement, drug culture);
A new era of division touched off by the Cold War had a great effect on the lives of Americans in the 1950s. Senator Joseph McCarthy and the activities of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) relentlessly investigated Hollywood, the State Department, and institutions of higher education. Nearly everyone was affected in some way by the new hysteria over communist subversives in American life. Professors who refused to sign new loyalty oaths were often times fired, believing that these oaths infringed on academic freedom (Thelin, 2004, p. 276). The HUAC was viewed as a symbol of the limitation of free speech and a direct threat to civil rights. When it became known that McCarthy was propagandizing a political witch-hunt through out-right lies to go after “enemies,” a sense of disillusionment with the government was a result (Patterson, 1997, p. 201). After 1960, in which a large group of Berkeley students held a demonstration at a HUAC meeting in San Francisco, the HUAC viewed many student groups as tools of the Communist party (“U.S. Reds,” 1966; Magolda & Magolda, 1988, p. 9; O’Brien, 1971).

In addition, cultural factors were also at work in the 1950s that had an influence on the college generation of the sixties. Among them were the Beatniks, a new counter-culture group typified by the Columbia student and poet Allen Ginsburg who reveled in poetry, politics, new age art, and drug use (Patterson, 1997, p. 410). Beats such as
Ginsberg and Jack Kerouac greatly influenced “New Left” people such as Tom Hayden, leader of the Columbia SDS, and pioneers of the Hippie movement such as Harvard Psychologist Timothy Leary (Patterson, 1997, p. 410). The Beat movement was an example of a counter culture that influenced the future hippie culture and commune living. The movement widened the generational differences between the young and the old, which would greatly affect the student protest movement in the sixties (Feuer, 1972). Out of this new counterculture came a resistance and a reaction to traditional western society and values such as the protestant ethic and capitalistic materialism (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 59). These new values eventually clashed with tradition. Several scholars claim that student protest was an outlet for this clash (Laufer, 1971). These new values manifested themselves through student participation in the Civil Rights Movement.

The “new left” demonstrators of the sixties were perhaps most heavily influenced by the Civil Rights Movement. On February 1, 1960, several North Carolina A & T college freshmen sat down at the Whites only Woolworth’s lunch counter in Greensboro North Carolina and remained there until the store closed, enduring jeers and threats (Patterson, 1997, p. 430). This “sit-in” method of demonstrating against segregation spread rapidly through the U.S. and was eventually used as a key tactic in student protests during the sixties (O’Brien, 1971; Laufer & Light, 1977, p. 14). The Greensboro sit-in also launched the Civil Rights Movement and led to the formation of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), of which several whites were members (O’Brien, 1971). Other organizations such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) also had numerous
white volunteers, many of whom were college students. The Civil Rights Movement became bloodier and more divided as freedom riders and other groups were attacked in the south (Patterson, 1997, p. 443). This increased the divisions within American society but also held the hope for new promise in the future. Out of students’ involvement in the Civil Rights Movement came the adaptation of tactics to student political activism (Boren, 2001, p. 140).

New movements such as the Peace Movement led by the Campus Peace Union (CPU), National Committee for Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), and the Student Peace Union (SPU) also had politicizing affects on campus students. These groups were active in organizing literature and campus protests (O’Brien, 1971; Johnston, 1998, p. 24). With the increasing political participation of college students came the signing of the Port Huron Statement by Tom Hayden and other SDS members in 1962 (O’Brien, 1971; Patterson, 1997, p. 444; Boren, 2001, p. 141). The Port Huron Statement was a widely popular New Left manifesto that pointed out the remoteness of ordinary citizens from control over the decision-making process (O’Brien, 1971). The Port Huron statement and the SDS also solidified student and new left aims and through the SDS would influence many protests on America’s campuses.

Finally, the new role of higher education in America also influenced student protest development. After World War II, higher education grew at an unprecedented rate (Laufer & Light, p. 13). Given the massive growth in enrollment, a myriad of new issues sprang up including the rise in bureaucratization and other structural changes. This growth was perceived by some students as contributing to a lack of community, lack of institutional purpose, and alienation of the student from the university (Salter, 1973).
Overarching this theme was the larger question of “What is the role of the university?” Large lecture hall classrooms seemed to some students like assembly line learning. A new emphasis on research and tenure has shadowed the focus on instruction and faculty loyalties in the lives of professors. Leon Eisenberg (1970) mentions that these factors make the university into “a producer of a managerial class rather than that of a haven for personal development” (p. 1690). However, several studies have shown that even at large universities, students were not necessarily dissatisfied with higher education at the time (Kenniston & Lerner, 1971, p. 49; “President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 74). There may be other causal factors at work at large multiversity type institutions that cause more protest than at other institutions.

Indeed, the size of the institution often correlates with incidents of student protest (Van Dyke, 1998, p. 30). According to Scott and El-Assal (1969), out of 104 state-supported non-technical schools surveyed, schools with 10,000 or more students had the most demonstrations compared to smaller schools that had some or no demonstrations. This makes sense intuitively as one thinks that the more students there are, the more variation in political beliefs, interests, religion, etc. will produce a large enough number of students to partake in protest (Norr, 1977, p. 58; Bowers & Pierce, 74, p. 7; Van Dyke, 1998, p. 31). However, protests over In loco parentis, student participation in university governance, and criticism of the governance structure at universities happened at many schools, just more so at larger ones. In addition, during the mid 1960s, colleges that were more selective had more protests as well as those colleges that had a previous history of student protest (Norr, 1977, p. 59; Van Dyke, 1998, p. 33). However, during 1970, these
institutional characteristics were not as prominent, as protests attracted more moderate students.

Student protest in America began as isolated incidents protesting specific university policies. These early protests were rarely political. As more students joined new organizations, student groups became more political, oftentimes protesting broader societal issues. A combination of factors influenced the development of the student generation that entered colleges and universities in the mid 1960s. This new generation had different outlooks on politics, familial life, academics, civil rights, public service, and religion, oftentimes introduced by highly educated parents with a permissive attitude toward child rearing (Watts & Whittaker, 1966; Flacks, 1967; Astin et al., 1975; Westby & Braungart, 1965, 1970). These new demographic and societal changes resulted in a new assertiveness on the part of students, first exemplified in the Free Speech Movement at the University of California at Berkeley in 1964.

2.2 Berkeley, 1964

The iconic student protest example in American history is the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley in the fall of 1964. No other student protest has shaped subsequent protests and shook the higher education establishment like the FSM. It became the “prototype” for student protest throughout the decade so much so that the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest (1970) named it the “Berkeley Convention” for the tactics employed and the administrative actions taken (p. 22). The protests at Berkeley were largely successful (President’s Commission, 1970) by utilizing the same
methods as those used during the Civil Rights Movement (Astin et al., 1975). This mass movement of support was touched off by the use of civil police authorities to arrest students. This action only fueled the fire of protestors. The police intervention was interpreted as a confirmation of the claim that the university was repressive (“President’s Commission,” 1970). In this way, the administration fueled the flames of dissent and legitimized the power of protest.

On October 23, 1960, Clark Kerr issued the “Kerr Directives” which put student organizations under the direct control of administration officials (Heirich, 1971, p. 78). These directives forbid student governments to speak on off-campus issues, made administration approval a prerequisite of student government actions, and made sure student organizations must not be affiliated with any political goal or advocate outside groups. In effect, the administration’s policies prevented the student government from taking on certain issues that were very relevant to the students at the time because they were political. In addition, the administration prevented any outside political groups from expressing themselves on campus and dealt with students by suspension and mass arrests.

On September 16, 1964, the Berkeley administration announced that off-campus political groups could no longer use a small area of university property to distribute literature, collect money, or try to gain memberships (Astin et al., 1975, p. 20). Before this time there was an area on the edge of campus that allowed outside groups to solicit members. Political groups were extremely upset by this and offered to agree not to solicit money from passersby. The Berkeley administration refused to change the enforcement
of the policy (Astin et al., 1975, p. 20). The Free Speech Movement (FSM) was formed to protest the administration.

On October 1, campus police arrested a person who was not a student for soliciting money for the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). When the police tried to take him away in a car, the car was rushed by a large group of students who formed a sit in around the car for 32 hours (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 24). The students used the car as a stage for speeches which ranged from politics to music lyrics. Eventually the students collected funds to repay the damage done to the police car. After this incident, the administration held a series of hearings, committees were formed, and students began to engage in more protest activities which led to a general faculty and student strike in December 1964. During this strike, the administration building was occupied by a sit-in that was only broken up after mass arrests, ordered by Governor Edmund Brown. There were hundreds of arrests and charges of police brutality. The leader of the FSM, Mario Savio, was suspended, jailed for 120 days, and refused readmission to the University (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 24).

The President’s Commission on Campus Unrest (1970) noted that before the mass arrests, the actions of the FSM were not widely supported by university students. After the arrests, so many students supported the FSM that classes and other programs stopped as a mass strike was instituted. Eventually, the administration changed their policies on political activity. The Chancellor and the President both submitted and then retracted their resignations. Eventually President Clark Kerr did resign a year later. In the end, few institutional changes were instituted as a result of the sit-in. A possible reason for the little change was that although the FSM and other protests were about university policy,
the origins of this protest and the veracity with which students protested was largely based on societal factors that the administration had little control over (President’s Commission, 1970, p. 25). In effect, although the administration could liberalize policy, which it did, they had no power to stop the new wave of political activity which college students at the time were partaking in. As it would turn out, Berkeley was the event that touched off years of similar incidents on university campuses throughout America.

2.3 Protest Expands

The mass media covered the Berkeley incident and it gained widespread coverage due to its controversial nature. The media played a hand in spreading the message of the FSM and their tactics to other universities and empowered organizations such as SDS to new heights of power (Boren, 2001; Astin et al., 1975). In addition, they also angered many Americans who thought that the protests and disruptions were not necessary. There were in fact many protests on campuses during 1965. Out of 849 campuses involved in a national survey, most of them reported protest (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 29). These protests were about campus administration policies, dining hall food, dormitory regulations, academic freedom, and student participation in administration. Societal issues that were protested combined the war, racism, and a feeling of lack of political efficacy with university grievances which manifested itself as a feeling of repression perpetuated by the system, of which the university was a part (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 29). This attack on the system or “the establishment” would be a recurring theme in protests that followed.
Changes in the Civil Rights Movement during the mid to late sixties also had deep effects on student protest. Riots in Watts and Harlem, the refusal of the Democratic National Convention (1964) to seat the Mississippi Freedom Delegation, and the assassination of Malcolm X divided moderates from hardliners within the Civil Rights Movement (Magolda & Magolda, 1988). Huey Newton and Bobby Seale formed the Black Panther party, while White members of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) were expelled by Stokely Carmichael in 1966. Black power and separatism became dominant over cooperation and as a result Black militancy came to the fore (Magolda & Magolda, 1988). Many protestors claimed that the university, as part of the system, was racist. This anger fueled many student protests over racial equality, as many student groups demanded Black studies programs, outreach to Black communities, and changes in admissions policies of Blacks. Competing attitudes toward race, combined with a controversial war politicized many young people.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed Congress in August of 1964 and the subsequent escalation of American intervention in South-East Asia began to dominate the efforts of student protestors. The war unified many different groups in a single cause against the war. Many students saw the American system of government as corrupt and any institution that dealt with the American government corrupt also. These institutions included American universities, which in 1968 spent $3 billion annually for research and development of which 70% of this money came from the federal government (Heineman, 1993, p. 13). Over half of this money originated from defense related industries (Heineman, 1993, p. 13). Many universities had specific research programs focused on the development of weapons used by the military. Student protestors, feeling a lack of
impact on foreign policy and racial equality, began to attack the system as the root cause of societal problems (Magolda & Magolda, 1988).

Subsequently, the university was seen as complicit in the war which only fueled the fires of dissent. Soon there was widespread protest over military contracts and ROTC programs on campuses across the nation. In 1967, tens of thousands of students on hundreds of campuses joined in the “End the Draft Week” in which massive demonstrations and draft-card burnings were carried out (Boren, 2001, p. 145). At the University of Wisconsin, a large group of students demonstrated against the Dow Chemical Company recruiters on campus for their ties in the production of napalm for use in the Vietnam War (Boren, 2001, p. 145). When police tried to remove students, large crowds would form to prevent them from doing so. Rocks were thrown at police and troops were called in but students eventually gave up (Boren, 2001, p. 146). Similar protests over university involvement in Defense Department contracts occurred throughout the protest era, including a successful protest at Pennsylvania State University (Heineman, 1993). As the incidence of student protest escalated, new tactics were utilized. This can be seen in protests at Columbia in 1968 and in subsequent protests throughout the nation.

2.4 The Escalation of Protest

Student protest tactics were largely peaceful at Berkeley and the years following but after 1967, student protest groups used more severe tactics. By 1968, student disillusionment caused by the seemingly failed attempts to change foreign policy in
America, to gain greater equality between the races, and to make an impact on society became widespread (Boren, 2001, p. 172). These factors led to more violent protests, exemplified at other schools throughout 1969 such as the incident in April of 1968 when Black students at Trinity College in Hartford Connecticut held the school’s trustees captive until their demands were met (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 38). This was also the case at San Fernando Valley State College in Los Angeles where officials were threatened with knives (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 38). Political tactics such as terrorism and the threat of terrorism were also used. For example, a secretary at Pomona College was injured by a bomb, a student at San Francisco State College was injured while planting a bomb, and a custodian at the University of California at Santa Barbara was killed by a bomb (“President’s Commission,” 1970). At many schools the target of these bomb threats was the ROTC building on campus, the symbol of the American military and the university’s complicity in the Vietnam War.

In response to these new violent tactics utilized by student protestors, universities began to implement more punitive disciplinary rules. According to a study cited by the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest (1970), more than 900 students had been expelled or suspended while 850 had been given reprimands at 28 different schools in 1969. According to the same commission, over 4,000 students were arrested during the 1968-69 school year and about 7,200 arrests occurred in 1969-1970 (p. 39). In addition to increasing use of police and arrests, reports of police brutality toward students were also on the rise (Astin et al., 1975; President’s Commission, 1970). These issues were exacerbated by sensationalism in the press (Lucas, 1994, p. 279). A prime example of these trends is exemplified in the protests at Columbia University in 1968.
At Columbia, on April 23, 1968, five buildings were occupied by SDS and the Students Afro American Society for a week (Lusky & Lusky, 1969). The reasoning behind this sit-in was to protest the Institute for Defense Analysis, a military think tank affiliated with Columbia. In addition, the students were protesting the planned construction of a gymnasium on community land and to protest the disciplinary probation of Mark Rudd and other SDS leader over previous protest incidents (Lusky & Lusky, 1969). The city police were called in and arrested 707 people and 148 were injured (Astin et al., 1975, p. 25). Classes were suspended and Hamilton hall, the first building occupied on April 23, was again occupied over the suspension of SDS protest leaders. The police were called in again, resulting in injuries on both sides (Lusky & Lusky, 1969).

There were definite similarities between the incidents at Berkeley with those at other schools. Students occupied buildings, the administration did not understand what to do, police were called in, and students were injured. This in turn widened support for the protestors from the more moderate students which led to a major strike and attempts to reform governance and disciplinary procedures. Different from Berkeley, the protestors at Columbia tried to use the university as a means for political change (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 37). In addition, there was more property damage, student arrest resistance, and more violent police reaction than at Berkeley (Astin et al., 1975; “President’s Commission,” 1970). This type of violence continued to be the trend of future student protests (Bowers & Pierce, 1974, p. 10). The more violent and massive the student protests were, the more the press covered them, leading to greater public outrage.
The press covered many campus disruptions, with the most violent incidents getting the most coverage (Lucas, 1994, p. 279). This invited outrage from average citizens who viewed young people and the new counterculture as obscene, disrespectful, and morally degrading. This coverage made campus protest a major political issue and by 1970, many Americans considered student protests to be one of the worst problems facing America (Keniston & Lerner, 1971, p. 40). By 1970, over 30 states had enacted nearly 80 laws dealing with campus unrest (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 40). Most of these laws, as with the Higher Education Act of 1968, were aimed at tightening disciplinary policies and denying financial aid to those students who break them. But while government was trying to suppress student protest through punitive measures, new student groups began to protest. As the Civil Rights Movement took a radical turn, Black groups at various campuses demanded greater numbers of Black faculty, students, and other rights.

In November 1967, several Black students at San Francisco State College broke into the office of the campus newspaper and beat the editor (Astin et al., 1975, p. 28). The Black Student Union at SFSC occupied the administration building at which point police were called in and then violent confrontations occurred. At South Carolina State College in February 1968, Black students began a protest movement over segregated buses in the college’s hometown of Orangeburg. A few days later on February 8, some students began attacking National guardsmen, which were called in by the mayor. The police began shooting at the students. Three students were killed, and twenty seven more were wounded (Boren, 2001, p. 172). Incidents such as the one at South Carolina State also further radicalized black students at other campuses, as they were growing in number
on America’s campuses. Incidents at Historically Black Colleges and Universities such as Bowie State, Fisk, and Howard grew in regularity and strength (Boren, 2001, p. 173).

At Cornell, a program to enroll more Black students was implemented in 1963 but caused problems as Black students enrolled in greater numbers (Astin et al., 1975, p. 29). Even as a proposed Black studies program was in development, members of the Afro-American Society (AAS) felt that it was not enough. They made demands for separate facilities for Blacks at which point the university denied their demands. Black students then protested with property damage and violence. Six of these protestors had to appear before a disciplinary board for student conduct (Astin et al., 1975, p. 29). The AAS, occupied a residence hall and issued a statement calling for the dismissal of charges against the six cited students, separate Black housing facilities, and an investigation into a cross-burning incident, occurring just days before in front of a Black residence hall (Astin et al., 1975, p. 29). Rumors of other students coming to force the Black students out of the hall were rampant, as well as bomb threat rumors. Supporters brought guns to the occupiers. Eventually a negotiation between the AAS and the administration took place and the Black students left the buildings (Astin et al., 1975, p. 29). Cleary, having a group of students armed threatening violence is an impediment to university operations, and an example of how a few radical students can escalate a situation.

As at Berkeley and Columbia, the students at San Francisco State College, South Carolina State, Howard, Fisk, Bowie State, and Cornell were all protesting the policy and actions of the administration. But it is also evident how tactics have evolved since Berkeley. At Cornell and San Francisco State College, the issues were supposed racism and the protestors were Black students. They used violent tactics such as property
damage, assault, bomb threats, and gun carrying. This was a far cry from the sit-ins that evolved from the early Civil Rights Movement. This use of violence caused counter violence, making sensational news stories in the media and causing widespread public backlash, as noted earlier. Many people believed that only harsh measures could control students and that police violence was brought upon by the protestors themselves (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 40). This public attitude was evident as 1968 continued. Not only were student groups becoming more radical, many other people in American society were radicalizing as well.

1968 was a year that radicalized the nation. A combination of the war in Vietnam, events at the Democratic National Convention, the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., the Orangeburg killings, and the assassination of Robert Kennedy contributed to the use of more violent tactics. In addition to the radicalization of the Civil Rights Movement noted above, numerous race riots plagued cities across the nation (Patterson, 1997, p. 449). Incidents occurring in Vietnam added to this racial tension, further radicalizing student groups.

The Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War shook war supporters and boosted war protestors as graphic pictures of the dead came across America’s airwaves after the January 30, 1968 attack (Patterson, 1997, p. 449). The attack was a complete surprise and a very costly operation for the North Vietnamese. But it was construed as an American defeat and shown as a sign that the Vietnam War may be unwinnable by respected newsmen such as Walter Conkrite. This caused fear in the minds of many Americans, especially students, about the draft. Already by 1967, there was a serious effort by many
American youths at draft resistance (O’Brien, 1971). Indeed, the war would in May 1970 be a truly radicalizing force for many students on campuses throughout America.

The Democratic National Convention in August 1968 ignited wrath from many young people and American people in general and provided a boost of support of protestors. Mayor Richard Daley ordered 12,000 police to the site to fight off possible demonstrators. When demonstrators did show up he denied them permits to march, protest, or sleep in parks. Groups such as the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (MOBE) and the Yippies of the Youth International Party (YIP) were among the 10,000 or so protestors. They were clubbed by police after refusing to leave a public park. Again on August 28, police were ordered to attack protestors with tear gas and clubs. In the ensuing melee hundreds of protestors and bystanders were injured as cameras recorded everything (Boren, 2001, p. 178).

The incidents at the Democratic National Convention, as well as the Orangeburg killings in February 1968, served only to ignite indignation against the police and the military. These incidents gave credence to what some protestors were saying. Many student protestors and others began to realize that political and social change through electoral politics was ineffective, further adding to extreme measures (Boren, 2001, p. 178). The cold realities of the draft boards, the injustice of assassination, the feeling of ineffectiveness with the Civil Rights Movement, and the spread of the youth counter culture all added to the tumultuous late 1960s. But as radicalized students began to use radical tactics, a larger number of moderate students also began to demonstrate in their own way, turned off by groups such as the SDS. The SDS split into different groups at their 1969 Chicago convention with the “Weathermen” promoting terrorist tactics, others
promoting non-violence, and yet others complaining that women were not involved enough with the leadership of the organization (O’Brien, 1971). The Weathermen and their violent tactics pushed away moderates and they eventually lost power and went underground.

With public backlash and violent responses to student demonstrations, the vast power that radical groups had was dwindling. Although more moderate student actions such as the peaceful October and November 1969 Vietnam War Moratoriums gained wide support, the remainder of 1969 was calm. This was not the case in the spring of 1970. In April of 1970, Stanford witnessed students throwing rocks, breaking windows, and setting fire to buildings (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 43). Governor Ronald Reagan of California shut down the university system on all 28 campuses for four days (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 45). National Guardsmen were sent onto the campuses of the universities of Kentucky, South Carolina, Illinois at Urbana, Ohio State, and Wisconsin at Madison (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 45). However, no other incident reflected the growing trend of violence like the incidents at Kent State and Jackson State College in May 1970.

2.5 Kent State and Jackson State College

In April 1970, President Nixon declared that the United States would begin bombing Cambodia. This ignited anti-war protests across the nation. Students began to take stronger action to protest the War as their support base spread. At Ohio State, student demonstrators were tear gassed and shot with birdseed shells by the
National Guard and the local police (“OSU and Miami,” 1970, May 5; Boren, 2001, p 187). The OSU administration left the university, as 6,000 National Guard Troops patrolled the campus. There were other similar incidents across the country, but none were as severe as the incidents at Kent State.

On May 1, a crowd formed outside of the bars in Kent Ohio and began harassing passersby about their views on the War in Cambodia. The crowd swelled, throwing bottles and lighting fires at which point the mayor of Kent called the Adjutant General of Ohio to send a National Guard liaison officer (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 241). The National Guard was called in on May 2 after local businesses and local government feared that they could no longer maintain order. On May 2, university officials tried desperately to prevent rumors and even filed for an injunction against any property damage on campus. Later that night a group of 1,000 students began chanting pro-Vietnamese chants and throwing rocks at the ROTC building. Eventually the students lit the building on fire. Fireman came to the campus without police aid and students began slashing the fire hoses and preventing the firemen, who withdrew, from doing their jobs. The police did not intervene because the chief of police feared for his officers’ lives (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 246).

Students were never informed about what would happen if the Guard came to campus. There were several meetings during the day on May 2 between administration and student groups but nothing serious was discussed involving the use of the National Guard. Student resentment of the Guard continued to grow. President White came back to campus as soon as possible, as did Ohio Governor Rhodes, who said this of the incidents at Kent: “We are going to eradicate the problem, […] We are not going to treat
the symptoms” (as cited in “President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 254). This adversarial attitude toward the students would become evident in action taken during the next two days.

In the evening of Sunday, May 3, a large group of students began gathering and the campus police and the Guard decided to impose an established curfew early. At 9:00 p.m. the Ohio Riot Act was read and the police gave the crowd five minutes to disperse. The students did not disperse so the police and Guardsmen drove them away with tear gas. The students regrouped near a spot called Prentice Gate and made demands, asking to speak with the Mayor and President White about removing the Guard from campus and abolishing the ROTC. The police told them that they would not be able to talk to the two men, and once again read them the Riot Act. Feeling betrayed, the previously non-violent students began throwing rocks at the Guardsmen and police. The police fired back with tear gas as students ran in all directions, some being bayoneted. When things settled down, over 50 people had been arrested (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 258). By this point many more students were enraged about the presence of Guardsmen and the disorder around them.

By 11:45 a.m. on Monday May 4, a crowd on the commons grew to nearly 500 when General Canterbury, head of the Guard, ordered the crowd dispersed. He ordered his troops to “lock and load” at which point their weapons were loaded and ready to fire (“President's Commission,” 1970, p. 263). This infuriated the crowd as they began to throw rocks yelling “pigs off campus!” (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 263). Canterbury ordered a skirmish line of 96 men to move out to disperse the crowd. Some grenadiers shot two canisters of tear gas into the crowd, in an effort to push them back.
The crowd was pushed back to the football field. What happened after this is widely disputed. What is known is that students were harassing and throwing rocks at the Guardsmen as they marched back up Blanket hill. Someone fired a shot at the crowd without orders and 27 other guardsmen fired 61 shots total. Four students were killed and nine were wounded. Students panicked and took cover. About a half an hour later students began to gather again, very confused and emotional. About a half hour after that the commons area was clear (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 265).

Clearly there were widespread problems with the administration at Kent. President White and university officials had given up their sovereignty to Kent’s mayor, Governor Rhodes, and the National Guard. It is interesting to note that Kent had not had a history of violent disruption of this magnitude. In fact, the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest (1970) stated that (much like the University of Toledo) “compared with other American universities of its size, Kent State had enjoyed relative tranquility prior to May 1970, and its student body had generally been conservative or apolitical” (1970, p. 234). Most analysts agree that if the administration and Kent police officers had handled the situation differently from May 1 onward, this tragedy could have been prevented (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 289). Students were not protesting the Cambodian invasion or the Vietnam War; they were protesting what they perceived to be repression. The majority of them deeply resented the Guards’ presence on campus. It should be pointed out that the crowd on May 4 was peaceful and only when the decision was made to disperse the crowd was violence involved.

The response to the Kent State tragedy was extreme across the country’s campuses. By May 10, 448 campuses were either closed down or experiencing heavy
protest (as cited in Astin et al., 1975, p. 32). 337 campuses around the country shut-down after news of Kent State spread. At Bowling Green State University, after a couple of hundred students staged a sit-in in his office, President William T. Jerome automatically cancelled all classes for a week. All classes were cancelled at the University of Akron and Miami University of Ohio was shut down indefinitely due to threats of violence. At Ohio University, a fire bomb caused $4,000 in damages to the ROTC building and football stadium. At Ohio State University, President Novice G. Fawcett shut down the university indefinitely because he said that there was an “imminent danger of further disruption and violence” (“OSU and Miami,” 1970, May 7).

OSU had already experienced several days of violence that started on April 30 when the Committee for Student Rights protested the university’s refusal to discuss a list of 28 demands that were presented to them. This list, fairly typical of other demands at other schools (including Toledo), called for great enrollment of Blacks, abolition of military recruitment and the ROTC, and more student power in university governance. 650 people were arrested and state Highway Patrolmen and the National Guard had been called in by Governor Rhodes. Dozens of people were injured in clashes. Like Kent, there were various clashes between students and Police/Guardsmen, fires were lit, and firefighters were harassed. Ten days after the deaths at Kent State, two more students were killed at Jackson State College in Mississippi, further aggravating the situation.

Jackson State College was a small black college, enrolling 4,300 students. It was located in Jackson Mississippi, a state notorious for Jim Crow and the Civil Rights Movement (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 412). There were several incidents from 1965-1970 with groups of people throwing rocks at white motorists going down Lynch
Street. On May 13, 1970, a group of people along Lynch Street were throwing rocks at passing motorists (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 417). A passing police car was hit with a rock. By 10:00 p.m. the police established roadblocks and sealed off the campus. The rock throwing stopped but more students and other people continued to gather in front of Alexander Hall, a student residence hall, until the crowd was 700 strong by 11:00 p.m. Jackson State’s security force was harassed by the crowd. The president of Jackson State, Dr. John Peoples, issued a 10:30 p.m. curfew, which was largely ignored by the crowd of students (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 420). Jackson’s Mayor called the Governor to request that the National Guard be sent in. Members of the crowd turned over cars, and set fire to a trash trailer (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 418).

At about 10:45, about 100 students and other young people marched toward the ROTC building in an attempt to burn it down. Later on that night, a security officer found two Molotov cocktails burning on a porch roof of the ROTC building. President Peoples told the local police, who teamed with the Mississippi Highway Patrol, to move onto campus and secure the ROTC building. A crowd of about 300 students threw rocks and screamed obscenities at the approaching officers. By midnight the crowd had begun to disperse (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 418). However, at 9:30 p.m. the next day, a group outside of Stewart Hall began throwing rocks at passing cars. The crowd swelled to nearly 200 and the campus was once again sealed off. There were several assaults on reporters and a man attempted to blow up a dump truck by shooting at its gas tank. The police were called in along with a unit of Highway Patrolmen (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 423).
The crowd continued to grow while the National Guard arrived on campus. They began marching toward the campus while fire trucks and crews attempted to put out fires lit by protestors. The firemen were barraged with rocks and requested police protection. The firemen put out the fires and left campus while police entered campus on a truck. After the truck reached Alexander Hall, many students and other protestors were yelling “pigs! pigs!” at the police while many students looked on from stairwell landings in the dorm (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 428). Lieutenant Magee of the police used a megaphone to tell the students to disperse as some officers were being hit with rocks coming from the hall. At that point a barrage of gun fire was heard. The law enforcement officers had fired directly into Alexander Hall. In the doorway, 20 year old Phillip Gibbs was killed by a shotgun blast. James Earl Green, a high school student, was running to the side of nearby Roberts hall was also gunned down by a shotgun blast. 12 others were wounded in the gunfire, which lasted 28 seconds with 150 rounds fired (“President’s Commission,” 1970, p. 432). Over 400 bullet holes were found in Alexander Hall, with nearly every window shot out. The President’s Commission on Campus Unrest (1970) found that “the stark fact underlying all other causes of student unrest at Jackson State is the historic pattern of racism that substantially affects daily life in Mississippi” (p. 444). The incidents at Jackson State ignited fury within the Black community across the nation, and was the catalyst for actions taken by the Black Student Union at the University of Toledo.

At Kent State and Jackson State College, there were several factors that contributed to the escalation of violence. In both cases, the local government decided that it would be best to quell the situation by calling in outside police forces and the
National Guard to move onto campus. Police confusion was also evident, as jurisdiction played a role. There were no policies in place concerning loaded weapons and proper ways to manage student protests that turned into riots. The question of where and when it was proper for outside police to enter a university or to call in the National Guard was not predetermined. When outside forces did show up, the already angry mass of students began throwing rocks out of a sense of “repression” from having State Highway Patrolmen and National Guardsmen on their campus. In addition, the administration of Kent State and Jackson State, did not intervene at the proper times and resigned their sovereignty to outside police forces (Astin et al., 1975, p. 32-33).

Through all of this, there were problems with rumors, communication with the student body, administrative intentions, and otherwise general confusion. In these incidents, the administration plays a pivotal role in quelling rumors and communicating its intentions. John Spiegel (1977) writes:

In part, misunderstanding occurs because of the gap in values, beliefs, and experience separating the two groups. In part, the failure of communication is due to the novelty of such occasions and the absence of any traditional or agreed upon style of conduct for the procedures, such as characterizes labor bargaining sessions (p. 152)

New values, societal forces, racism, and the Vietnam War, converged to cause this separation from students and administration that was so evident at many of the schools at the time. If the administration had prepared for these types of incidents and if certain actions were taken, the administration could have diffused and many times prevented violent student protest (“President’s Commission,” 1970; “American Association Report,” 1970). The University of Toledo, like other universities, experienced student protest stemming from the very same factors as those that occurred at Kent State and
Jackson State College. However, there were several characteristics of the University of Toledo that aided in the prevention of violence.

Throughout the history of student protest in America, we have seen the beginnings, the politicization of students, the onset of mass protest, and the escalation of tactics which have sometimes resulted in violence. This same type of evolution also occurred on the University of Toledo campus, starting with the establishment of political groups such as the SDS, growing in action through demonstrations, and gaining support as a consequence of national events. We also see the public backlash through legislation and local community opinion. All throughout this period however, we also see the establishment and expansion of student rights, representation, and attempts at broader administrative transparency. Through wise administrative leadership, student protests were diffused and in some cases prevented.
Chapter 3

Student Activism at the University of Toledo, 1965-1972

The University of Toledo was founded in 1872 by Jesup Wakeman Scott, who viewed Toledo as the “future great city of the world” (“The University of Toledo,” 2001). Throughout the early 20th century, the school grew, incorporating a law school, a college of education, a college of arts and sciences, and a college of business administration. By the 1920s, enrollment was growing at an impressive rate. In one year, enrollment grew by 32 percent. A new campus was planned and local voters supported the bond levy to finance it, creating University Hall in 1930. During the Great Depression, the university faced significant financial trouble and programs were cut. However, WWII “transformed UT into the modern university it is today” (“The University of Toledo,” 2001). With government contracts, the burden of the financial situation lessened and after the passage of the GI Bill, over 3,000 veterans enrolled at UT.

In 1958, the City of Toledo allocated over 12 percent of its budget to the university. New funding was needed if the university were to continue. President William S. Carlson pressed for state funding of the university and on July 1, 1967, UT
became a state institution. By the 1969-1970 school year, UT had 13,531 full time students (“Data Form A,” 1973). These students, like other college students across the country, would experience a new era never before experienced in the history of American higher education.

Student protest was not a new phenomenon at the University of Toledo in the late 1960s. There were several periods throughout UT’s history in which student protest was active. In 1947, the administration proposed the establishment of a ROTC unit on campus (Luetke, 1969, May 23). This action was not supported by the majority of students and was largely editorialized against (Luetke, 1969, May 23). However, there were no mass protests such as the ones that would occur at UT in the 1960s. In 1957, over 100 male students wore Bermuda shorts and gathered outside the library to protest the ejection of two male students for wearing short pants (Pakulski, 1977, April 22). These protests were institution and event specific and were small scale in nature. However, several sources point out that if protest has occurred at an institution in the past, it was far more likely to occur in the future (Gusfield, 1971; Astin et al., 1975; Levin & Spiegel, 1977). By the early 1960s, students were indifferent toward political issues, based on to topics covered in *The Collegian*. However, as political and social forces began sweeping the nation, the students at the University of Toledo were affected as well.
3.1 Political Stirrings

By 1965, the students at the University of Toledo (at the time called Toledo University) were largely indifferent based on articles on student protest and the Vietnam War in the university’s student run newspaper *The Collegian*. Several student editorials were in support for student protestors and the War while others were critical of people protesting the War. During the mid sixties, UT students were influenced by several outside voices during the Doerrmann theater convocation series, in which prominent journalists, activists, and leaders, were invited to Toledo to give speeches about the current topics of the day. In 1965, the ex-envoy of Vietnam to the United States, Tran Van Dinh, spoke to a group of students about the war stating that “the Vietcong is the true reformer and patriot…for he dies striving to help his land” (Steingroot, 1965, December 3). These speakers, addressing contemporary societal ills and the Vietnam War, increased student interest and led to the formation of student political groups.

On March 26, 1966, 700 students attended UT’s first teach-in, in which outside professors such as Dr. Anatole Rappaport from the University of Michigan and Dr. Thompson Bradley from Swarthmore College came to Toledo to discuss the Vietnam War. Several other UT professors spoke about U.S. policy as well. In addition, a student, William Leckie Jr., spoke of the effectiveness of protest but did not denounce the United States’ presence in South East Asia, stating that it reflected “only a minor facet of a sick society.” He went on to point out that “the war must be looked at in the perspective of a complete social critique” (Steingroot, 1966, April 8). This attack on society or “the establishment” in 1966 is an early indicator of how the student protest movement in this country would shift from local campus issues, to the Vietnam war and
then to society itself. Attacking the establishment led to student groups trying to use the university as a political tool for change, as we have seen at Columbia. The organization that was leading the charge was Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), which opened a chapter at the University of Toledo in 1966.

The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) had a small following on campus, only 4 national members and 30 or so supporters of the nearly 13,000 students on campus at the time (Jones, 1968, May 11). The Toledo SDS, after an editorial attacking the *Collegian* as “mainstream,” began publishing its own newspaper: the *Toledo Free Press* (“Local SDS Publishes,” 1966, April 29). The first issue, issued on April 25, 1966, attacked the Student Activities Committee’s policy on the distribution of literature on campus by student groups. The SDS claimed that the committee prohibited the distribution of literature on campus and that it did not matter whether the university enforced it or not. They claimed that this policy was against an American Civil Liberties Union document on the freedoms and rights of students. By May, the SDS was criticized by Jim Funk, the program chairman for the UT chapter of Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) (“SDS Stands,” 1966, May 13). Funk wrote a letter to SDS claiming that they violated rules in the Student Activities Committee handbook about the distribution of literature on campus. YAF claimed that it was “exercising its student prerogative to oppose SDS because of its blatant violation of the university’s regulations concerning student activities” (“SDS Stands,” 1966, May 13). Eventually YAF members submitted a complaint with the Student Activities council. The council voted to confiscate any SDS publications being passed out on campus (“Student Activities,” 1966, May 13).
In early April 1967, Carey McWilliams, editor of *The Nation* magazine spoke to a group of students in Doerrmann theater as part of the convocation series. McWilliams urged students to protest and claimed that “indications are that dissent is in some danger in the United States” (as cited in “TU Students Urged,” 1967, April 7). He called on students to be critical of the Johnson administration and dissent to policies that they feel are wrong. In May 1967, students did in fact utilize dissent to protest university policy.

### 3.2 Initial Student Action

On Monday, May 15, 1967, theater students participated in a sit-in in the Doerrmann Theater’s green room to prevent workers from installing computer equipment for the registrar’s office in a small room next to the theater (“Lack of Communication,” 1967, May 12). This small room was used for make-up and other theater functions during productions at the theater. By 1:00 p.m., the protest grew into the hall in front of President Carlson’s office. The original complaint in this protest was that the administration did not inform the theater department of the move. The students claimed this as an example of a chronic lack of communication between students and the administration (“Lack of Communication,” 1967, May 12).

The initial complaint grew into a list of grievances that students had against university policy. The list charged the university with telling the students one thing and doing something else, as well as questioning university policy over student money, expansion, student housing, and community relations. They charged that the university had failed to define police powers and that the student government was a creation of the
administration to suppress student activism (“Lack of Communication,” 1967, May 12). By Wednesday, Bob Grant, Dorian Paster, and Bill Leckie engaged in a debate with students using a megaphone which attracted passersby. Some of those counter protestors stated that “this campus is a professionally oriented school in which students merely want to learn a trade so they can make money” (“Lack of communication,” 1967, May 5). Bill Leckie, member of SDS and a leader of the sit-in, responded by saying they would like to change this stigma, as there are some benefits of a liberal arts education (“Lack of Communication,” 1967, May 12).

President Carlson responded to the protests by addressing the students’ complaints. Carlson invited them to a meeting with Dean of Student Services Dr. Lancelot Thompson to discuss the situation. A spokesman for the group, Robert Grant, outlined three demands:

- More student representation on administrative committees, and student selection of staffs of the four student publications
- A financial statement on handling of student activity fees. (Dr. Carlson said that this information was available to students)
- “Coherent definition” of powers of campus police (“Some Solutions,” 1967, May 18)

Dr. Thompson agreed that lack of communication was a major contributor to the problem. The Faculty Senate also came to this conclusion. Both Dr. Thompson and the faculty senate offered a weekly update newsletter put out by the administration in order to inform students and faculty of administrative actions taken that would impact them (“Faculty Senate Talks,” 1967, May 19). Dr. Thompson also stated that a university
committee was searching for a new space for an actor’s dressing room in order to find a new space due to the registrar’s computer equipment in the green room (“Some Solutions,” 1967, May 18).

On October 12, 1967, the Peace Torch Marathon stopped on campus (“Peace Torch,” 1967, October 13). The journey of taking a lit torch across the country was a symbol of protest against the Vietnam War. The peace torch group was part of a morning rally sponsored by the Toledo Committee for Reasonable Settlement in Vietnam, in which it was urged that people protest the war. Some students counter-protested the rally by interrupting the program and setting fire to a pile of programs. A man named Stuart Raaka, part of the peace torch group, was slammed against a wall by a Toledo student in the student union after the student asked Raaka his views on the Vietnam War (“Peace Torch,” 1967, October 13). The glass shattered and afterwards a group of students ran to the steps of the student union and engaged in debates with the marchers.

As this incident and the Student Activities Committee confiscation of SDS literature shows, student views on national issues such as Vietnam and student protest were far from one-sided. In the fall of 1967, the Students and Faculty Opposed to the War in Vietnam, a group of faculty and students, contacted about one half of the faculty and one fourth of the student body in order to sign a petition that would stop the war in Vietnam and negotiate peace. Ninety-eight faculty members and 244 students signed the petition which appeared as a full page ad in The Collegian (“Stop the War,” 1968, February 2). The group was “loosely associated” and came into prominence again on February 9, 1968, after a protest of Marine recruiters in the Student Union (“Group of Students,” 1968, February 9). There were no more than 10 students picketing during this
protest, and they participated in peaceful debates with other students. At the time, there was still no widespread support for protest and student attitudes towards the war in Vietnam were divided on UT’s campus.

The “loosely associated” group of students and faculty named their new group the Student-Faculty Peace Committee (“TU peace,” 1968, February 23). This committee claimed that education through guest speakers and film series and not protests and marches will be the main activity of the group. By February 23, 1968 the Committee had 30 members. Dan Smith, spokesman for the group stated that “UT’s ‘conservative campus’ reflects the ‘close blend of apathy, pessimism and a feeling of ineffectiveness that permeates the whole country’ concerning Vietnam” (“TU peace,” 1968, February 23). Whether the majority of students at Toledo were conservative or liberal cannot be proven either way. However, incidents such as the ones reviewed, point to the fact that there were many conservative students that supported the war and a few liberal students who disagreed with the U.S. involvement in the War. Dan Smith pointed out that “each individual student has a lack of faith in his ability to do anything about our country’s present policies…many are on the borderline between a pro-war and a pro-peace commitment. Even the present members [Student-Faculty Peace Committee] comprise a wide strata of opinion” (“TU Peace,” 1967, February 23).

As the politicization of the student body became more apparent, the Student Body Government began to delve into national politics as part of the student elections on April 3 and 4, 1968 (“TU Students To Vote,” 1968, March 26). There was a referendum put on the ballot: “I approve of the current governmental policy to defend our allies in Southeast Asia” (“TU Students To Vote,” 1968, March 26). The best glimpse of student
political attitudes on TU’s campus at the time is reflected in the results. 929 students voted against American policy while 898 approved of America’s policy (“Perris Defeats,” 1968, April 5). So we can see then that the political attitudes of the students on UT’s campus in the spring of 1968 were divided when it came to the War and, as noted above, divided when it came to student protest. But as students on the Nation’s other campuses began to utilize protest as a means for change, UT students would do the same.

3.3 Growing Use of Protest

In March 1968, more than 50 students fell ill with sickness (“TU Students Dump Meals,” 1968, April 3). Some of the students thought that it could be food poisoning and later met with university officials to discuss the improvement of food. This group met with Ogden foods, the company that operated and supplied dining halls on UT’s campus. After the meeting, about 200 students voted in favor of a protest action. The students felt that Ogden Foods had “barely met minimum contract standards [and] the dormitory food was worse than ever” (“Food Protest,” 1968, April 5). The next day the Carter Hall cafeteria erupted in a food fight.

On April 2, 1968, male students in the Carter hall dining area staged a food riot to protest the administration’s handling of food service in the dining halls on campus. Local television camera men were videotaping and egging on students to throw more food (“Food Protest,” 1968, April 3). Charlie Gallo, leading the protest, made sure that students did not break any dishes and only threw the food. As the food was flying in Carter Hall, other students from campus joined in and the protest spread to the Dowd-
White-Nash complex. At this point the campus police came with riot equipment and nightsticks. Seven police officers came in to break up the riot but this only infuriated the students with the police “receiving quite a bit of verbal abuse” (“Food Protest,” 1968, April 3). The Director of Student Activities, Daniel C. Seeman, then asked the police to leave because they were causing more harm than good. The police did as he asked but waited outside of campus with Toledo Police and Ohio Highway Patrolmen, who felt that it was not necessary to further interfere with the demonstrations (“Students Sit in,” 1968, April 3).

The students then ran to the intersection of Bancroft and Campus Road and sat down in the middle of the intersection (“Food Protest,” 1968, April 3). Eventually the students left Bancroft after motorists drove them off. Some of the students continued to sit on Campus Road until UT’s Administrative Vice President, Dr. Jesse Long, came to address the group. Dr. Long congratulated them on their “spirited but otherwise peaceful” assembly and invited them to meet with university officials later that afternoon (“Peace Effort,” 1968, April 3). Soon after this, Dr. Long collapsed and was taken to Toledo hospital. The protest ended after this point with a meeting planned with the students and President Carlson.

Dr. Carlson met with student leaders the next day to discuss the food issue and other issues involving inadequate dorm maintenance and the need for self-government by dorm residents (“Food, Repairs,” 1968, April 5). Carlson offered to change the dining system to a ticket system in which student meal plans would roll over monies not spent if they skipped a meal. President Carlson removed the Food Operation Supervisor, John Stewart, and his wife, the cafeteria manager at MacKinnon hall (“Food, Repairs,” 1968,
April 5). In addition, the general supervisor of all campus dining areas resigned. Carlson invited Dr. Byron E. Emery, a food engineer, to study and make recommendations for improving food service at UT (“Food, Repairs,” 1968, April 5).

By the time the protestors had spread across campus, there were nearly 800 male and female students. The police were prepared to break up the riot and the situation could have quickly spun out of control had the police not taken the advice of Dan Seeman to back down. The Toledo police and Ohio State Highway Patrol had the foresight not to interfere (“Peace Effort,” 1968, April 3). Had they interfered, there could have been a repeat of similar scenarios that played out at Columbia or Berkeley. If that had happened, the protestors would have surely gained a much larger base of support which would have led to more massive and intense protest. In this respect, the administration was successful in preventing a peaceful demonstration from spiraling out of control.

The death of Martin Luther King, Jr. on April 4, 1968 ignited large riots in Washington D.C. and in other places around the country. On many college campuses memorial marches and services were held in his honor. At UT, several students and John Stoeper, a UT law professor, organized a 1.5 mile march involving 250 people, many of whom were UT students and faculty (“250 at TU,” 1968, April 7). Everyone in the march was silent and peaceful. Dr. Carlson sent a memorandum asking faculty and students to “work together in maintaining as nearly normal operation of the university as possible” (Carlson, 1968, April 8). Dr. Carlson met with Elizabeth Clarke, president of the Student Senate, and Ivar Szper, vice president-elect of the Student Body Government, to determine the best course of action for university operations in light of the death of King. The memorandum asked faculty not to have tests during the following week.
Carlson added: “May I suggest that there is responsible leadership among these young people, and that we should be grateful for their concern for the welfare of their fellow students and for the institution as a whole” (Carlson, 1968, April 8). At this point, President Carlson and his administration had diffused two protests by formally addressing the reasons for the protest and making changes. For this Carlson received respect from some and disparaging remarks from others.

Not everyone in the surrounding area liked Dr. Carlson’s approach to dealing with these protests. William P. DeHan, Vice President of Sales Engineering at American Warming and Ventilating Inc. of Toledo wrote to Carlson (concerning the food riot) stating: “It is, I feel a shame that you were subjected to a meeting of this nature as I feel that your job is to oversee a fine institution of learning—not a playschool” (DeHan, 1968, April 8). In the coming years Carlson would receive hundreds of letters criticizing students on campus and even criticizing his actions with regard to those students. But Carlson held his own view of students. He wrote in his June 5, 1968 commencement address: “If one looks at youth without allowing himself to become distracted by what happens on the fringe, he will find heartening evidence of stability, or morality and of seriousness of purpose among the great majority” (Carlson, 1968, June 5). In the future, this outlook would be tested time and again.

3.4 The Rise of SDS

The Students for a Democratic Society at Toledo staged an “abolish ROTC” rally on April 21, 1969 (“Tempers Flare,” 1969, April 22). SDS had circulated fliers around
campus that charged the ROTC with “imperialistic aggression against popular movements at home and abroad” (“Tempers Flare,” 1969, April 22). This flier and the demonstration infuriated a number of Toledo students. About 100 counter-protesting students gathered at a rally, “heavily outnumbering the SDS members present” (“Tempers Flare,” 1969, April 22). Shouting arguments erupted between ROTC and SDS members with a good number of students singing “Home on the Range” to drown out the SDS protestors (“SDS in Rally,” 1969, April 22). At one point, Dean of Students, Dr. Lancelot Thompson, arrived on the scene and took Charlie Tobasko, regional SDS organizer, from the crowd after someone attempted to assault him by grabbing his collar.

This event caused widespread reaction from the campus and the neighboring community. By April 23, a petition to abolish SDS on the UT campus was circulating. The petition called for punishment of “riotous tactics or forceful methods” that might be used on campus (as cited in “Ouster of SDS,” 1969, April 24). Public outrage was also evident. Local businesses such as the Walker Furniture Company, in a letter to President Carlson, wrote of the SDS Anti-ROTC fliers: “To think that such pure unadulterated filth, such unthinking stupidity, such blind thinking and such hate can exist at a modern university is beyond thought. These are the works of some very sick minds” (Walker, 1969, April 23). WTOL Toledo 11, a local broadcasting corporation, mentioned in a May 2, 1969 letter to President Carlson that they recorded a denunciation of SDS in “forceful” terms from a very “articulate” young man:

This news story just aired as we covered it, and the response from our viewers has been overwhelming. ‘Bravo!’ they say. ‘At least some young man has stood up for America.’ Our letters and phone calls have been so numerous that I thought this reaction might be of interest to you. (Hardwick, 1969, May 2).
With all of this public outrage toward SDS, there were few supporters. However, the Student Body Government President Terry Perris asked the student body to analyze the present situation. He said that the news media have “played up the actions “of a small minority of students and added that “if you disagree with the position of SDS, the answer is not to eliminate them from campus. As long as they stay within their rights and do not in any way become violent in their actions, they retain the right to dissent, the same right as any other group or individual at the University of Toledo” (Perris, 1969, April 24).

President Carlson had more in common with Terry Perris than with the public, who wrote to Carlson, in his attitude toward SDS. In response to the Walker Furniture Company letter, Carlson said “there are many points of view as to the proper way to deal with such matters so that the situation can be controlled rather than inflamed” (Carlson, 1969, April 29). In a response to the WTOL 11 letter, President Carlson stated:

I would like to throw them off the campus bodily but am afraid this is exactly what some of the SDS’rs are looking for, thus initiation confrontations that could spread throughout the institution. Moreover, we have no legal right to exclude anyone from the campus so long as he does nothing unlawful. Despite what might be our own wishes now and then, we have no choice but to be firm and prudent. (Carlson, 1969, May 6)

President Carlson was not quick to ban some groups on campus. He saw that action as playing into the hands of the protestors.

3.5 Police Take Action

By May 1969, the university administration was using different tactics in response to protests. In a SDS rally on May 7, three students and one non-student were arrested by Toledo police for using a microphone, charged with disturbing the peace (“4 arrested,”
1969, May 9). The rally was the same day as the ROTC awards ceremony and campus security was on alert. Five speakers began to address the crowd of 400 when they began using a microphone. The students had been warned by Dr. Lancelot Thompson (Dean of Students) that it was a university violation but began using it when a nearby band began rehearsing (“4 arrested,” 1969, May 9). The use of a microphone was prohibited by university rules because it was disruptive to classes that might be in session. Director of campus security Charles Lovejoy, Campus Police Chief Leo Surprise, and several officers went through the second floor of the building where the speakers were speaking. The speakers barricaded the door but the officers broke through to arrest the four men while speakers and onlookers shouted “Gestapo tactics start now” and “here come the pigs” (“4 arrested,” 1969, May 9).

After the arrests were made, the crowd broke up into smaller groups, where heated arguments ensued. A spokesman for the SDS said that the police actions were oppressive and that SDS was being denied freedom of speech. Interestingly enough, Charles Lovejoy reported that there were undercover Toledo Policemen in the crowd (“4 arrested,” 1969, May 9). A second rally occurred the next day after a mass meeting in the Student Union discussed the previous day’s arrests. This rally occurred without any university or police intervention. The students again used a microphone but nothing was done to stop them. The crowd grew to over 500 people after faculty and students began urging fellow students to exercise their right to free speech. The rally was organized by a new group called “concerned faculty and students” and the Black Student Union. The Collegian described the rally as “calmer than yesterday” as all students, even those who
disagreed with the rally’s organizers, were allowed to speak (“Week’s Second,” 1969, May 9).

Many students at the rally charged the university with inconsistency in enforcing university rules, citing how a local band was allowed to use an amplifier the previous night, forcing a professor to move his class. Another student argued that “the four persons were arrested only because they were attacking the ‘university and the power structure’” (“Week’s Second,” 1969, May 9). Indeed these students may have had a point. The clause in the student rules and regulations prohibiting the use of microphones and sound equipment was as follows: “The employment of speakers, megaphones, singing-shouting and other noisemaking, including the use of band instruments, may not be used except for properly approved requests” (as cited in “Student Group,” 1969, May 9). Clearly, the band practicing on Wednesday was in violation without arrests.

This fact prompted several students to organize a petition to request that the charges against the students be dropped (“Student Group,” 1969, May 9). Dr. Thompson attempted to show that there were differences between the Wednesday and Thursday rallies. He claimed that he was “under pressure” from other administrators to call in the police during the second rally but did not in the “interests of the safety of the university and its students” (“Student Group,” 1969, May 9). To some students it seemed that the university acted “before it considered all of the consequences” (as cited in “Student Group,” 1969, May 9). But according to a statement put out by concerned faculty, Dr. Thompson and President Carlson both told 11 faculty members that they were not consulted and had no part in deciding to make arrests (“University Discipline,” 1969, May 23). Whatever the actual events were surrounding the arrests on May 7, there was a
problem with communication. After this day, an emboldened SDS grew more vociferous in its actions and attracted a larger following. After the arrests, the issues that were being protested changed and attracted more protestors. The protest went from 300-400 listeners and curiosity seekers on Wednesday to over 500 the next day. No longer was it about trying to abolish ROTC or even supporting SDS. It was now about free speech, student rights, and the role of the university administration. The SDS, once a very small, unpopular organization, grew its base and became louder, as did its opponents.

While some students began questioning university policy, it was clear that the surrounding community wished that far more punitive measures were put into place. Several anti-SDS op-eds appeared in The Blade (“Stand Against SDS,” 1969, May 10; “Recognition of SDS,” 1969, May 9). City councilman Gene Cook wrote to President Carlson about implementing the recently passed Toledo’s Safe Schools Ordinance (Cook, 1969, May 8). This law was passed by Toledo City Council as an emergency measure for the “immediate preservation of the public safety and welfare” (Cook, 1969, May 8). This law, which was passed by a unanimous 9 to 0 vote, called for a $1,000 fine and up to a one-year jail term for anyone found guilty disturbing or interfering with any activity conducted in a school, college, or university while on school property. In addition, the law called for a $300 dollar fine and a 30-day jail term for cursing at professors, teachers, or other school staff. President Carlson was not excited about this Ordinance, as he replied to Cook:

As you are aware, it is not an easy problem in that activists always seek means to provoke the university into something that will gain sympathy to the radical cause. Too hard a line can gain them the support they seek, and of course this support is the last thing we want to see coming from other students […] we’ll do the best we can. (Carlson, 1969, May 13)
Indeed, Carlson had a history of communicating and working directly with students as incidences arose (i.e. Doerrmann Theater sit-in, Carter Hall food riot, etc.). He saw that taking too hard of a stand against SDS or other protestors would play into their hands (Carlson, 1969, May 13).

3.6 SDS Becomes Bolder

In light of the recent growth in support for SDS, 100 members and students marched from a rally to Carlson’s office to present him with four demands (“TU Head,” 1969, May 15). Dr. Carlson refused to address the whole group but gave audience to groups of five students each in his office while the rest of the students listened to tape recordings of the discussions later in Doerrmann theater. Also attending were Dr. Thompson, Terry Perris, Ivar Szper, Vice President of SBG, and Executive Vice President Dr. Jesse Long. The SDS members demanded the following: 1. Abolish ROTC on Campus, 2. End military recruiting on campus, 3. Provide open and free admissions with student control of the curriculum, 4. Give amnesty to the three students and one non-student who were arrested during the May 7 rally (“TU President,” 1969, May 15).

In the previous incidents that have happened at UT such as the Doerrmann theater sit-in and the Carter Hall Food riot, President Carlson worked with students and essentially “gave in” to their requests by quickly taking action. This was not the case with the SDS demands. Carlson explained that he saw “no correlation” between support for the war and allowing ROTC on campus (“TU Head,” 1969, May 15). He said that military recruiters are allowed on campus and are relevant “in the same way recruiting by any business is relevant” (“TU Head,” 1969, May 15). He pointed out that “all
professions are allowed to recruit.” With regards to open enrollment, he said “I have long been an advocate of free education. You’re talking to the wrong person” (“TU Head,” 1969, May 15). He suggested that more pressure be placed on the Ohio legislature to make that happen. President Carlson also mentioned that the rally where the arrests were made were disruptive while subsequent rallies were not. One student asked him why no arrests were made at later rallies even though they broke the same rules. Carlson addressed the issue by saying the matter was in the hands of the courts and that the administration no longer had any control over the situation. Carlson left campus after the meetings under armed guard (“TU Head,” 1969, May 15).

After President Carlson denied the demands placed by SDS, literally hundreds of letters from local individuals, politicians, radio stations, local colleges, and other businesses poured in for support of President’s Carlson’s stand against the SDS. Most of these letters discussed how tired they were with SDS both locally and on the national scene. There were several appraisals of the “law and order” policy adopted by Carlson. A letter from local radio station puts the consensus view as follows:

…WSPD received many calls in letters of support. We’re not surprised. The average citizen has had it up to here with so-called students who want unlimited freedom for themselves but who, for example, think nothing of trying to take away freedom of a young man to voluntarily sign up for reserve officer training […] and yet there are those who will defend this insidious, calculated nonsense […] persons without brains or the courage to label coercion and anarchy for what they are […] the man who drew the line is President Carlson. (WSPD Editorial, 1969, May 20)

The American Veterans (AMVETS) Toledo Post 52 passed a resolution and sent it to Carlson stating:

Now therefore be it resolved that the Ohio Dept of AMVETS, meeting in convention, condemn the SDS as a militant, disruptive society no longer entitled to recognition on our college campuses, and recommend punitive action be taken
by our courts against the campus organizers, SDS officers, and those who with full knowledge of the aims of the SDS provide financial backing. (Seagrave, 1969, May 20)

Many letters were sent in applauding President Carlson’s stand, with no letters attacking him. Carlson would always respond by saying that he had to be careful not to overreact. It would seem that the local feelings about campus unrest and the SDS were completely clear and in opposition. It is interesting to note that taking harsh measures against students, including the use of police, were not used more often, as there were serious pressures put on university officials to take strong stands against disruption.

The period after the demands was followed by a more politically active atmosphere of the student body. A petition sent out by SDS opponents urging President Carlson to revoke SDS’s charter was signed by more than 200 people and was submitted to Carlson even before SDS made their demands (“TU President,” 1969, May 15). Literature was circulated around campus urging the expulsion of SDS students. One flier charged the SDS as “fascist-tactics-oriented dupes of the Communist Party of America” and blamed the destruction of society on SDS (“The Time for Action,” 1969, May). Meanwhile, SDS and supporters staged further rallies. Another student group, calling itself “Caucus” was formed to offer students an alternative to the SDS but was still focused on change (“SDS Presents,” 1969, May 16). Caucus circulated a petition calling for campus police to stop carrying guns due to a fatal shooting of a Wittenberg College student (“Caucus Petition,” 1969, May 23). The petition eventually gathered mass support and campus policemen began only carrying guns at night. There were many incidents of students using already established formal channels, such as petitions, SBG announcements, etc. but some students decided to take more direct methods for change.
On May 16, six students took over President Carlson’s office for about 15 minutes, bursting past the secretary and letting other students in through a hallway door ("15 minute invasion," 1969, May 17). President Carlson was not there but the students interrupted Executive Vice President Dr. Jesse Long who asked them to leave. Charles Lovejoy, Director of Security on campus, showed up and told remaining students outside that outside law enforcement was on its way. The rest of the students dispersed and eventually the office was cleared. No arrests were made but Lovejoy recognized the students and planned to file charges under the new Toledo “safe schools” city ordinance. It turned out that Thomas Weills, Jr. was charged under the ordinance. A rally was held on May 21 that attracted 250 students in order for Weills to publicly discuss the issue. Charlie Tobasko, regional SDS organizer, said that he did not think the charges would hold and reiterated the four demands given to president Carlson (“Dad Upstages,” 1969, May 22).

Meanwhile, the faculty engaged in more debate and chose sides on the arrest issue and SDS. The arts and sciences faculty, in a meeting on May 20, 1969, invited Dr. Lancelot Thompson to answer questions about the arrests that occurred on May 7 (Roe, 1969, May 20). The faculty wanted to clear up exactly what led to the arrests. After hearing what Dr. Thompson had to say, a resolution was drawn up that called for the withdrawal of the criminal complaints filed against the persons arrested, stating “we oppose in principle the university’s seeking external legal sanctions in dealing with matters which are chiefly internal to the university” (Roe, 1969, May 20). The resolution passed by a vote of 47 to 29. Another group of concerned faculty issued a statement condemning Director of Campus Security Charles Lovejoy and Chief of Police Leo
Surprise for their “substantial breach in power” in arresting the four students (Concerned Faculty, 1969, May 23). It would come to light that Lovejoy and Surprise were on a different page than Carlson on prosecution of students.

Lovejoy was the first witness to testify against the four students on May 23, 1969 (“Four Will Stand,” 1969, May 23). The original charges filed against the four speakers at the May 7 rally were dropped and new charges, drawn up by UT police Chief Leo Surprise, were filed under the new Toledo “safe schools” ordinance. Carlson told The Blade that he was unaware of the new charges until after they were filed (“Four Will Stand,” 1969, May 23). Carlson asked the city prosecutor to drop the charges against the four students but the trial continued. Lawyers for Larry Press, one of the students charged, filed for a new trial because the Toledo ordinance was unconstitutional and too vague (“Press Seeking,” 1969, May 29). In addition, they argued that Lovejoy and Surprise had no authority to arrest Press for violating a City ordinance that was out of their jurisdiction. It is unclear what happened after this incident but it is clear that there was a communication problem between President Carlson and the administration with campus security and campus police. The fact that the Chief of UT police filed charges without the knowledge of Carlson is evidence of this.

In June 1969, SDS and the new group Caucus teamed up and conducted a peaceful anti-war march outside of the ROTC honors day review (“150 Protest,” 1969, June 6). The two groups proclaimed it “Red Wednesday” and shouted slogans such as “Ho Ho Ho chi Minh; NLF is gonna win” and “War is good business, invest your son” (“150 Protest,” 1969, June 6). About 10 counter-protestors and others began pushing and shoving with SDS and Caucus members but these incidents were broken up and no
arrests were made. President Carlson presented the President’s Award at the ROTC ceremony when protestors began shouting “Send Carlson to Vietnam!” The protestors then went to the ROTC armory where they proceeded to disrupt a reception by arguing with ROTC members. The protest was over after the reception and no violence or property damage was experienced. Shortly after this protest, SDS ceased to exist as a national organization.

3.7 The Fall of SDS

The summer was cool as far as protests were concerned. The SDS had factionalized and split at their national convention in Chicago. This also affected the SDS at Toledo. The Worker-Student Alliance, headed by Dave Reaven, was at UT in the fall, as well as the Weathermen, headed by Bud Blanton (SDS Division, 1969, December 5). Although these groups were on campus, they would not have the impact or the exposure that the SDS had had at Toledo during the Spring of 1969. For example, in February 1970, a group of protestors picketed the Marine Recruiting table in the Student Union and argued with the recruiters (“Marines Draw,” 1970, February 6). Unlike previous incidents sponsored by the SDS, there were only five protestors. A decline in radical and argumentative measures was evident, as the focus on the Vietnam War and other issues tended toward education and the Student Faculty Peace Committee. The use of less radical tactics and education attracted a broader base of more moderate students, diluting the radicals.
The rest of 1969 was relatively peaceful as the most radical element of students lost power. The Student-Faculty Peace Committee organized a campus Moratorium to protest the Vietnam War ("Class Moratorium," 1969, September 30). President Carlson acknowledged the event by saying "out of respect for persons who have strong feelings about the Vietnam issue, and to give them an opportunity to express these in a responsible way, the policy is that both faculty members and students are free to hold and to attend classes or to participate in the observance on October 15, as conscience dictates" (Carlson, 1969, October 2). The moratorium was the result of a petition put out by the Student-Faculty Peace Committee which received majority support for the moratorium. Bill Baldwin, the chairman of the UT moratorium, pointed out in The Collegian that the moratorium was not a radical movement and that all participants in the moratorium were committed to non-violence ("Carlson Policy," 1969, October 3). Baldwin added: "Fear of the SDS is especially strong in the Midwest [...] part of the purpose of the moratorium is to 'wake up the community' to the fact that such events need not necessarily be radical" ("Carlson Policy," 1969, October 3).

The moratorium, which was part of a national moratorium, proceeded without incident. A March to Gesu church and a memorial service attracted 1,400 people ("Peaceful Protests," 1969, October 17). There were workshops taught by faculty members about Southeast Asia, the War, and society, which attracted about 150 people each at the seven workshops. 2,000 people attended a speech presented by President Carlson in which he reaffirmed his personal opposition to the Vietnam War. He stated:

But in the short run, the cruel and misconceived venture in Vietnam has done more than any other thing to undermine student beliefs in the legitimacy of our normal political processes and to convince them that violence is the order of the day. I share their horror at this war, something I have been saying for a long time,
and I consider that the deep alienation it has inflicted on young Americans—who otherwise would be well disposed toward their country—is one of uncountable costs of the Vietnam undertaking (Carlson, 1969, October 15).

From what has been evident of 1967-1969, President Carlson identified with students, attempted to understand their needs, and is against the War in Vietnam.

From the beginning of 1970 until the Kent State tragedy, most of the demonstrations on campus were not demonstrations at all; they were of an educational and conventional political nature organized by the Student-Faculty Peace Committee. The Committee designated one day a month to be “Peace Action Day,” involving canvassing, leafleting, and meetings (“Peace Group,” 1970, January 13). Peaceful demonstrations were also advocated. There is no definitive answer on how students felt about peaceful protest vs. more radical tactics. Considering some of the other incidents on other campuses at the time, some observers would charge UT students as being apathetic towards the administration and the war.

A discussion on apathy and interest of the student body on political affairs was reported in the February 13, 1970 issue of The Collegian. The editor of The Collegian, Mark Luetke, stated that students at UT “don’t have to be affected by what the TU administration does, because they can just leave the campus and go home” (as cited in “Views Differ,” 1970, February 13). He felt that students don’t care. The Collegian business manager, Joel Bernstein complained that “[students] want things handled for them.” He went on to say that “students here just aren’t as sophisticated as students from other universities” (as cited in “Views Differ,” 1970, February 13). Several honors students disagreed with these statements, noting that students here may simply have other interests. UT president Carlson said that he thinks students are far from apathetic.
Carlson saw a trend “from confrontation to problem solving” (“Views Differ,” 1970, February 13). Carlson stated: “Student militancy has been redirected. But anger is reflective of fundamental problems of pollution, exploitation, Vietnam, and racism” (as cited in “Views Differ,” 1970, February 13). Indeed, there were no radical protests on UT’s campus during the summer of 1969 and fall and winter 1970. However, after the events at Kent State on May 4, 1970, students united to protest in numbers not yet seen at UT.

3.8 University of Toledo’s Reaction to Kent State

As soon as news reached Toledo about the tragedy at Kent State, the Student Senate met and requested a moratorium and workshops as a memorial to the students that died in Kent (“University of Toledo,” 1970). Later that evening, President Carlson called a meeting with the Board of Trustees, various administration officials, and the President and Vice President of the Student Body Government (SBG) to “determine how to react to the Kent State tragedy in a constructive way that would avoid disorder on this campus“ (Carlson, 1970, May 5). SBG and other student leaders wanted to call for a full student strike after SBG President Bill Fall organized a mass meeting of 3,000 students, the largest in university history (“TU Allows,” 1970, May 5). A complete boycott of classes was supported by The Collegian, the Student Union Board, and the faculty on the Council of Arts and Sciences (“Voluntary Moratorium,” 1970, May 5; “Faculty Resolution,” 1970, May 5). President Carlson stated that UT “can’t tolerate a strike […] there is nothing to be gained by it” (“Voluntary Moratorium,” 1970, May 5). A moratorium with
optional classes was arranged and approved by the Board and President Carlson. Bill Fall supported the moratorium and told UT students to keep “cool.” Fall said: “we don’t want another Kent State here […] We want to come up with constructive solutions, not just tear down. This is what college students need. This is what all of America needs” (as cited in “TU Allows,” 1970, May 5).

On May 5, about 3,000 people attended the noon rally in which Carl T. Rowan, SBG President William Fall, university chaplain Roger Ridgway, and President Carlson spoke about the War in Vietnam and the deaths at Kent State. Dr. Carlson repeated a previous speech on Vietnam by saying:

The cruel and misconceived venture in Vietnam has done more than any other thing to undermine student beliefs in the legitimacy of our normal political processes and to convince them that violence is the order of the day. I share their horror at this war, something I have been saying for a long time, and I consider that the deep alienation it has inflicted on young Americans—who otherwise would be well disposed toward their country—is one of the uncountable costs of the Vietnam undertaking.” (Carlson, 1970, May 5)

Carlson went on to point out that the War has clouded the focus on other issues such as racism, pollution, urban decay, and inequality, reaffirming his views on the War.

On May 6, the moratorium involved a 500 person candle light vigil, planned by 300 or so students on May 5. This group had mixed feelings on which direction they wanted to take their protest during the moratorium. According to The Collegian, about 1/3 of these students supported immediate picketing of university buildings. Picketing did occur at University Hall and the Army Reserve armory throughout the moratorium. Other students maintained a 24 hour vigil at four crosses for the four dead at Kent State (“TU Students to March,” 1970, May 8). There were various rallies and discussions and
a rock concert featuring The Byrds. Out of all of the various events that occurred on campus at the time, a new group was formed.

A new group known as Students of Toledo Organizing for Peace (STOP) had a rally on May 6 in which they outlined their objectives. These objectives included removing all ammunition from campus, removing the Army Reserve unit from campus, and the removal of all troops from Indochina ("Moratorium Activity," 1970, May 8). Later that afternoon six students did present demands to President Carlson that included banning all guns from campus and removing the Army Reserve unit located on campus.

Carlson agreed to their demands and sent the ammunition, bayonets, and trucks away to a local army camp ("Carlson Approves," 1970, May 8). Carlson also placed a formal request to U.S. Representative Thomas L. Ashley to work with the Pentagon to remove the Reserve unit from campus ("TU Students to March," 1970, May 8). The department of the Army sent an official to Toledo to discuss the removal of the Reserve unit but Rep. Ashley stated that it would be difficult to remove the unit ("TU Rally Pays," 1970, May 5). On Saturday, May 9, 800 people, including many UT students, took part in a march in downtown Toledo that concluded with several speeches. Some UT students were a part of the 1,000 protestors in Washington D.C. that day ("Protestors Stage," 1970, May 12).

The moratorium at Toledo was scheduled to end on Thursday, May 7, three days after the deaths at Kent State ("TU Moratorium to End," 1970, May 6). The Faculty Senate adopted a resolution on May 5 that requested the moratorium to last for the remainder of the week and that there be more workshops and noon meetings every day during the week. The Student Senate supported this stance and asked that no tests be given until May 12 ("TU Moratorium to End," 1970, May 6). President Carlson,
however, rejected this idea stating that “the faculty have a legal and professional
obligation to students enrolled in their courses” (Carlson, 1970, May 6). On May 7, a
small group of students went through University Hall calling for a strike. Carlson sent
out a statement urging that the university be kept open (“University of Toledo,” 1970).
The administration decided to go that route after several people (including students)
complained that the purpose of the university is for education and that the moratorium
was interfering with that (see “Letters Discuss Moratorium,” 1970, May 8; “Mechanical
Engineer Petition,” 1970, May 5; Straub, 1970, May 7). Classes were held, and the
following Monday, classes were scheduled to be back to normal.

On May 20 and 21, a Student Body Government developed special referendum
was voted on to consider student input on the direction that should be taken on student
rights, the moratorium, the status of guns on campus, the ROTC presence, and the
Vietnam War (“University of Toledo Student Referendum,” 1970, May 20, 21). Out of
these numbers, we can get a good picture of the mood of the student body. 5,149
students participated in the referendum. Asked which direction the university should go,
3,255 students voted for “resumption of normal business at the University” compared to
928 for “resumption of the moratorium” and 650 for “closing of the university until June
12, 1970” (“University of Toledo Student Referendum,” 1970, May 20, 21). 2,695
students wanted to remove the Army Reserve unit, while 2,419 did not want to remove
the unit. It is very interesting to note that when asked if the ROTC program should be
removed from campus, 1,352 said “yes” while 3,769 said “no.” It would seem then that
the University of Toledo’s student body were divided with regards to the ROTC and
somewhat divided with regards to the Reserve Unit on Campus. It is evident then that
the majority of students (of the 5,149 who voted) wanted to get back to business as usual, rather than continue the moratorium.

In addition to the student referendum, the SBG passed a resolution asking for a new grading option to be adopted for the spring 1970 semester (“Agenda Item,” 1970, May 15). The SBG then requested the Faculty Senate to address the decision. The Faculty Senate passed a resolution on May 15 that created a special grading system for the spring 1970 semester, in light of the incidents occurring around the country (“Faculty Senate Resolution,” 1970, May 15). The system allowed for students to formally request a pass/no-credit option. The courses graded in this manner would not be added into G.P.A.s. President Carlson, who was at the faculty meeting, “received a standing ovation when he said that the university’s continuing goals were to keep the school open, to prevent violence, and to have no city police, state patrol, or national guardsmen on the campus” (“TU Students Permitted,” 1970, May 21). The SBG resolution, the Faculty Senate resolution, and Carlson’s speech is an example of how student opinion changed the system through formal channels.

As evidenced above, many students used traditional channels (i.e. SBG) to get their points of view across. Compromises were apparent on both sides. The Students compromised on the moratorium extension, while the administration compromised with the students on a whole list of things from removal of the Army Reserve Unit, to allowing a pass/no-credit option. But some students, feeling that their voices were not heard, attempted more direct tactics.
3.9 Black Student Union Demands

Before the incident at Jackson State, amidst all of the commotion and events on UT’s campus during the moratorium, members of the Black Student Union (BSU) met with President Carlson. The BSU made nine requests, including the hiring of more Black faculty, an increase in Black students, a Black studies program, and financing and recognition of the BSU (“BSU Presents,” 1970, May 12). A BSU spokesperson reported that Carlson has opened up “meaningful communications with Black students” (“BSU Presents,” 1970, May 12). This seemingly cordial relationship with the BSU and President Carlson changed after the deaths of two Black students at Jackson State in Mississippi.

On May 15, President Carlson attempted to communicate with BSU officials to decide on a course of action for a memorial service (“Negro Protest,” 1970, May 18). He got no reply and decided to fly the flag at half mast over the weekend. About 100 students (mostly Black students) protested by marching down Bancroft street (“Negro Protest,” 1970, May 18). Some of the students stood in the middle of the dividing line on Bancroft and Toledo police sent three patrol cars to the scene. University officials quickly ordered the police away (“100 TU Students,” 1970, May 17). Students also painted two of the Kent State memorial crosses black and continued the vigil on May 17. A few Black students came to Vice President Thompson’s home after midnight and discussed the War and the incidents at Jackson State while several rumors that a building would be blockaded the next day circulated around campus (“Negro Protest,” 1970, May 18).
At 6:00 a.m. on Monday May 18, Black students blocked the entrances to University Hall for five hours. A crowd of about 2,000 gathered when they could not get into the building to attend classes, some angry and some supportive of the BSU. Their demands, very similar to those of Black students at San Francisco State College and Cornell, were as follows: “$200,000 for a Black studies programs, manned and directed by Blacks; the hiring of a full time coordinator of Black studies; first priority placed on hiring of Black professors in each department; a Black student enrollment commensurate with the population of Blacks in the City of Toledo; a minimum of three Black graduate students in every department” (“The Declaration,” 1970, May 18). These demands arose after the BSU perceived that the UT administration did not respond to the deaths at Jackson State (“The Declaration,” 1970, May 18).

The BSU issued a statement pointing out that when Kent State occurred, the university had a three day moratorium. But when the deaths at Jackson state occurred, they “did nothing for four days” (“The Declaration,” 1970, May 18). “This indicates to us that the university administration feels only white deaths are to be mourned, while Black deaths are insignificant and go ignored. Therefore, it would appear to us that the value of Black lives in America are not to be equated with those of Whites” (“The Declaration,” 1970, May 18). The statement went on to say that UT had a history of discrimination and mistreatment of Blacks. They stated: “We expect the university officials to negotiate with us on these proposals with an attitude of sincerity, honesty, and respect for Black people, unprecedented in the annals of Black-White relations in Toledo” (“The Declaration,” 1970, May 18). President Carlson, quickly rectifying the situation, announced that there would be $219,000 allocated for the BSU demands and
that there would be a three day moratorium for the Jackson State dead (“Negro Protest,” 1970, May 18). His decision to allocate $219,000 for a Black studies program would be one of the most controversial acts of his administration.

On May 20, President Carlson presented a statement to the Board of Trustees explaining the events surrounding the BSU incident. Carlson pointed out that the assertion that steps were not taken sooner for a memorial service were simply not true. He said he flew the flag at half-mast, planned a memorial service for the following Monday, and attempted to communicate with BSU representatives, who never responded. He told the Board that the $219,000 was allocated toward the hiring of Black graduate assistants, and funding a Black studies program. The funding, he claimed, was already allocated for academic expenses before the BSU made their demands. Carlson’s position was supported by the faculty who stated that the administration was “able to bring into sharp focus the longstanding university commitment to improved educational opportunities and expanded curricular offerings for Black students in the Toledo area” (University Faculty Resolution, 1970, May 20). The faculty went on to write:

The faculty of the University of Toledo voices its strong support of President William S. Carlson and his administrative colleagues in their considerate and thoughtful conduct of the negotiations with black students on Monday, May 18. [...] We salute President Carlson for this thoughtful and forthright leadership. As members of the university faculty, we support his interest in open communications, his concern for the welfare of all university students, and above all, his concern that the University remain open ready to serve its widely varied constituency. (“University Faculty Resolution,” 1970, May 20)

During that same faculty meeting, Carlson defended his actions during the blockade by saying: “There were two choices—break it up by force or settle it peaceably as soon as possible. We chose the latter on the theory that making an issue and using force in this tense time could have long-lasting repercussions. It was agreed that temporary
inconvenience was preferable” (Carlson, 1970, May 20). Indeed, as soon as Carlson agreed to some of the requests made by the BSU, the incident was over and calm returned to campus.

However, none of this convinced the local community or the public at large that what he did was right. What Carlson had done was considered by some to be radical. He received hundreds of letters deploring his allocation of $219,000 for the black studies program. WSPD, the American Federation of Federal, State, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), and many individuals felt that Carlson had “given away” public money (“WSPD Editorial,” 1970, May 21; Roehrig, 1970). In fact, the money was already allocated in the university budget for academic expenses (“BSU Demands Interview,” 1970). Many of the letters complained that Black students were being treated at the expense of other groups. H. K. Scheller wrote: “What plans are being made for German culture, Irish studies or similar curriculums for other foreign minorities” (1970, May 20). An anonymous writer wrote: “Mr. Carlson by paying in excess of $200,000 in blackmail [underline in original], has displayed spineless authority which seems to be the trend today of so many people in similar trusted positions” (anonymous letter, 1970, May 20). Stanley A. Sterner wrote: “I am fed up with the complete lack of leadership on the part of College and University administrations. Starting with the mealy mouthed way you gave in to a couple of kids this past couple of days. It was disgusting to watch you on TV the other night alibi away your actions” (Sterner, 1970, May 20). Clearly the public wanted a more forceful approach toward protesting students.

A particular line of reasoning posited by those who did not support Carlson seemed to emerge multiple times. The belief was that if you “give in” to the demands of
a protesting group, this will then encourage other groups, which takes away credibility. It has clearly been shown that this attitude in the hands of administrators is very dangerous. President Kerr, President Kirk, and many other university presidents around the U.S. decided to ignore a problem until police forces were needed. The end result was evident at incidents at colleges around the nation. According to his own words (Carlson, 1970, May 20), President Carlson did what he believed was necessary to prevent violence.

Although the vast majority of people who sent letters to Carlson disapproved of his handling of the situation, a few people supported his actions. In reply to a letter from Pastor John E. Meyer, President Carlson stated: “My only reply to those who call me by phone to berate me is to point out that we are holding classes, no one has been injured and no property has been destroyed. I’m not sure whether this makes much impression on a closed mind” (Carlson, 1970, May 26). Mrs. Lenore J. Johnson, also in support of Carlson, wrote “I am writing to tell you how pleased and proud I am that you are making a real attempt to bring racial justice to the University of Toledo. It is long overdue and if we can’t move effectively, may be too late […] I am especially glad that it was accomplished without bloodshed or even police and guns in evidence!” (Johnson, 1970, May 21). In a few response letters, Carlson stated: “Nobody can be sure he has done exactly the right thing when trying circumstances arise. However, most of our faculty believe, as I do, that avoidance of violence, injury and property damage is an accomplishment of some significance, especially when we view what has been happening elsewhere.” In addition, AFSCME local 1935, who initially blasted the President for “giving away” $219,000 to the BSU, changed their outlook and backed Carlson’s stand, after he met with them and explained exactly where the money came from and how it was
going to be used ("Union Shifts," 1970, May 22). Whatever reactions most people had
toward Carlson’s actions, the Ohio legislature stated its priorities with sweeping
legislation, designed to prevent out-of-control protests on Ohio campuses.

3.10 Public Hearings on Campus Unrest, House Bill 1219

At the beginning of June 1970, Governor James Rhodes agreed to establish a joint
commission of the houses of the Ohio legislature to study the state of campus unrest on
Ohio’s campuses ("Rhodes Creates," 1970, June 2). The commission traveled around to
each of the Ohio universities to determine ways in which the state government can better
handle future protest situations. Students from UT submitted recommendations which
included student and faculty representation on boards of trustees, the establishment of an
advisory panel of students for the governor, the passage of regulative legislation
governing law enforcement on campus, the establishment of clear lines of jurisdiction
and authority when dealing with disruptions, and acknowledging student input on the
committee’s mission ("Rhodes Creates," 1970, June 2). Many of these student
recommendations would be noted in the committee’s Interim Report of the Legislative
Committee on Campus Unrest (1970).

The joint subcommittee conducted public hearings at the University of Toledo on
August 1, 1970. President Carlson spoke to the subcommittee:

Anyone who could have read my mail or taken some of my telephone calls this
spring would be quite aware that there is a difference of opinion about some of
the causes of campus unrest and a still greater difference as to how to deal with it.
Of one thing I am sure; no matter what we would have done or NOT done in May
there would have arisen the same degree of disagreement. Decisions had to be
made and once made, they become a commitment to a particular course of action.
One can then look at the results, but he can only guess what might have been if decisions had been different. The only certainty is the factual report that members of the subcommittee already have seen. No property was destroyed, no person was injured and no outside agency—police, highway patrol or military—had to be summoned. There was no financial expense other than a cost of approximately $50 worth of overtime for campus police. During the moratorium, classes were optional, yet classes WERE being held every day on both campuses […] (“Dr. William Carlson discusses,” 1970, August 7).

Dr. Carlson went on to say that there was a “splendid concern” of many individual students, the SBG, the faculty, administrators, and the Board of Trustees. “We didn’t agree on everything,” he said, “yet once problems were discussed and understood there was strong support forthcoming” (“Dr. William Carlson discusses,” 1970, August 7). Carlson then proceeded to praise the student press and the student referendum for “providing information and communication when it was needed badly” (“Dr. William Carlson discusses,” 1970, August 7). Carlson noted that the University of Toledo was in need of correction and improvement and that “for more than three years representatives of all the major campus segments have been working to resolve these problems” (“Dr. William Carlson discusses,” 1970, August 7). Indeed, many of the recommendations that the committee put forth were already in place at the University of Toledo (Carlson, 1970, November 2).

The results of the joint committee study were sent to Dr. Carlson on November 2, 1970, as the “Interim Report of the Select Committee to Investigate Campus Disturbances” (1970). The report offered recommendations for implementing changes into Ohio’s universities in order to prevent student protest. The areas addressed for change include revision and adoption of student codes of conduct, faculty professional codes of conduct, better administrative practices, and the reassessment of the role of campus security and outside law enforcement (“Interim Report,” 1970, October 8). In
response to the report, which was sent by majority floor leader Robert E. Levitt, Carlson pointed out that UT had already adopted many of the recommendations that have been put forth. Carlson wrote:

Our campus security forces have undergone special training and have worked with the city police, the sheriff’s department and the Highway Patrol on the matter of coordination and intelligence. We think this liaison is working well. Our security chief has briefed all our maintenance supervisors and key personnel, especially in matters of bomb threat procedure. They have been most cooperative on several occasions. Our communications equipment has been improved greatly and some security measures have been taken that have not been publicized. (Carlson, 1970, November 25)

President Carlson also pointed out that “we have made considerable use of the Campus Advisory Committee (university policy committee) in planning for disorders, and especially for coping with bomb threats. This group is most helpful because it is made up of representatives of all our campus interests: trustees, administration, faculty, students, non-academic employees, campus security staff, and alumni” (Carlson, 1970, November 25). Carlson also raised the point that every student was sent a letter and a copy of Chancellor John D. Millet’s analysis of H.B. 1219, which provided new consequences for campus disturbances (Millet, 1970, September 16).

In addition to this action, the Faculty Senate developed several methods for students to discuss topics in a constructive way through formal channels. These included the “offering of interdisciplinary seminar courses to examine in a scholarly manner the most pressing issues of the day; the scheduling of a weekly colloquium to provide a forum where the University community may discuss whatever problems students feel vocal about; and finally enhancing of opportunity for students to carry out individual projects in the community at large” (Lewis, 1970). These opportunities for students were implemented to “employ their emotional energy” to further their education, rather
than “leaving such energy to feed upon itself or to become available for radical manipulation” (Lewis, 1970). Students may not have worried much about the Interim Report, but House Bill 1219 quickly became an issue of contention at UT.

House Bill 1219, which became effective September 16, 1970, was regarded as “one of the toughest in the nation” (“Ohio Campus,” 1970, September 14). The main purpose of the legislation was to provide harsh consequences, including dismissal and suspension, to any student, employee, or faculty member that is convicted in taking part in campus disturbances (“Ohio Campus,” 1970, September 14). The law created the new crime of “disruption” for interfering with the normal operations of the university such as refusing to leave a building, violating curfew, or encouraging others to break policy (see House Bill No. 1219). Anybody convicted of “disruption” is automatically dismissed from the university and cannot attend another state sponsored university for a year. A September 14 article in The Toledo Blade pointed out: “Many legislators felt that university administrators were coddling campus lawbreakers and would continue to do so unless they were forced to take action by statutory law” (“Ohio Campus,” 1970, September 14).

A group of legislators, and others met for the first “campus colloquium” to discuss the bill. At the colloquium, Ohio senator Valequette stated that the bill is addressed at law and order but does not get to the root of the problem. She said the “concept of justice” was omitted from the bill (“Colloquy Discusses,” 1970, October 9). Assistant professor of law at UT, Tomas Willging, also pointed out that the bill “raises fundamental questions about the due process of law” (Willging, 1970, October 16). A group of students and faculty planned to file suit against H.B. 1219 on the grounds that it
was a “deterrent to free speech, that it only vaguely defines acts for which a person may be prosecuted, and that it contains defects in hearing procedures” (“TU Student-Faculty,” 1970, January 22).

It is not known how much of a role H.B. 1219 played preventing further protest on the University of Toledo campus. In September of 1970, President Carlson said that “we don’t anticipate any problems” (as cited in “Presidents of Colleges,” 1970 September 14). Carlson said that he feels that things will remain calm at UT this coming fall because “we have had and expect to have very good communications throughout the entire university community” (as cited in “Presidents of Colleges,” 1970 September 14). In spite of this, there were several incidents such as a September 13 rumor that the ROTC building would be burned by “hippies” (“TU, Army Deny,” 1970, September 13). The Toledo SDS chapter, still an organization, planned a march in Detroit to support auto-workers on November 2, 1970, and a bomb threat was called in to Scott Park Campus security officials (see “SDS to March,” 1970, October 30; Wilson, 1970, November 17). This was not the only bomb threat called into UT. Another was called in on December 9, 1970 (“Inter-office memorandum”). Bomb threats were the discussion of the University Policy Committee, and President Carlson issued a memorandum to all faculty concerning bomb threats (Carlson, 1970, November 19). Although some UT students participated in peace marches (1971 Kent Memorial-“SBG to Commemorate,” 1971, April 30; 1972 peace march in Toledo- “Peace Marchers,” 1972, May 2), no mass protests, blockades, or other large scale actions occurred on campus from this point through 1975.
Chapter 4

Institutional Structures and Policies

Affecting Student Protest at the

University of Toledo

The University of Toledo had several policies put forth by the administration and other structures present that aided in the prevention of violent student protest on campus. Before protest tactics became radical in the late 1960s, students at UT had a significant voice in university governance. The university administration was quick to establish formal channels of communication with students in order to remedy problems quickly. In addition, the administration worked with student government and the faculty for administrative transparency. Above all, UT had a president who understood the dangerous scenario of student protest and punitive response. In these ways, the University of Toledo administration was successful in maintaining the mission of the university and preventing violence.
4.1 Student Involvement and Student Rights Policies

On May 28, 1968, the University of Toledo Board of Trustees adopted the Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students that was prepared by the American Association of University Professors. At the time, UT was the only university in Ohio to do so (Carlson, 1968, December 17). A commission composed of “three Trustees, three professors, five students, three administrators, and the President” aimed at implementing this statement and clearly defining student rights on campus (Long, 1970, October 27). A part of the Joint Statement on Student Rights and Freedoms cited in the Student Government Report on Student Rights (20 August 1968) states:

As constituents of the academic community, students should be free, individually and collectively, to express their views on issues of institutional policy and on matters of general interest to the student body. The student body should have clearly defined means to participate in the formulation and application of institutional policy affecting academic and student affairs. The role of the student government and both its general and specific responsibilities should be made explicit, and the actions of the student government within the areas of this jurisdiction should be reviewed only through order and prescribed procedures.

This statement makes it clear that there needs to be greater student involvement in institutional governance. The commission spent time defining student participation and governance over a complete list of areas. Executive Vice President Dr. Jesse R. Long wrote of the student rights committee: “I believe this was the first time student representatives had ever had a chance to discuss their ideas fully, freely and face to face with Trustees on a continuing basis” (Long, 1970, October 27).

By 1969, the Student Body Government and the Rights Commission were successful in having students sit on the University’s admissions, financial aid, planning and development, library, commencement, summer sessions, discipline, traffic, food
service, and student activities committees ("Gains Scored," 1969, March). Before April 1968, only the discipline, traffic, food services, and student activities committees had student representation. Terry Perris, the president of the Student Body Government, made an agreement with the Board of Trustees that he had the right to speak on student issues and reviews the board’s agenda a week in advance. Mr. Perris mentioned that for the first time the SBG has an “influence” on the board ("Gains Scored," 1969, March).

Terry Perris, in his May 21, 1969 report on the state of the student body, assessed the gains made by students during his tenure as Student Body Government President:

> During the past year, as a result of this reasoned yet aggressive approach many tangible gains have been achieved: we have seen the student government gain a significant voice in the Board of Trustees and most recently we have seen the President and Vice president of the student body seated as non-voting members of the Board of Trustees; we have seen students seated as voting members of many of the major policy-making committees of the university; […] we have seen the student body presidents of all state schools institute monthly meetings in Columbus with Chancellor Millet to discuss Regent’s policies as they affect students; we have seen the students of this university achieve control over the $1.5 million of the student services budget; we have seen an academic grievance committee established to implement student rights in the classroom and we have seen the student body achieve a dominant voice in the making of policies governing the Student. Union (Perris, 1969, May 21)

It can be seen then that the University of Toledo students had clear roles and influence over the governance of the university. The Student Rights Commission established clear rules and rights for students. These structures of representation and rights are very important aspects of preventing violent disruption on campus. Having clearly articulated student rights, the University of Toledo left little room for critical questions on their policies that fueled protests such as the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley.

When questions were raised about the student rights policies at UT, the administration was quick to settle doubts. In December of 1968, a flier circulated on
campus claiming that the university was operating under a 1964 policy that required the names of participants, the reasons, and literature samples from student demonstrators. The flier claimed that this policy was an infringement on free speech and the right of assembly and also charged that the University of Toledo’s administration was on the “same level as the Communist Party of America” (“Liberal Protest,” 1968, December 12). However, the administration made an official statement clearing up the issue before it became a problem. Daniel C. Seeman, director of student activities made it clear that the university operated under a provision of the approved Joint Statement on Student Rights and Freedoms that stated that students “should be free to examine and to discuss all questions of interest to them, and to express opinions publicly and privately. They should always be free to support causes by orderly means which do not disrupt the regular and essential operation of the institution” (as cited in “Liberal Protest,” 1968, December 12). The person or group that circulated the flier was unknown.

The Student Rights Committee met nearly 20 times in 1968 and by 1970, a revised code of conduct came out of the committee that took into consideration House Bill 1219, and the Interim Report of the Legislative Committee on Campus Unrest (1970). The Student Senate accepted the new code of conduct unanimously. At the hearing on conduct procedures and standards, Dr. Jesse Long stated:

As for myself, I see in this document on Procedures and Standards an opportunity for us to work together. No single person can do much all by himself. But each of us is a member of a segment of the university community—students, faculty, administration. Together we have been making progress, especially since 1966, and we shall continue to do so as long as we have the desire, the good will and the faith in each other that has helped us over some rough spots in the past. (Long, 1970, October 27)
The new code of conduct devised by the Student Rights Committee was approved by the Board of Trustees on February 9, 1971 (“Student Rights Document”) and was posted in The Collegian on February 23 (“Student Conduct”).

Improving student participation in university governance is clearly essential when trying to prevent widespread and disruptive protest (Shotland, 1976, p. 131; American Association Report, 1970, p. 2; Neff, 1968). The Student Rights Committee achieved this goal and as a result, UT had a solid foundation with clear communication channels and student participation before the major national riots swept other colleges and universities around the country. In fact, in a letter from Senator Stephen M. Young in February of 1969 to President Carlson, Young recommended that universities seat one member from the senior class on the board of trustees. Young pointed out that “this recognition of the younger generation, giving them all rights and privileges of other trustees, would be a definite step forward in assuring against mounting student dissension and disruption of academic life.” In a response to this letter, Carlson replied:

We’ve met the problem here by involving students in many committees and commissions, some of which are appointed by the Chairman of the Board, and it has been our custom for quite some time to expect the president of the Student Body Government and the editor of our university newspaper to attend all meetings of the Trustees. This has been most helpful in furthering mutual understanding of each other’s problems. We continue to expand every opportunity for student participation in working out peaceful solutions of matters in which they are interested. And I might add that they are interested in practically every facet of university life. (Carlson, 1969, March 4)

President Carlson’s willingness to listen to student demands and include students in policy making are in line with recommendations submitted by the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest (1970), The American Association of State Colleges and Universities’ Report on Maintaining Campus Order and Integrity (1970), and other
literature on the topic as ways to prevent student unrest. In this way then, the University of Toledo was a step ahead in the prevention of violent student protest before the societal factors that resulted in violent protest at other schools swept the University of Toledo. Student questioning of their rights were solved quickly, keeping the students and the administration on the same level of acknowledgement. These proactive steps solved many of the issues that could have possibly turned into reasons for students to protest. In this area then, the students and administration at UT was successful at making protests unnecessary.

4.2 Administrative Leadership and Communication Networks

The university administration began working on ways to improve communication with students already in May 1966. A campus wide forum on student rights was held in order to discuss what was to be done about student rights on campus (“Students Urged,” 1966, May 13). The Student Rights Committee, a group of faculty and students, sponsored the event as part of their plan to make a new list of student rights. This kind of open dialogue about student rights issues encouraged student involvement with university governance and gave students a place to air their grievances. In addition, President Carlson was influential in striving for better communication with students.

During the Doerrmann theater sit-in, President Carlson quickly responded to the protesting students by inviting them to a meeting with the Dean of Student Services. The administration listened to the demands presented by the student group and discussed
ways to remedy the situation. Dr. Thompson also decided that it would be a prudent step to develop a weekly newsletter to inform students and faculty of administrative actions, in order to inform students of any actions taken that would affect them. Indeed, the development of an administrative newsletter was cited as a critical component of preventing rumors and increasing administrative transparency on campus (“American Association Report,” 1970, p. 2).

The administration also quickly addressed the participants in the Carter Hall food riot. Not even a half an hour after the protest began, Dr. Long went directly to the students and addressed their wishes and granted them a meeting with Dr. Carlson. Dr. Carlson listened to their demands and said “I’m pretty much in sympathy with what I think you’re seeking” (“Food, Repairs,” 1968, April 5). He then took real action to correct the situation and the students were satisfied. In this incident, the leadership at UT took quick and decisive action to diffuse the protest from growing into something far greater. Dr. Long and Dr. Carlson genuinely took the students’ point of view in mind and took the time to listen. This is a prime example of effective communication in action and of empowering students to participate in the governance of the institution.

Decisive action communicating with students was also evident after the incidents at Kent State. Carlson quickly called a meeting with the Board of Trustees, various university officials, and Student Body Government heads, and discussed appropriate action. He did not accept a complete student strike, but he did compromise with students by declaring the moratorium. Although he took action to address student protests, Carlson did not always give in to student demands. When Carlson was presented with SDS demands in May 1969, he did not accept their demands, but he did arrange question
sessions with small groups. He similarly attempted quick communication with BSU leaders after the incidents at Jackson State and participated in a meeting with them to discuss their demands. He quickly took action for Black students, ending any further disruption.

The incidents at the University of Toledo shared several features to incidents that happened elsewhere around the country during this time period. There were administrative decisions/policies/actions in which some students felt like they had no say in the matter and protested. The original complaint expanded into a list of grievances over other concerns. The complaints were similar to other student complaints at other campuses in that they revolved around student power, representation, race issues, free speech, and communication with the administration. The actions on the part of the UT administration of inviting the students to voice their complaints and respond with action diffused the situation before it got out of control. This type of communication has been shown to prevent violent student protests. Astin et al (1975), pointed out:

> willingness by administrators to establish communications with protestors seemed to be one way of avoiding violence. For instance, when the administration established a committee to study demands, the chances that violence would occur were clearly reduced. Moreover, in no instance did violence follow after the administration made some change in response to protest demands. (p. 86)

The UT administration was also working on becoming more transparent to the student body by including them in governance of nearly every aspect of the institution. This action also has been shown to aid in the prevention of violent student protests (“American Association Report,” 1970). The protest itself was largely successful in awakening the administration to the plights of the students, while the administrative action in listening was largely successful in preventing further protest.
President Carlson stuck to his own particular view of students. His ability to understand and communicate with students was an attribute that gave him the respect and support that a university president needs in times of crisis. It has been shown time and time again that he quickly met with protesting students and took positive action on their behalf. Even when his actions warranted large public outcry, such as his handling of the BSU incident in 1970 and the SDS in 1969, Carlson made sure to find ways to not “give protestors what they want” by reacting with punitive action (Carlson, 1969, May 6; Carlson, 1969, May 13; “Dr. William Carlson Discusses,” 1970, August 7). He certainly had the courage to pursue knowingly unpopular positions to prevent further protest, such as his allocation of $219,000 for the BSU demands (“Negro Protest,” 1970, May 18). Although he was quick to address student grievances, he had the courage enough to deny radical demands, such as those presented to him by the SDS in May 1969. He had the support and respect of the faculty for his handling of situations (University Faculty Resolution, 1970, May 20; Concerned Faculty, 1969, May 23). He also had the support of the Student Body Government, whom under his administration, saw the largest growth in student representation and rights in the history of the institution. He also had the support of the Board of Trustees who supported his actions in times of crisis, no matter what the public thought. President Carlson was a prime example of positive presidential leadership.

Indeed, the role of an effective president at universities in preventing violence is paramount. A story told by an administrator in the AASCU report (1970) reflects positive presidential leadership:

This administrator told of one demonstration on his campus where the president prepared a long statement in response to the demonstrators’
demands, explaining what was already being done in these areas. The president went out to read the statement to the crowd with this result: “They were tremendously surprised to see him. He got a great cheer when he arrived. They listened to that statement. He actually stayed and answered some questions. He got an enormous hand when he finished. And everybody went away except for about 80 radicals who were left there with their signs and nothing.” In this administrator’s view, this combination of the president speaking directly to the students and not just saying “nice things” but actually answering their demands and questions is the kind of visible presidential leadership that is needed during a crisis. (p. 7)

Again in the President’s Commission on Campus unrest (1970):

He must possess, in addition to more traditional attributes, the qualities of leadership necessary to steer the institution through crisis and disorder. He must have the courage to tell students clearly and honestly when he cannot meet their demands, and he must have the consideration to explain why the answer must be “No.” Having found such a man, the trustees should permit him (and his administration) to administer the university without undue interference and should support him in times of crisis. (p. 124)

Out of all of the ways universities can try to prevent disruption, there are still students who protest and administrators are largely out of control of the societal forces that cause this protest. In order to effectively handle these students, it takes a wise leader to handle crisis who truly understands the situation. President Carlson was indeed a leader such as this.

4.3 The Role of Law Enforcement

Clearly, the role of the police is a large factor in student protest. At the University of Toledo, the role of police was generally handled in a positive manner. For instance, during the Carter Hall food riot, seven police officers came with riot equipment, ready to
end the protest by force. Not surprisingly, this infuriated the protesting students even more. Daniel C. Seeman, Director of Student Activities, was at the scene of the riot and made a critical decision, asking the police to leave because they were causing more harm than good. The campus police left and met with Toledo police and state Highway Patrolmen outside who determined that it wasn’t necessary to interfere. However, there were some communication and jurisdiction issues between the administration and the UT police force. Except for the May 7, 1969 rally, the Toledo Police and the State Highway Patrol did not interfere or come onto the campus, but waited off campus during protests.

At the May 7, 1969 SDS rally, four students were arrested by Toledo Police in a large public setting. The SDS, a small group on campus, cried oppression on the part of the university. The next day a large rally took place protesting the administration’s policies concerning free speech on campus. There were questions of the legality and justice concerning the arrests made on May 7 and with the fact that there were no arrests made at this new rally. This was where a breakdown in communication and a dispute over the role of the police force on campus took place. It turned out that there in fact were undercover Toledo policemen at the May 7 rally, and that Dr. Carlson and Dr. Thompson were not informed of the arrests until after they had taken place. Clearly there was a communication problem between the administration and the police. This chasm was also evident when Director of security, Charles Lovejoy, filed charges against Larry Press using the Toledo “safe schools” ordinance without the knowledge or consent of President Carlson. At a faculty meeting, concerned faculty stated, “we condemn Lovejoy and Surprise for their substantial breach of power” (“University Discipline,” 1969, May 23). This was an area that the University of Toledo had some issues to resolve.
Interestingly enough, where there was a communication breakdown between the administration and the TU police, is when there was far more widespread protest. After the four students were arrested on May 7, 1969, there was a far more massive rally the next day, and the original issues changed and now the rally was about free speech on campus. When Lovejoy filed the charges against Press, the SDS once again had a broader platform of support (see “Dad Upstages,” 1969, May 22). The actions of Leo Surprise and Charles Lovejoy during and after campus protests were dangerous indeed. If these two had taken more leverage in using their own power to make decisions (such as arrests) that affect the whole campus, there may have been violence, and massive protest. The majority of the time the TU Police did listen to the administration, such as when Daniel C. Seeman asked the police force to leave at the Carter Hall food riot.

This area may have been the weakest link in UT’s defenses against violent protest. However, when students worked through formal channels to change the role of the police force, they were successful, such as the petition that requested to have UT policemen carry no weapons during the day while on patrol. In addition, steps were taken to correct the communication issues between the administration in the police force.

In a letter to Robert E. Levitt, State Senator, Carlson said:

Our campus security forces have undergone special training and have worked with city police, the sheriff’s department and the Highway Patrol on the matter of coordination and intelligence. We think this liaison is working well. Our security chief has briefed all our maintenance supervisors and key personnel, especially in matters of occasions. Our communications equipment has been improved greatly and some security measures have been taken that have not been publicized. (Carlson, 1970, November 5)

There was then, preparation training, guidelines, and other types of training for campus police officers at UT during the time period. This type of training and clarification of the
role of law enforcement on campus is cited as paramount to the prevention of violence on campus ("American Association Report," 1970, p. 10; "President’s Commission," 1970, p. 132; "Interim Report," 1970). Although there were divergent interests between the director of security, the Chief of police, and President Carlson, the issue did not exacerbate any further student protests into violence.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

Student protest in the United States has been a recurring theme throughout the history of American higher education since the early eighteenth century (Astin et al., 1975; Johnston, 1998; Altbach & Peterson, 1971). In the late 1950s and early 1960s, several cultural, political, and demographic forces shaped the emergence of a new kind of college student. War in Vietnam, the hippie movement, generational conflict, Communism, the Civil Rights Movement, and rapid growth and bureaucratization of American higher education, all had an influence on the generation of young people entering college (Altbach & Peterson, 1971; “President’s Commission,” 1970). Coming from a very different childhood than their parents, these students had new ideas on individual rights and the structure of society (Astin et al., 1975). These factors came to a head at the University of California at Berkeley in 1964.

The events at the University of California at Berkeley began a nationwide phenomenon of renewed student protest. After Berkeley, student protest tactics shifted from relatively peaceful rallies and sit-ins to more radical tactics, often involving disruption, property destruction, and violence (“President’s Commission,” 1970).
Violence on the part of student protestors and law enforcement officials became a national crisis, a problem that interfered with the mission of higher education ("President’s Commission," 1970; "American Association Report," 1970). Higher education institutions across the nation, especially in Ohio, were affected by student protest and in some cases significant property damage and violence ("President’s Commission," 1970).

As the incidents at Berkeley and at other institutions attest, administrative policies and decisions regarding the role of students play a large role in determining the outcome of student protest (Heirich, 1968). Understanding the proper actions to utilize in the prevention and diffusion of student protest are essential in maintaining the mission and the integrity of a higher education institution. Certain structures, such as student representation in university governance, effective communication channels between the administration and students, proper roles of law enforcement, and wise administrative leadership, within the administration can prevent the incidence and support of massive student protest that could turn violent ("President’s Commission," 1970, p. 12-13; "American Association Report," 1970; Interim Report of the Legislative Committee on Campus Unrest, 1970; Brown, Miser and Emmanuel, 1988; Miser, 1988; Neff, 1968; Shotland, 1976).

The University of Toledo did experience incidents of student protest. UT had radical political groups such as the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). There were massive rallies protesting the ROTC on campus and the Vietnam War. There were protests that took action against university policies and what the protestors viewed as repression of students by the administration. There were controversies surrounding
student rights, representation, and code of conduct, as well as rallies for free speech. The University of Toledo students experienced the same cultural, political, and generational changes that caused rallies and protests on other campuses around the country. However, the University of Toledo did not experience the shutdowns, injuries, deaths, or property damage that other campuses, including a few in Ohio, experienced ("Dr. William Carlson discusses," 1970, August 7). Sound administrative leadership, a solid foundation for student rights and representation, proper law enforcement roles, and effective communication channels all contributed to the prevention of violent unrest on the UT campus during a tumultuous period of American and Ohio history.

This examination of campus unrest in America and specifically at the University of Toledo examines the incidence of student protest and the reaction it caused. The role of proactive institutional policies in the prevention and diffusion of student protest is paramount in deescalating student protest. The administration at the University of Toledo took several very important actions and prevention measures, including greater student representation, overt student rights and conduct policies, proper administrative transparency, effective communication channels, and effective administrative leadership. The implication of this research for higher education is to inform administrators of the nature of student protest and to point out successful ways of dealing with student protest by the utilization of the University of Toledo as an example of ways protest can be prevented and diffused.

After 1970, massive student protest disappeared (Feuer, 1972). Different theories have been advanced concerning the disappearance of student protest (Altbach & Cohen,
Cary Kart, University of Toledo professor of sociology, discussed the feelings of students in 1977:

There’s no war and no draft; students are into work and making money, they’re not into changing the world. They have come to understand that it isn’t easy to change the world. They see little things being done, like health-care plans, and believe this is the best way to do things. (as cited in Pakulski, 1977)

Indeed, students at the University of Toledo were more focused on smaller changes and former channels. On March 7, 1977, Students United for Equality through Honorable and Equitable Methods (SUE THEM) was founded to investigate administrative abuses of student rights and to advocate for the removal of those administrators found guilty of abusing student rights (Pakulski, 1977, April 22). Bob Daniel, Vice President of SUE THEM, pointed out: “We intend to protest by using the judicial process of this country. We don’t intend to violate any laws, but we also intend on policing administrators so they don’t violate any laws” (as cited in Pakulski, 1977, April 22). Clearly there was a shift from more radical tactics utilized by campus activists, to a greater reliance on formal channels. Scholars have identified several reasons for the shift in student tactics for change.

Astin et. al (1975), using the Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP), noted trends in student attitudes, values, and beliefs. The CIRP covers a national sample of 300,000 entering freshman at 300 institutions in the United States (Astin et al., 1975, p. 184). Astin et al. (1975) pointed out that although massive student protest died out during the early seventies, political attitudes of entering students endorsed more liberal positions than their predecessors in the 1960s. This trend has caused a type of “depolarization” of student attitudes. “Apparently one legacy of campus unrest is that yesterday’s ‘liberal’ views have become today’s ‘mainstream’ views” (Astin et al., 1975,
The authors further mentioned that the major issues that were protested during the Sixties have largely been resolved or have died out. But they also cite several incidents of unrest that have occurred after the early Seventies (p. 195). They mention: “If our notion about the centrality of issues is correct, there is a real possibility that widespread campus unrest will reappear if a new set of issues arises” (Astin et al., 1975, p. 196). Indeed there have been incidents of student unrest at colleges and universities across the country, such as the anti Apartheid protests of the 1980s (Hirsch, 1990).

One of these “new issues” that Astin refers to today is state budget cuts for higher education. In August of 2009, the government of California drastically cut funding on education in the state (“Will Budget Cuts,” 2009, August 5). The University of California System has about 220,000 students and is “raising student fees by 9%, reducing freshman enrollment by 6% and cutting at least $300 million from the budgets of its 10 campuses” (“Will Budget Cuts,” 2009, August 5). Students and educators have responded with protests. On February 27, 2010, 200 students that participated in a series of teach-ins trashed university buildings and smashed windows along Telegraph Avenue at UC Berkeley (Hill, 2010). Police responded with batons, as students threw bottles and lit trash on fire in the streets. The students at various California colleges and universities are planning a massive day of protest on March 4. Protests again are being used as a political tool. Alessandro Tinonga, a student at Laney College who is helping to organize the March 4 events on his campus, stated that “unless there’s a growing student movement throughout the state, we’re never going to be able to pressure Sacramento” (as cited in Hill, 2010). Clearly, student unrest is an important contemporary issue. By looking at the...
history of student protest at the University of Toledo, we can see how previous
generations dealt with a perennial problem and learn from these incidents.

Although the causes and sources of student protest vary throughout history, the
same disenchantment and the feeling of helplessness in response to authority through the
government or university administration has resulted in similar displays of protest.
Looking at the successful practices of the past at the University of Toledo can help the
university administrators of the future handle protest and student grievances before they
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